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ABSTRACT
OUTLINE OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF EMOTION
February 1986
Bram Michael Fridhandler, B.A.
, University of California
M.S., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor James R. Averill
A psychoanalytic theory of emotion is presented and
elaborated. The theory is psychoanalytic more in its
applicability to psychoanalytic issues than in its being
drawn primarily from psychoanalytic sources. The most
important single source is Averill 's (non-psychoanalytic)
"social constructivist" perspective on emotion.
After a brief introductory chapter, the psychoanalytic
literature on affect is reviewed. In Chapter II, Freud's
several affect theories are traced in detail. Conclusions
are drawn that differ in significant respects from those of
previous reviev/s of Freud's affect theory. Separate
theories are isolated in Freud's views of hysteria,
obsessive-compulsive neurosis, anxiety neurosis, and in
early, middle, and late periods of his writings. Freud's
"clinical" writings are examined separately from his meta-
psycholog ical works, and several themes emerge in these
clinical writings, particularly a view of affects as
inherently justified.
Post-Freudian, particularly ego psychological, writings
viii
on affect are reviev/ed in Chapter III. The reviev/ is
organized according to six sets of issues: metapsychology
,
defense and unconscious affect, biological theories,
anxiety, ego and cognition, and object relations and
representations. Major papers in each area are critically
discussed.
In Chapter IV the theory itself is presented. Emotions
are described as schematic organizations (structured wholes,
made up of heterogeneous components, and understandable in
terms of the concept of schemas)
. These schemas are
contained in and activated by the ego, and consist of
physiological, psychological, and social responses. The
importance of addressing emotions at the level of
organizations of responses is stressed. Elaborations and
implications of the theory are presented, focusing on
causation, adapt iveness
,
irrationality, and repression. The
relationship between the present theory and psychoanalytic
theory in general is critically explored.
Chapter V consists of a discussion, from the
perspective of the present theory, of the major issues in
psychoanalytic affect theory that are reviewed in Chapter
III. In addition, the issues of anxiety and psychotherapy
are briefly discussed. Finally, in a concluding chapter,
the theory is critically assessed, and views on the
importance of the theory are presented.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For nearly fifty years, psychoanalysts have lamented
their lack of a satisfactory theory of affect. Time and
again, analysts have returned to the topic in efforts to
devise a theory that would be conceptually viable and would
meet their theoretical and practical needs, but, by their
own consensus, without real success. Freud did not leave a
theory of affect, but a series of theories, unreconciled
with one another. It was some years afte.r Freud's death
before sustained efforts were again made to construct an
adequate general theory of affect; these efforts mostly took
place among emigre analysts in the United States and their
American successors. After a series of panels and many
papers, it was still possible for a prominent analyst to
write that "every analyst who has approached the subject has
begun by emphasizing the meager and unsatisfactory state of
our theoretical knowledge" (Brenner, 1974b, p. 532).
One can isolate two kinds of approaches in the efforts
of analytic theorists to construct a psychoanalytic affect
theory. These two approaches could be called the endogamous
and the exogamous. Some theorists (e.g., Jacobson, 1971a?
Rapaport, 1953} have sought to devise a theory through ever
more elaborate extensions and coordinations of the existing
terms of psychoanalytic theory, particularly those contained
1
in Freud's metapsychology
.
This is the endogamous approach.
It is not clear how successful this approach ever was in
gaining the allegiance of psychoanalytic theorists and
practitioners. Although in some instances the efforts were
widely cited, it is hard to detect a progressive
dissemination of even these most prominent papers in
contemporary writings. In any event, the endogamous
approach has by now lost most of the influence it once had.
Freud's metapsychology simply no longer carries the
authority it did, and without this authority, theories based
on it seem hollow. Even Charles Brenner, noted for his
defense of the adequacy of Freudian views (e.g., Brenner,
1979) , in his affect theory shows little interest in past
metapsycholog ical considerations
.
A second factor in the decline of efforts to construct
an account of affect out of the existing materials of
psychoanalytic theory is simply the relative failure of such
efforts after decades of attempts. Early post-Freudian
theorists recognized that the prospects were poor for
producing an adequate affect theory from the available
concepts, and they blamed the predominant interest in
instincts for this situation (Brierley, 1937; Glover, 1939).
Their predictions have been borne out. The concepts of
instinct or drive have not provided a foundation on which a
theory of affect could successfully be built. They have led
post-Freudian theorists, as they led Freud himself, into
3exceedingly complex and often inconsistent formulations
which fail to serve the purposes of theory.
For such reasons, current theorists have turned, by and
large, to the exogamous approach to building an affect
theory. Most theorists in the past ten or twenty years who
have addressed themselves to analytic affect theory have
based their theories on concepts from other fields and modes
of thought than psychoanalysis, and have devised original
conceptions far less constrained by the Freudian explanatory
framework. The decline of metapsychology has opened the way
for a greater infusion of new thought. There is reason to
hope that these borrowings from other fields and the
original approaches based on them will enliven psycho-
analytic theory and lead to more successful solutions to the
problem of affect.
Borrowing from other fields, though, is a consequential
procedure and will not leave psychoanalysis as it was.
Incorporating solutions of psychoanalytic problems which are
based on the theories or assumptions of other disciplines
must alter the character of psychoanalytic thought,
particularly when an area as fundamental as affect is
involved. These solutions, insofar as they are accepted,
bring changes that can occur unobtrusively—silently, so to
speak—and these changes can potentially affect even the
most fundamental principles of psychoanalysis. Borrowings,
then, should involve reflection on whether the new solutions
4are in harmony with the essential features of psychoanalysis
one wishes to preserve.
In this dissertation, a new theory of affect is
proposed. The theory is intended for use in psychoanalysis.
Whether it would find acceptance and by whom cannot be
known, but the effort has been guided by an interest in
addressing psychoanalytic questions. This theory, I hope,
has features to recommend it even to those who are not
adherents of any form of psychoanalytic theory and who are
not concerned with psychoanalytic problems, it is not only
the psychoanalytically oriented who are interested in a
successful account of affect and emotion, and the present
theory will be the more valuable if it captures the interest
of a wider audience. Nevertheless, it has been devised with
the primary intent of finding application to psychoanalytic
problems.
This theory is of the exogamous variety. It does not
have its origins in Freudian metapsychology , nor is it based
on other traditional psychoanalytic metatheoretical
entities. It employs only one such traditional entity—the
ego—and not without first subjecting this concept to a
critical examination. If it may be considered a psycho-
analytic theory, then, this is not because it is built from
readily recognizable psychoanalytic materials. Its
borrowings are from two main sources. First, it draws
heavily on Averill's "social construct ivist" perspective on
emotion. The present theory has been guided at a great many
points by Averill's framing of the issues in emotion and by
the answers he has proposed, m some cases, Averill's views
are directly adopted here; in other cases, the approach
taken here parallels Averill's. The second main non-psycho-
analytic source for the present theory is cognitive
psychology, from which it borrows the concept of a schema.
This concept, I will attempt to show, can be made to do
valuable work in the effort to understand emotion, in ways
psychoanalysis can use.
Eefore this theory is presented, the psychoanalytic
literature on affect is reviewed. Of course, not all
psychoanalytic writings on affect are included. Although
the literature is not as extensive as one might imagine,
still to review all papers and books which take affect as
their primary focus would be highly demanding and beyond the
scope of this project. Therefore, the review focuses first
on Freud, whose changing conceptions are closely examined.
Freud offered so many conceptions of affect that, as is
often true in Freud, he raised a great many of the issues
that recur in later psychoanalytic efforts, and therefore a
close study of his views is well repaid. Following the
critical review of Freud, a selection of the subsequent
literature on affect is reviewed. Major papers are
discussed as they fall into enduring themes, and the
discussion aims to pick out from these papers some of the
recurring concerns and the difficulties these theorists have
encountered and often foundered upon.
Following this presentation of the most prominent and
pertinent analytic accounts of affect, I present my own. To
make the task more manageable, I begin by restricting the
domain of the theory. Mine is a theory of emotion only,
which I define. Then, drawing on Averill, I claim that
emotions need to be described as organizations of component
responses, and I argue that they are well described as
schematic organizations, borrowing the concept of a schema.
1 place these phenomena in the ego, where they are part of
the ego's adaptive repertoire; I describe the factors in the
activation of emotion, and particularly the kinds of
problems on which the ego brings emotions to bear.
In the closing section of the chapter, I address the
question of whether this theory is psychoanalytic. This is
a question that has not often been addressed. In general,
psychoanalytic affect theorists, even when borrowing their
theories from elsewhere, have been satisfied simply to
assert that their theories are analytic, and have relied on
their own status as psychoanalysts and on the publication of
their work, for the most part, in psychoanalytic journals to
substantiate the claim. This procedure holds the danger I
described above, that concepts brought in from other fields
will change psychoanalysis in ways of which no one is
clearly aware and which few would desire. Providing a forum
for a discussion of these issues would be an advance.
Moreover, my own theory is in particular need of an account
of its claim to be psychoanalytic, since it cannot rely on
institutional or historical factors.
Whether the theory is genuinely psychoanalytic can be
separated from the issue of whether it addresses, in
productive ways, the issues analytic affect theories have
struggled with. There is only a difference of degree,
perhaps, between a psychoanalytic affect theory and one
which addresses psychoanalytic issues well and which does so
while preserving the essential features of psychoanalysis.
Rigid distinctions need not be drawn, if terms for a
discussion are available. Such terms will be more available
here once all the issues have been presented, so we can
return to this issue of whether the present theory is a
psychoanalytic one in the concluding chapter.
The theory is offered as a viable and illuminating
account of emotion. More specifically, though, it is
offered as a new and more useful way of addressing issues in
the psychoanalytic theory of affect. Accordingly, a chapter
is devoted to trying the theory out, so to speak. Each of
the major issues which emerge in the course of the
literature review is addressed, at least briefly, and a few
other areas which are closely related to affect theory are
also considered. These discussions, of course, are not
meant to be fully adequate considerations of these complex
issues in terms of the present theory; that is a task for
the further research that the protocol of dissertations and
other beginnings entitles one to call for. They are ways of
demonstrating something of this theory's usefulness, and
they may in turn help clarify the nature of the theory
itself.
CHAPTER II
FREUD'S THEORIES OP AFFECT
Introduction
Freud did not have a single theory of affect. Whether
one draws distinctions as Rapaport did (Green, 1977;
Rapaport, 1953; Valenstein f 1962), or in some other way,
such as the expansion of Rapaport' s scheme employed here, it
is clear that Freud's understanding of affect underwent
fundamental changes as his theory developed, and that he
often held more than one view at the same time. The present
review is organized so as to isolate Freud's several
theories of affect. These are examined as they appear in
Freud's writings, and their connections with selected
aspects of Freud's metapsychology and his theories of
neurosis are highlighted.
When Freud discussed affect in general, he did so
almost without exception in metapsychological terms. The
literal meaning of "metapsychology" is correct here; the
terms of these discussions were above, or outside of, the
psychological. In the earlier years, this meant affect was
discussed in terms of the ambiguous psychological or
physiological, literal or metaphorical energy that Freud
came to identify with sexuality and to call libido. Later,
9
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and its mechanisms and goals. When Freud turned to
particular affects, on the other hand, he tended to discuss
them in psychological terms, free of references to energy,
structures, and mechanisms. These discussions fall into
what Klein (1973a) has called Freud's "clinical" theory.
These two sorts of theory, the clinical and metapsycho-
logical yield theories of affect that bear only a distant,
though distinct, relation to one another. Although it is
the metapsychological theory that Freud identified as his
theory of affect and that has been the exclusive focus of
the major reviews of Freud's theory of affect, both the
clinical and metapsychological theories are reviewed here.
Early Theories
Freud's metapsychological theories of affect are among
the most obscure and confusing aspects of Freud's theory,
and they are formulated in some of the most highly technical
terms. For this reason, the following review gives
extensive consideration to the earliest forms taken by
Freud's affect theory. These early forms, which preceded
the distinctively Freudian theoretical framework, betray the
roots of the later theories and reveal with particular
clarity the assumptions that persist in the later theories
but which are often obscured by the technical terms of
Freud's metapsychology
.
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Hysteria and affect theory
The concept of psychic drive energy is central to
Freudian theory. In popular conceptions, on the other hand,
the central feature of psychoanalysis is probably its
emphasis on the pervasive influence of emotions. These two
central features—energy and emotion—are united in the
origins of Freud's thought, where affect and energy are
equivalent, or rather, the roles that would later be filled
by psychic energy are filled by affect.
Psychoanalysis originated in Freud's study, with Josef
Breuer, of the etiology and treatment of hysteria. The
distinctiveness of Freud's and Breuer 's views on hysteria
did not lie in the adoption of a psychological framework.
Other physicians regarded hysteria as a psychological
phenomenon— indeed, this was their reason for dismissing
hysteria and hysterics from the proper realm of medicine
(Freud, 1910/1957)—and moreover, Freud and Breuer adopted a
mixed psychological and physical model (see Freud,
1894/1962, where Freud describes the model as "psycho-
physical"). The distinctiveness of their approach was in
the primary role they gave to affect. That is, the first
step toward psychoanalysis was the explanation of hysteria
on the basis of the vicissitudes of affect.
Freud (1910/1957) recounts the origins of
psychoanalytic theory and therapy in the first of five
lectures he delivered at Clark University in 1909. In this
12
lecture, Freud describes Breuer 's treatment of Anna 0., and
in particular the great strides made in the treatment after
Breuer and his patient discovered that her hysterical
symptoms—paralyses, disturbances of posture and vision,
nervous cough, inability to drink fluids, inability to speak
or understand her native language, and more—disappeared
when she recalled the occasion of the first appearance of a
symptom, if (and only if) the recollection was accompanied
by an energetic expression of emotion. Breuer and Freud
concluded that the symptoms were the result of the lack of
expression of aroused affect.
One was driven to assume that the illness occurred
because the affects generated in the pathogenic
situations had their normal outlet blocked, and that
the essence of the illness lay in the fact that these
"strangulated" affects were then put to an abnormal
use.... a certain portion of our mental excitation is
normally directed along the paths of somatic
innervation and produces what we know as an "expression
of the emotions". Hysterical conversion exaggerates
this portion of the discharge of an emotionally
cathected mental process; it represents a far more
intense expression of the emotions, which has entered
upon a new path. (Freud, 1910/1957, p. 18)
This passage highlights the close connection Freud
initially drew between affect and hysterical symptoms, and
demonstrates as well the physicalistic nature of this
connection, notwithstanding statements in the same lecture
that this was a "purely psychological" theory. Some
features evident in this passage recur throughout the course
of Freud's theory of affect.
Freud and Breuer (1893/1955, 1895/1955; Freud,
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1894/1962) devised a model of the mind or brain based on
their findings in hysteria, and this model is reflected in
central features of Freud's later metapsychology
. Affect,
they held, is principally aroused by experiences, that is,
by perceptions and ideas. Once aroused, the affect
constitutes an increase in the normally prevailing optimal
excitation in the nervous system, and the nervous system is
so designed as to attempt to relieve this excess excitation
in some fashion and to return to the optimal level. The
customary and ideal method of returning to optimal
excitation is through the movements, sounds, secretions
(e.g., tears), and actions that are known as "expression of
the emotions". So long as these processes can proceed
freely, no lasting difficulty is encountered; the
debilitating effects of emotion on thought and action are
only temporary. However, should any factor interfere with
this means of eliminating excess excitation, hysterical
symptoms result.
Freud and Breuer maintained that two separate factors
were responsible for interfering with this process. Of the
two, only the one favored by Freud endured in later
psychoanalytic thought—this, naturally, was the factor of
inhibition or defense. Emotional expression could become
the object of defense for a variety of reasons, including
restrictions of social propriety or other situational
constraints, but Freud considered the more common basis to
14
be the unacceptability of the underlying feelings to the
person's own moral strictures. The second factor blamed by
Freud and Breuer for blocking emotional expression was
"hypnoid states". Hypnoid states, the explanation
particularly favored by Breuer, consist of an altered state
of consciousness, similar to that induced by hypnosis, in
which normal processes of emotional expression do not take
place. When either factor is present, the normal
dissipation of excitation fails to take place, with the
result that the excitation attaches itself to the relevant
perception or idea, which then persists in the mind in an
abnormal and pathogenic fashion.
Such charged ideas differ in two ways from ideas
without an abnormal degree of energy attached to them.
First, they are more potent and persistent than ideas in a
normal state, and second, they are less accessible to the
process of conscious association. As a consequence of their
greater potency, these ideas exert a disproportionate
influence over mental life; hysterical symptoms are the
chief indication of this. As a result of their
inaccessibility to ordinary association, separate networks
of associations, dissociated from one another, are built up,
so that when one of the networks is active, only those
associations are available to consciousness. Blocked
emotional expression and "splitting of consciousness" are
therefore two aspects of the same phenomenon.
15
Hysterical symptoms represent an attempt to discharge
the energy attached to charged ideas in the split-off
association network. The attempt does not succeed, though,
because each time the emotion-arousing idea or event is re-
encountered, the split-off associations receive a fresh
charge of energy. Freud and Breuer's cathartic therapy
resolved this situation by relieving the pathogenic ideas of
their charge of affect (through abreaction) and by bringing
the split-off ideas back into the conscious network of
associations.
According to this model of the mind, there are two
paths open to emotion, once it is aroused, it can either be
literally expressed (i.e., expelled), or it can attach
itself to an idea. The latter event has two major
consequences. First, the mind is split into conscious and
unconscious portions, and second, the emotional energy
presses constantly for release, and finds this release,
albeit inadequately, in the form of neurotic symptoms. This
model contains the essential features of the final Freudian
model of mind, but with affect occupying the place later
taken by drive. In later theory, it is the energy of drives
that becomes attached to ideas ("cathexis") and that is
expressed in neurotic symptoms, and it is the kind and
quantity of drive energy attached to an idea that determines
whether the idea is permitted into consciousness.
16
Anxiety Neurosis and Affect Theory
Affect appears in another context, entirely independent
of hysteria, during this pre-psychoanalytic phase of Freud's
work, and some implications of this second context run
virtually counter to those of the first. During the same
period of time in which he was collaborating with Breuer in
the development of their theory of hysteria, Freud's
(1895/1962) attention was drawn by another clinical
syndrome. Among patients suffering from "neurasthenia"—
a
commonly diagnosed syndrome at that time, primarily
characterized by tiredness, intracranial pressure,
dyspepsia, and various other symptoms of malaise (Laplanche
& Pontalis, 1973)—Freud distinguished a sub-group whose
primary symptom was intense and chronic anxiety, including
both physical and mental aspects. In other words, in
contrast to hysteria, where the symptoms were considered by
Freud and Breuer to be abnormal physical substitutes for
emotional expression, the main symptom of "anxiety
neurosis", as Freud proposed to call this new syndrome, was
itself an emotion.
Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis merits discussion in
some detail. This is not merely because it contains the
most sustained discussion of affect of that period of
Freud's work, although that alone v/ould make it worthy of
attention. The theory's importance goes beyond its
historical role, for not only was it maintained in some form
17
as a theory of anxiety almost throughout Freud's life, but
it profoundly influenced the body of Freud's work. This
influence was at least equal to the influence of the early
theory of hysteria, and yet it has been far less widely
appreciated.
The argument Freud (1895/1962) advanced for
distinguishing anxiety neurosis from neurasthenia was two-
fold. First, Freud argued, they formed distinct clusters of
symptoms, and thus there was a prima facie basis for a
distinction. Second, the illnesses were caused by two
distinct etiologies, a conclusion Freud based on experience
with his patients. Freud adhered to the position, already
prevalent in medicine, that neurasthenia was caused by
masturbation, whereas for anxiety neurosis Freud held the
cause to be failure to discharge sexual arousal in a normal
and complete fashion.
Freud (1895/1962) reported he found anxiety neurosis in
cases where sexual arousal was present but where, for
various reasons, it repeatedly failed to end in "normal
coition under the most favorable conditions" (p. 109) . Some
circumstances cited as fitting this description were coitus
interruptus, prolonged courtship, voluntary abstinence, and,
for a woman, marriage to a man suffering from premature
ejaculation. That such circumstances have in common sexual
frustration has led some writers (e.g., Rangell, 1968) to
state that Freud held the sole decisive factor to be simple
18
absence of physical sexual discharge. Freud encouraged this
view by describing the essential condition as an
"accumulation of excitation" (p. 114).
However, a close inspection of Freud's (1895/1962)
discussion reveals that it would be incorrect to describe
the anxiety in anxiety neurosis as a simple conversion of
sexual arousal, due to its excessive accumulation. An
anxiety neurosis does not come into existence, according to
Freud's account, solely due to the absence of physical
discharge, but requires also a failure of mental mastery—
-
"the mechanism of anxiety neurosis is to be looked for in a
deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical
sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of that
excitation" (p. 108)
.
What is meant by this deflection of somatic excitation,
and what are its causes? Freud had developed a model of
sexual satisfaction (described cursorily in Freud, 1895/1962
and in detail in Freud, 1895/1966a) which required a full
involvement of sexual ideas in coitus in order for an
adequate discharge to be achieved. For this mental
involvement to be accomplished, a well-developed set of
sexual ideas had to be present in the mind and their
activation by somatic energy had to be permitted, and had to
be maintained during the sexual act. Any factor
interrupting this process was likely, in the short or long
term, to produce anxiety neurosis through the mechanism of
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insufficient mastery or binding of somatic excitation by the
mind, or more specifically, a failure of ideas to adequately
absorb energy and then discharge it as required for full
release of excitation.
Coitus interruptus, Freud held, produced anxiety
neurosis in men not through lack of physical discharge-
orgasm being readily possible—but through the mental
distraction imposed by the task. In fact, any factor making
intercourse less mentally exciting and satisfying, such as
condoms, premature ejaculation, or coitus interruptus, was
thought to act similarly to produce anxiety neurosis by
blocking the full activation of sexual ideas (Freud,
1895/1962, 1894/1966).
Sexual abstinence would be the simplest case if Freud's
theory involved simple accumulation of excitation, but the
explanation of anxiety neurosis in cases of abstinence is
actually more complicated than cases of physically adequate
but mentally unsatisfying intercourse. Abstinence in adults
leads to an accumulation of sexual energy, but this need not
lead to anxiety neurosis; it may lead merely to
intensification of "libido" (used here by Freud to mean
conscious sexual interest). However, if the energy is
"defelected into other paths, which hold out greater promise
of discharge than does the path through the psyche" (Freud,
1895/1962, pp. 109-110), anxiety neurosis develops and
sexual desire diminishes or disappears. Freud seems to hold
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that constitution primarily determines whether sexual
abstinence leads to anxiety neurosis or simply to
intensifying sexual desire (see Freud, 1894/1966); in any
event, anxiety neurosis was not regarded as an inevitable
consequence of abstinence, even prolonged abstinence.
A final pertinent case in point is "virginal anxiety",
in which newly aroused somatic excitation leads to anxiety
because sexual ideas are not yet sufficiently developed to
be capable of absorbing the energy. Here again, it is not
deprivation per se which leads to anxiety neurosis, nor
over-excitement, but "psychical inadequacy". Virginal
anxiety should subside, presumably, with increased sexual
knowledge, regardless of whether sexual activity takes
place.
Anxiety in anxiety neurosis serves as a substitute
discharge of the energy deposited in the nervous system by
the genitals. Ordinarily, this energy is discharged in
sexual intercourse with full psychological involvement,
together with physical components such as "accelerated
breathing, palpitation, sweating, congestion, and so on"
(Freud, 1895, p. 111). In anxiety neurosis, certain of
these physical components are preserved and serve as an
avenue for partial, somatic discharge; in other words, the
physical form of anxiety is determined by the natural
discharge paths of sexual excitement.
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Comparisons
We can now turn to the differing conceptions of affect
indicated by Freud's theories of hysteria and of anxiety
neurosis.
One notable difference between the theories of hysteria
and anxiety-neurosis is that energetic emotional
expression—"abreaction"— is considered to hold very great
curative powers in hysteria, but not in anxiety-neurosis,
where the expression of anxiety, no matter how energetic,
produces no change in the neurotic symptomatology. This
difference might be taken to indicate a plain contradiction
in Freud's views, but further consideration suggests that it
demonstrates instead that Freud, again, held two distinct
conceptions of affect, or perhaps subsumed two different
entities under the heading of affect. In abreaction, affect
is expressed with a full mental involvement; that is, the
emotional expression is integrated with the memory of the
event which originally provoked the affect. Thus, affect in
abreaction differs from anxiety in anxiety-neurosis by
virtue of having mental content. Years later, Freud would
again vacillate over whether affect intrinsically had mental
content.
Defense is a second area where the two different views
of affect carry divergent implications. Freud was
developing his concept of defense concurrently with these
conceptions of affect (Freud, 1894/1962, 1896/1962). He
described defense as the removal from consciousness of
unacceptable ideas; ideas were elemental entities in the
mind, derived from images or perceptions, in hysteria,
affects were considered to attach themselves, in a quite
literal way, to ideas; therefore, in the theory of hysteria,
affective energy could be defended against, m the theory
of anxiety-neurosis, however, the process of defense could
have no relevance to affect, as the anxiety was solely a
somatic entity, and defense was against mental ones. This
ambiguity, too, persists in Freud's later work, where he
alternates in his views on whether affect can be the object
of defense or be unconscious.
Although there are several areas of divergent
implication, each with connections to more than one area of
Freudian theory as it later unfolded, one difference
predominates. Affect as presented in the theory of anxiety
neurosis originates in somatic sources and remains a somatic
entity, whereas the affect of the theory of hysteria
originates in psychological sources and is both
psychological and somatic in nature. Thus, Rapaport's
(195 3) "first phase" of Freud's affect theory is not
unitary, as Rapaport views it, but instead contains two
quite discrepant views.
Under the view connected with the theory of hysteria,
affect is produced as a purely psychological reaction to
external events, and requires no internal source. This is
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the basis of Freud and Breuer's characterization of their
theory as an "ideogenic" theory of hysteria (Freud s Breuer,
1895/1955), or simply a "psychological" one (Freud r
1910/1957). Once the psychological process of affect
arousal is accomplished, the energy that has been created in
the nervous system normally makes a rapid transition from
psychic to somatic energy and is discharged in emotional
expression. However, we have seen that it may instead
remain in the mind, attached to ideas, and at the same time
be "converted" to physical energy in the form of hysterical
symptoms.
Affect in the theory of anxiety-neurosis does not make
these transitions from the mental to the physical. On the
contrary, in fact, a causal precondition of anxiety-neurosis
is precisely the failure of somatic excitation to become
mental. In other words, anxiety is a strictly somatic
phenomenon here. In more contemporary terms, anxiety in
this theory seems to be a purely physiological process; one
may speculate that its mechanism would involve primarily the
sympathetic nervous system. In any event, no ideas,
beliefs, wishes, memories, or other psychological entities
are involved, even as causal agents.
In short, Freud maintained both psychological and
physiological theories of affect during this early period.
One can find the descendants of these two views interacting
in complex and sometimes confused ways throughout Freud's
theoretical writings, and both the interaction and the
confusion continued after Freud's death. Broadly, one may
say that the views of affect derived from the theory of
hysteria formed the basis for Freud's theories of psycho-
logical conflict and defense and for other aspects of his
"clinical- theory, whereas the main terms of the theory of
anxiety neurosis soon became the foundation for the meta-
psychology
.
We have seen that Freud's theories of hysteria and
anxiety-neurosis differ sharply with regard to their
conceptions of the nature of affect, their assumptions about
the effects of abreaction, and the ways they construct the
relation of affect and defense. Yet commentators have often
overlooked these important differences. Rapaport (1953),
for example, stated that Freud's theory during that period
"equates affect with the quantity of psychic energy, which
was later conceptualized as drive-cathex is" (p. 179). This
formula applies only to affect within the theory of
hysteria, where affective energy attaches itself to ideas,
in precisely the same way drive energy was later described
as attaching itself to ideas in the process of cathexis. In
the theory of anxiety-neurosis, though, affect is not
psychic energy at all.
Rapaport (1953) referred to the theory of anxiety-
neurosis when he stated: "...the anxiety-affect was
explained as affect or libido (these terms were at this
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point still interchangeable) transformed by being repressed"
(P. 179). Rapaport is incorrect here on two points. First,
the terms affect and libido were clearly not interchangeable
at this stage of Freud's theory. Affect, we have seen, was
used in two senses, and neither corresponded with libido,
which was used to mean conscious sexual arousal. The
technical definition of libido as psychic energy only
developed later, and when it developed, it did not duplicate
either of Freud's early conceptions of affect. Rapaport's
false equation of affect and libido led him to believe
incorrectly that affect in the theories of hysteria and
anxiety-neurosis is the same entity, only transformed.
Second, repression had little place in Freud's theory of
anxiety-neurosis. He considered unacceptability of sexual
excitement only rarely to be the cause of the failure of
ideas to absorb genital energy; either distraction or
"inadequacy" of the ideas themselves relative to the
quantity of energy were the main causes, in his view.
The Discharge Theory of Affect
In 1900, Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams,
where he brought forth many of the conceptions he had
developed during the preceding years. In so doing, he laid
the foundation for his overall theory, and the book is
frequently cited as the beginning of psychoanalysis (Fine,
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1979; Jones, 1953). m The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud
offered a new theory of affect, in rudimentary form, and
this was the first theory of affect to be developed within
the broader set of terms that we recognize as Freudian
theory. The central feature of Freud's theory of affect as
presented in The Interpretation of Dreams was the view that
affect represents a discharge of psychic energy (Rapaport,
1953). This view was to remain in place for more than 25
years, and during that period provided the essence of the
classical psychoanalytic theory of affect.
Two lines of thought jointly produced Freud's 1900
concept of affect. The first was the model of mind he had
developed, of which some details had been published (Freud,
1895/1962, 1900/1953) and some had been shared in written
form only with Freud's close friend, wilhelm Fliess (Freud,
1895/1966b). The second line of thought was that concerning
the unconscious. This latter topic, of course, was
emphasized by Freud in a large proportion of his published
writings, and received extended discussion on many
occasions.
In The Interpretation of Dreams, affect in dreams is
described and classified through the use of examples, and a
limited theoretical account of some features of dream affect
is provided. A more basic discussion of the theory of
affect is provided in the final chapter of the book, where
Freud gave his metapsychology its first published
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expression; the concept of affect as discharge of psychic
energy was also stated there for the first time. The two
views of affects expressed in these two different places are
not incompatible, but have relatively little connection with
each other. This is an early instance of the divergence of
the "clinical" and "metapsychological" theories (Klein,
1973a) the two views each stand independently, not
conflicting with each other, but not supporting each other
either. Before turning to the metapsychological discharge
theory of affect let us consider the other views on affect
in The Interpretation of Dreams, which appear mainly in the
discussion of affects in dreams.
In Freud's discussion of dream affects, he advances
four assumptions, of which the first has the broadest
implications. This first assumption is that affects in
dreams are always appropriate to some aspect of the "dream
thoughts" (i.e., the thoughts that underlie the dream but
are not permitted into it due to the influence of
censorship)
. Sachs (1982) argues that Freud believed this
to be true of all affects, that is, an affect is always
appropriate to and proportional to its object or cause;
Sachs calls this Freud's "doctrine of emotions". This
theory of affect is essentially the common-sense one (i.e.,
that one feels emotions naturally in response to appropriate
situations) , with the crucial difference that in common
sense, one must be aware of the objects of one's emotions.
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This assumption of Freud's implies that an emotion is never
unrelated to cognitive content; when there seems to be no
ideational content, the emotion is based on an unconscious
idea, and if one were aware of the idea there would be
nothing anomalous about the emotion. (This assumption is
discussed further below, in the section "Inherent
justification of emotions".)
Freud advances three other assumptions in his
discussion of affects in dreams. The first is that affects
in dream thoughts often conflict with each other, with the
result that the affect in the dream is relatively mild. The
mechanism of this is not described. The second assumption
provides an additional explanation for the relative mildness
of affect in many dreams; Freud assumes that the state of
sleep reduces the intensity of affect, because he believes
that affect involves motility and motility is reduced during
sleep. This second assumption bears a close relation to the
concept of affect as discharge. The final one is an
argument that affects can be turned into their opposites in
the course of "dream work", which produces a dream out of
the dream thoughts. Again, the mechanism is not described,
and this proposition seems to conflict with the argument for
the appropriateness of dream affects to some element of the
dream thoughts.
The "discharge theory of affect", introduced in the
final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, probably best
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deserves the title of "the Freudian theory of affect-, since
it is framed in the terms of Freud's formal theory, since
Freud adhered to it through most of his career, and since
its account of affect is based on characteristic and
original Freudian hypotheses. Among Freud's statements of
the theory, there is none which summarizes it completely or
defines it in a way that can be understood independently of
context. One is required to synthesize Freud's comments
from various places and to place these within the relevant
theoretical context. The discharge theory of affect states
that affect is the release of psychic energy (derived from
instinctual drives, which have somatic sources) through
physical processes (mainly expressive or physiological ones)
which do not constitute gratifications of the drive. From a
functional point of view, the role of affect is to unburden
the "mental apparatus" of excessive tension when preferable
methods are unavailable, typically due to conflict.
A critical change was under way in Freud's theory of
anxiety during the preparation of The Interpretation of
Dreams, accompanied by concomitant changes in the concept of
psychic energy. In Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis,
anxiety was seen as the result of a deflection of sexually-
based somatic excitation from the mental sphere. By the
time Freud wrote the final chapter of The Interpretation of
Dreams, anxiety represented a transformation of mental
sexual excitement. Mental sexual excitement was transformed
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into anxiety due to the repression of sexual thoughts; in
fact, Freud described the experience of anxiety in place of
sexual excitement as "the essence of repression" (Freud,
1900, p. 604). Psychic energy now came to be identified
with sexual wishes, and the concept of libido, or mobile
energy derived from sexual drives, came into being. The old
views of anxiety as a purely physical process were
abandoned, and the theory of the production of anxiety due
to deflection of excitement was adapted by Freud, and became
the theory of anxiety due to repression.
The earlier logical framework was preserved, but the
boundary between the physical and the mental became blurred.
Libido, in particular, was ambiguous. A theory of affect as
a discharge of mental energy could only exist within the
context of an ambiguous notion of mental energy— in
particular, such energy has to be assumed capable of fluid
transformation between the mental and the physical spheres.
This fluidity had a precedent in Freud and Breuer's theory
of hysteria, where "affect" attached itself to ideas and was
subsequently released in physical expression. In The
Interpretation of Dreams these theoretical threads were
brought together and produced the discharge theory of
affect.
The statement of the discharge theory of affect in The
Interpretation of Dreams contains some, but not all, of the
elements of the theory. References to affect are scattered
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in various places in the theoretical discussion; only at one
point does Freud make a unifying statement.
[Affect] is viewed as a motor or secretory function,the key to whose innervation lies in the ideas in theUcs. (Freud, 1900, p. 582)
Here Freud asserts that affect consists of physical
processes, and specifies the types of physical processes.
The statement constitutes a discharge theory by virtue of
the fact that tension phenomena are excluded; in particular,
the concept of affect as a charge of energy attached to
ideas (as in the original theory of hysteria) is superseded.
However, such important elements of the discharge theory are
not mentioned here that the view of affect in The
Interpretation of Dreams is reasonably viewed as a precursor
to the discharge theory.
Another important element of the discharge theory made
its appearance in Freud's paper on the two "principles of
mental functioning", the pleasure and reality principles
(Freud, 1911/1958). There Freud distinguished between
affect and action as methods of discharge; of the two, only
action could represent a real gratification of the
underlying drive. Affect thus was seen as an essentially
inferior form of tension-reduction, a substitute to be
employed when action was impossible for some reason. The
most typical reason was conflict over the drive, and this
provides the relation of affect and conflict in the
discharge theory.
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The final formulation of the discharge theory appeared
in the 1915 papers on metapsychology (Freud, 1915/1957a f
1915/1957c r 1915/1957d). The relation between affect and
drive energy is made fully explicit, and the importance of
affect as a "safety-valve" is specified. A fundamental
'
distinction is drawn between ideas and affects in terms of
their status in the mind; although both are "instinct-
representatives"
,
ideas, Freud wrote, persist as actual
structures in the mind even when they are not in
consciousness, whereas affects exist only while they are
consciously felt, or in other words, while the actual
process of discharge is under way. These formulations
further consolidated the identification of affect with
discharge.
Between the papers on hysteria and obsessional neurosis
of the 1890's and the papers on metapsychology of 1915 Freud
radically changed his views on the relation of affects to
unconscious ideas. In the 1890's Freud held that a felt
affect always indicated the presence in the unconscious of
an idea for which that affect was appropriate. This was
implied by the view that unconscious ideas carried the
potential for specific affects, which was a prominent
component of Freud and Breuer's theory of hysteria. A
related assumption was that an affect, once stimulated by an
unconscious idea, emerged into consciousness as that same
affect (i.e., anger, shame, sadness, etc.), even if it was
detached from its original idea and attached to another one.
Freud considered this particularly clear in cases of
obsessional neurosis, where senseless combinations of affect
and idea appeared in the patient's conscious experience.
In 1900 (Freud, 1900/1953) Freud continued to advance
this notion in his discussion of dream affects. He made an
exception, however, in the case of anxiety, and this
exception gave an indication of further modifications to
come. Anxiety in dreams, he maintained, did not indicate
unconscious dream thoughts for which anxiety would be
appropriate. Instead, it indicated unconscious sexual
wishes which were under repression. Freud offered no
theoretical account of how sexual wishes could give rise to
anxiety, side-stepping the question by comparing the
relation of the dreamer's conscious and unconscious mind to
the relation between two people, each of whom could have
different reactions to the same event (Freud, 1900/1953).
The reasoning closely follows Freud's theory of anxiety
neurosis, except that instead of somatic sexual tension it
is unconscious sexual wishes that give rise to anxiety. The
most important factor for the present discussion is the
alteration in affect between the unconscious and conscious
realms. Not only did Freud introduce the possibility of
such a change, but he made it central to his theory.
The fulfillment of these wishes would no longer produce
an affect of pleasure, but one of pain; and it is just
this conversion of affect that constitutes the essence
of what we call "repression". (Freud, 1900/195 3, p.
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604; emphasis in original)
By 1915 (Freud, 1915d) Freud had essentially reversed
his 1890* s view of the determination of affects by
unconscious ideas.
It is possible for the development of affect to proceeddirectly from the system Dcs.; in that case the affect
always has the character of anxiety, for which all
^repressed" affects are exchanged. Often, however, theinstinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a
substitutive idea in the system Cs. The development of
affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute,
and the nature of that substitute determines the
qualitative character of the affect. (Freud,
1915/1957d, p. 179)
Here, the only affect that can emerge from the "system Ucs."
is anxiety, regardless of what affect would be appropriate
to the unconscious idea. Such anxiety would be "free-
floating" anxiety, appearing in consciousness unconnected to
any idea. When affects appear in consciousness in
connection with some "substitutive" idea, this idea
determines which affect is experienced, no matter how
different this idea is from the affect's source in the
unconscious.
The implications of this shift were far-reaching.
Affect was no longer at the center of psychic functioning, a
component of all psychic entities and operations. Affect
was also no longer thought to be determined through
subjective experience of objects, as in the common-sense
view. Instead, affect was placed at the periphery of
psychic functioning, and was thought to be determined
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quantitatively by the vicissitudes of drive energy and
qualitatively by arbitrary linkages with conscious ideas.
In short, affect had become an epiphenomenon.
Brierley (1937) and others have cited the crucial shift
that took place in Freud's focus between his earliest
theories and the later work, from affect to drive. It would
be more accurate to state that Freud gradually transformed
his earlier concept of affect into his later concept of
drive energy, with the essence of the transformation being a
loss of quality— i.e., Freud shifted from a concept of
energy with qualities (affect) to a concept of energy
without qualities (drive). In the earliest theory, the
theory of hysteria, affects of a particular kind were
attached to ideas in the unconscious. In the theory of
anxiety neurosis, affect based on energy without any
particular quality made its first appearance. In The
Interpretation of Dreams, ideas were no longer charged with
affect, but instead with the energy of sexual wishes, or
libido. Libido was protean, and could take on many forms;
anxiety, in particular, was among them. Soon other affects,
like anxiety, were derived from this energy that had no
intrinsic quality. [1]
Freud (1915/1957d) specifies that affect cannot be
unconscious. In part, this principle is a re-statement of
the shift to quality-less energy. The "system Ucs."
contains energy, but only when this energy is discharged can
it take on the qualities of felt affect. There were other
reasons for Freud to deny that affect could be unconscious.
During the period in which the metapsychological papers were
written Freud though of affect in terms of feelings, and it
would have been a contradiction to conceive of unconscious
(i.e., un-felt) feelings: "It is surely of the essence of
an emotion that we should be aware of it." (Freud,
1915/1957d, p. 177) However, Freud had in earlier years
been able to affirm a latent, unconscious state for affects.
Only with the shift from affect to quality-less energy did
the concept of unconscious affect become untenable.
These considerations—loss of quality and the
theoretical exclusion of unconscious affects—amplify the
nature of the discharge theory of affect. Affect was seen
as one of the possible "vicissitudes" of drive energy, which
appears in the presence of repression.
The quantitative factor of the instinctual
representative has three possible vicissitudes, as we
can see from a cursory survey of the observations made
by psycho-analysis: either the instinct is altogether
suppressed, so that no trace of it is found, or it
appears as an affect which is in some way or other
qualitatively coloured, or it is changed into anxiety.
(Freud, 1915/1957d, p. 153)
Without repression, there would be no affect. In the
presence of repression, sexual drive energy is compelled tc
seek some avenue other than sexual action and sexual
pleasure, and affect provides one such substitute outlet.
Relatively pleasurable affects offer an advantageous means
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of disposing of energy, since it avoids the necessity of
expending energy to suppress the instinct altogether and it
also avoid the experience of unpleasant affects,
particularly anxiety. In principle, any affect can serve
the function of discharge; the workings of the psychic
economy are not affected by the "qualitative" factor in
affect, except insofar as a distinction between pleasure and
"unpleasure" is concerned, since unpleasure sets defensive
processes in motion.
Affect Forms (Origins of Specific Affects)
The discharge theory specifies the function and general
nature of affect, but it does not explain the forms; that
is, it does not account for the origins of specific affects.
Freud provided different explanations at different times for
the origin of specific affects, and he neither integrated
these explanations nor explicitly abandoned earlier ones for
later ones.
Freud's earliest view (Freud & Breuer, 1895/1955) that
emotions were remnants of actions which had served a purpose
earlier in the history of the species was adopted from
Darwin (1872). Concurrently, in his theory of anxiety
neurosis, Freud was claiming that the elements of severe
anxiety—rapid breathing, sweating, palpitations, etc.—were
borrowed from sexual intercourse. Thus, Freud held
simultaneously that affects were determined by physiological
discharge paths and that they were vestiges of
phylogenetically old actions.
Some time later, Freud broadened the Darwinian theory
to include any experience (not just adaptive actions) as a
possible basis for an affect, and suggested that experiences
of the individual, as well as the species, could provide the
prototype for affects; the experience of birth was the main
exampjp. In a Lamarckian premise, Freud (1916/1963) wrote
that experiences repeated for many generations become part
of genetic inheritance, and are passed on as affects, m
this same vein, Freud (1916/1963) described affects as
hysterical attacks which had become a part of each
individual's inheritance. Conversely, Freud described
hysterical attacks as n a freshly constructed individual
affect" (Freud, 1916/1963, p. 396). This analogy between
affects and hysterical symptoms had been anticipated in
Freud's earliest account of hysteria.
Eventually, Freud (1926/1959) emphasized individual
experience as the principal source of affects; specifically,
he stressed birth as the prototype of anxiety. Inherited
experiences and vestiges of adaptive actions tended to drop
out of Freud's account, and physiological discharge patterns
adopted from intercourse were nc longer mentioned. Freud
(1926/195 9) agreed with Otto Rank that birth provided the
first experience of anxiety, or rather that birth produces
the pattern of responses that later, with some
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modifications, becomes the affect of anxiety.
The Signal Theory of Anxiety
In the papers published in 1915, Freud finalized the
discharge theory of affect that had been implicit in many
aspects of his thinking to that point. Many areas of
Freud's thought were integrated in these "papers on
metapsychology"
,
and the theory of affect was one. This
culmination of a long period of development of the theory of
affect was followed neither by a period of refinement of the
theory nor by a turning away from affect as a focus of
investigation. Instead, it was followed by a period,
lasting perhaps ten years, during which Freud overturned the
theory which had taken 20 years to evolve. It was not only
in the area of affect that Freud entered on new directions
of thought; the papers on metapsychology were followed by
profound modifications in Freud's thought (Green, 1977). It
is only in the area of affect, however, that Freud can be
said to have altered his basic beliefs entirely.
The new view appears in Freud's 1926 book Inhibition,
Symptom and Anxiety. Some anticipations appear in The Ego
and the Id (Freud, 1923/1961). There Freud states that "the
ego is the actual seat of anxiety" (p. 57). This means far
more than that affects are conscious. The ego was defined
by Freud as the adaptive portion of the personality, so to
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cite it as the "seat" of anxiety was to imply that anxiety
was primarily an adaptive phenomenon. This trend, evident
by implication only in 1923 f is fully developed in
Inhibition
, Symptom and Anxiety.
A second change implied in The Ego and the Id is the
re-attribution of quality and content to the energy of
affect. In the second chapter of the work, Freud returns to
the question of whether affects or feelings can be
unconscious. He searches for a term for the energy of
feelings in a state prior to becoming a feeling, and settles
(in desperation, one supposes) on the term "something".
Clinical experience.
. .shows us that this "something"
behaves like a repressed impulse. It can exert driving
force without the ego noticing the compulsion.
. .We then
come to speak, in a condensed and not entirely correct
manner, of "unconscious feelings", keeping up an
analogy with unconscious ideas which is not altogetherjustifiable. (Freud, 1923/1961, p. 22)
Whereas in 1915 (Freud, 1915/1957d) Freud had denied
that unconscious feelings could exist, because energy only
acquired content in the course of discharge, he changes that
position here and states that the energy of potential
conscious feelings—the "something"—has direction, like an
impulse, and quality, like a feeling. He has, in effect,
reversed himself. The formulation in The Ego and the Id
contradicts the 1915 position that affect is represented in
the "deeper layers of the psyche" only as a quantity of
quality-less energy, and that all the qualities (which is to
say, almost everything that we recognize as emotion) is
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added on inconsequentially in consciousness. This reversal
is only a step toward the basic changes of 1926.
The essence of the discharge theory of affect is that
affect constitutes a discharge of psychic energy, and that
the basic nature and function of affect lies in this fact.
In Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety, Freud specifies an
entirely different nature and function for anxiety, and
gives little attention to other affects, which are thereby
left without a theoretical account. The new theory of
anxiety is known as the "signal" theory. It is not an
"economic" theory; that is, in the signal theory, psychic
energy plays no role in the explanation of anxiety. It does
not depict affect as an epiphenomenon, but instead as an
important causal entity. Finally, it does not describe the
production of anxiety as an "automatic" process, returning
instead by and large to a psychological, common-sense
understanding of what makes a person anxious.
According to the signal theory of anxiety, anxiety is
produced by the ego in "danger situations". In other words,
one becomes fearful in fearful circumstances. The "danger
situation" includes objective, external dangers. The fear
one feels when in genuine danger Freud calls "realistic
anxiety". He investigates realistic anxiety no further,
implying that this common-sense response is self-evident and
in no need of explanation.
"Neurotic anxiety" is of more importance to the theory.
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In neurotic anxiety, one is afraid of something that, if it
were actually present, would warrant fear, so the fear
itself, in Freud's analysis, does not require explanation.
Anxiety is neurotic when one is unaware of the object of
one's fear. The issue is not whether one's fear is
exaggerated or inappropriate, given what prompts it, but
rather that, being unaware of what one is afraid, one is not
in a position to judge whether the feared situation actually
exists. To take one example, in an adult man with oedipally
based neurotic inhibitions, some strivings are unconsciously
equated with forbidden oedipal wishes to supplant the
father, and therefore arouse fear of castration. This
anxiety is neurotic if, as is almost always the case, the
man is unaware that he fears castration. If and when this
fear becomes conscious, it ceases to be neurotic anxiety
(and it ceases to exist altogether, since castration is not
actually threatened)
.
There are characteristic objects of neurotic anxiety
—
characteristic danger situations—at different stages of
childhood. The main ones Freud cites are threatened loss of
love, threatened castration, and threatened "loss of the
super-ego's love" (i.e., self-disapproval). These dangers
loom unconsciously when forbidden drives are activated. In
childhood, these objects of fear may be conscious, and may
even be justified, at least within the limits of the child's
understanding. In neurotic anxiety in later life, one
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continues to have an unconscious conviction that these
dangers are present.
There are deeper determinants of danger situations.
Here, Freud is not satisfied with common sense, which would
hold that fear in the face of loss of a loved one's love or
loss of one's penis requires no explanation. A danger
situation, Freud explains, is one which appears to portend a
"traumatic situation", and this latter is a situation in
which the organism is utterly unable to master or discharge
excitation. Such excitation can be external, such as
military battle or birth, but the source of excitation is
generally internal— i.e., instinctual. A danger situation
is one in which it appears one may be deprived of the means
of disposing of excitation. (Freud acknowledges that this
formulation applies less well to the threat of loss of the
super-ego's love.)
The signal theory of anxiety is named for the function
it specifies for anxiety. The signal is of danger, and the
function of the signal is to initiate coping operations.
When the anxiety is neurotic, the coping efforts are
neurotic defenses or symptoms. The signal is necessary in
order to motivate defense; Freud described the ego as weak
in itself, but when it has the power to emit the signal of
anxiety it can employ the omnipotent pleasure principle as
an ally.
The "transformation" view of anxiety is largely
abandoned, where Freud had previously held that anxiety was
a transformation of libidinal energy that was under
repression, he now said that energy had "little importance"
in connection with anxiety. An increase in drive energy
still precedes the experience of anxiety, in the signal
theory, but the relation between the two events is
completely altered. Whereas in the discharge theory the
energy was "directly transformed", in the signal theory the
ego "recognizes" a danger that the drive impulse seems to
pose, and reacts to this with anxiety. [2] Anxiety is no
longer the result of repression; instead, repression is the
result of anxiety.
And yet, Freud at points retains the old theory side by
side with the contrasting features of the new one. He
maintains that anxiety can be produced "automatically"
through an excess of stimulation, and that precisely this
takes place in the "actual neuroses"—anxiety neurosis and
neurasthenia (Freud, 1926/1959, p. 141). He equivocates on
the question of whether the energy of repressed impulses
finds expression in anxiety, stating that this is "very
possible" (ibid) before dismissing the entire question. He
adopts a common-sense view of the objects of fear, but only
to a point, and claims that the ultimate fear and the source
of all anxiety is the situation of being unable to discharge
excitation. Freud's retention of both theories
—
"automatic", physiological anxiety and signal anxiety
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"produced" by the ego-was to lead to continuing controversy
(Blau, 1952; Brenner, 1953; Rangell, 1955; Zetzel, 1949).
Nevertheless, the change was profound. Although he
equivocated on some changes (e.g., the transformation of
libido to anxiety) and retained heterogeneous elements in
the theory, the theory of affect presented in Inhibition,
Symptom and Anxiety was sweepingly different than the one
that had preceded it. The discharge theory had been
overturned. [3]
Freud's Clinical Theories of Affect
George Klein isolated two theories, or really types of
theory, in Freud: the metapsychology , and a n clinical w
theory (Klein, 1973a, 1973b). Other writers have recognized
Klein's distinction or have drawn a similar one (Rubinstein,
1976; Schafer, 1976; Spence, 1982). In speaking of a
clinical theory, Klein referred to a set of propositions
cast in terms of personal meanings and aims, as against the
metapsychological terms of instinct, energy, and structure.
Klein's term "clinical" is misleading, since he is not
referring only to propositions that apply in psycho-
therapeutic settings. Rather, he is referring to any
propositions cast in the ordinary-language terms of meaning
and intention, with the special extension of these terms to
include "disavowed", unconscious meanings and intentions.
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Alongside Freud's specifically theoretical (i.e., meta-
psychological) propositions about emotion, he advanced other
propositions that he did not attempt to link up to the
fundamental metapsychological entities, and which therefore
are cast in terms of the clinical theory Klein described.
Some authors (e.g., Rubinstein, 1973) would deny that these
are truly theoretical statements, and Freud himself might
have given them an ambiguous status, somewhere between
explanation and description. Regardless of how one
classifies such propositions, though, they offer new and
often deeper ways of understanding emotions, highlighting
new connections and providing new interpretations. Such
propositions have been more influential within and outside
of psychoanalysis than Freud's systematic theories of
affect.
Since neither Freud nor any of his followers and
interpreters have systematized the clinical propositions on
affect, a comprehensive review would be exceedingly
difficult. Instead, I trace an important theme, then
examine some examples of Freud's treatments of specific
affects.
Inherent Justification of Emotions
There is an important theme in Freud's treatment of
affect which finds some expression in formal theoretical
statements but which is more clearly evident where Freud
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does not attempt to formulate matters in metapsychological
terms. Despite being relatively unsystematic and informal
in comparison with others of Freud's propositions, it is a
characteristically Freudian assertion, arguably one of his
most central. Sachs (1982) calls it
-Freud's doctrine of
the emotions", and although Sachs overstates Freud's loyalty
to it, it does constitute an important dimension of his
conception of affect.
The assumption in question is that emotions which seem
irrational, excessive, unrelated to the current situation,
or in any other way anomalous are in fact related to and
justified by unconscious thoughts or wishes, in other
words, "irrational" emotions are only seemingly so; they are
as rational, appropriate, and justified as any other
emotion, only the state of affairs which justifies them is
out of awareness.
This assumption appears in a rudimentary form in Freud
and Breuer's understanding of hysteria. There, hysterical
symptoms were understood as distorted affects that had been
appropriate in the situation that first generated them. The
assumption achieves its first full expression in Freud's
theory of obsessive-compulsive neurosis (1894/1962,
1896/1962). This theory holds that the shame, guilt, and
self-reproaches over trivialities that are the pathognomonic
feature of this neurosis are not irrational or unjustified.
Instead, they are prompted by wishes and fantasies which are
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fully intelligible as sources of such feelings, but which
are unconscious. (Ambivalence toward loved ones, sometimes
including death wishes, was a frequent example.) This
clinical understanding was the basis for Freud's concept of
the splitting of affects from ideas, which in turn was
central to the metapsychological concept of unbound,
displaceable libido.
Sachs (1982) writes that Freud never stated this
principle explicitly, but in fact Freud did so in his
discussion of dream affects.
In the case of a psychical complex which has come under
the influence of the censorship imposed by resistance,
the affects are the constituent which is least
influenced and which alone can give us a pointer as to
how we should fill in the missing thoughts. This is
seen even more clearly in the psychoneuroses than in
dreams. Their affects are always appropriate, at least
in their quality, though we must allow for their
intensity being increased owing to displacement of
neurotic attention. If a hysteric is surprised at
having to be so frightened of something trivial or if a
man suffering from obsessions is surprised at such
distressing self-reproaches arising out of a mere
nothing, they have both gone astray, because they
regard the ideational content—the triviality or the
mere nothing—as what is essential; and they put up an
unsuccessful fight because they take this ideational
content as the starting-point of their thought
activity. Psycho-analysis can put them upon the right
path by recognizing the affect as being, on the
contrary, justified and by seeking out the idea which
belongs to it but has been repressed and replaced by a
substitute. (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 461; emphasis in
original)
Thus, as with the affects in obsessive-compulsive neurosis,
Freud held that affects in dreams were inherently justified
by conscious or repressed ideas.
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In Freud's discharge theory of affect, he contradicted
this view. There, affect had no inherent basis in the
unconscious, and acquired its character only through
accidental connections with conscious ideas, it appears
that in a clinical context, Freud believed affects provided
a reliable guide to the contents of the unconscious, but
that simultaneously, in the context of metapsychology
, he
attributed little meaning to affect. The metapsychological
concept of quality-less energy dictated that affect had to
be inconsequential, except as far as its intensity was
concerned
.
With the shift to a signal theory of anxiety, clinical
and metapsychological affect theory came closer together.
The central proposition of Freud's signal theory of anxiety
was that anxiety reflected an "internal danger situation",
and was thus justified by an unconscious state of affairs,
if not a conscious one. This feature of the theory led
Freudian analysts to greet it as an important new insight
with far-reaching benefits (Rangell, 1968; Schur, 1953),
while some non-Freudian analysts characterized it as merely
a belated recognition of common sense (Kardiner, Karush &
Ovesey, 1959). In fact, it was neither. Rather than a new
insight or an adoption of simple common sense, it was an
extension into metapsychology of the longstanding clinical
view of affects as inherently justified.
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Clinical Views of Specific Affects
Further insight into Freud's understanding of affect
can be gained by examining some of his discussions of
specific affects. In general, one finds Freud, in the
clinical writings on affect, either extending common sense
with a piece of theory and thereby making some anomaly
comprehensible, or conversely, importing the common sense
understanding of affect into psychoanalysis in order to deal
with a clinical problem. The chief example of the former is
found in Freud's discussions of love, the essentials of
which are well known. An example of the latter is Freud's
use of the concept of guilt to help understand the "negative
therapeutic reaction". These and other examples are
discussed below.
Freud discussed love several times in connection with
instincts, using the everyday meaning of the term ("the
spirit of our language" [Freud, 1915/1957a]) to support the
successive versions of his dual instinct theory (Freud,
1915/1957a, 1923/1961). When these writings are set aside
and one turns to the clinical writings, Freud's essential
addition to the understanding of love lies in his conviction
that adult love expresses longings established in infancy
and childhood, and that in some sense, love objects in
adulthood are substitutes for the parents of early
childhood. "The finding of an object is in fact a refinding
of it" (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 222).
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Freud elaborated this theme in his discussion of
"transference love", the love of female patients for their
analysts which Freud described as inevitable (Freud,
1915/1957b). Freud advised analysts not to turn away from
this love, nor to attempt to pursue the analysis "in spite
of it". Instead, he advocated a thorough analysis of it, in
preparation for which one should point out to the patient
that the love is not genuine, but is merely a transference
onto the analyst of feelings toward infantile prototypes.
However, he is compelled to admit that such statements to
the patient are "the truth, but not the whole truth
regardless of the consequences" (1915/1957b, p. J.f 8) , That
is, there- are no firm grounds for denying that such love is
rea], since all love reproduces infantile prototypes and
depends on them.
In addition to the general consequence of the
derivation of love from infantile attachments, namely the
seeking after love objects who duplicate characteristics of
the parents, Freud saw particular consequences of the origin
of love in infancy (Freud, 1912/1957). The boy's original
attachment to his mother, which is sexual, is repudiated and
repressed at the dissolution of the oedipus complex, arr! is
replaced by a sublimated, "tender" attachment. At puberty,
there is another surge of sexual interest, which must find
another object than Mte mother. Optimally, these two
streams are united, so that sexual satisfaction with a woman
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heightens tender feelings for her (the "normal over-
estimation of the sexual object in men"). However, sexual
fixation on incestuous infantile objects disrupts this
bringing together of tenderness and sexuality, and requires
that only "degraded" women can be objects of sexual
interest, so as to avoid any conscious association with the
mother. This state of affairs exists to some extent in all
men, Freud writes. He has less to say about women in this
connection, except that he believes them to be relatively
unaffected by a need to degrade sexual objects.
Freud commented on a variety of emotions apart from
love. A 1922 paper contains a representative example. In
the paper, Freud discusses the mechanism of projection in
jealousy, paranoia, and homosexuality. He divides jealousy
into three types—normal, projected, and delusional. Of the
normal type, he writes that "there is net much to be said
from the analytic point of view" (Freud, 1922/1955
, p. 223).
He describes the components of jealous feelings (grief,
pain, enmity, and self-criticism), but indeed, these remarks
are not psychoanalytic; that is, they do not find hidden or
forbidden meanings. Still, Freud finds a place for analytic
hypotheses, as he argues that jealousy has roots in
unconscious oedipal ties and in repressed bisexuality.
These factors, he writes, establish that
although we may call it normal, this jealousy is by no
means completely rational, that it,- derived from the
actual situation, proportionate to the real
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circumstances and under the complete control of theconscious ego. (Freud, 1922/1955, p. 223)
Rationality, then, establishes the boundary of
relevance for psychoanalytic study of this emotion, insofar
as jealousy is
-derived from the actual situation", there is
not much for analysis to say about it. This position is in
sharp contrast to the metapsychological writings, where
Freud had a great deal to say about all affects, it is
evident that Freud pursued different explanatory projects in
the metapsychological and the clinical writings on affect.
In the former, he attempted to explain the nature,
mechanisms, and functions of affect in general. In the
clinical writings, he accepted common-sense views of emotion
(e.g., that emotions which are proportionate to the
circumstances require no explanation), and takes up only
where common sense leaves off.
One other instance of Freud's clinical affect theory
has already been described, but it may be mentioned again
here. This is the explanation of shame, guilt, and self-
reproach in obsessional neurosis. Here again, Freud takes
up where common sense leaves off. In common sense, one
feels ashamed when one has done something shameful. Freud
asserted that shame and related feelings in obsessional
neurosis were not essentially different, but that the
neurotic harbors shameful unconscious wishes, which in the
unconscious are not distinguished from actual deeds.
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Freud not only brought his theory to bear on the
common-sense understanding of affect, but he sometimes
employed the common-sense view of an affect to deal with a
theoretical problem. This was the case with the
-unconscious sense of guilt", which he used to help explain
the "negative therapeutic reaction" (1923/1961). Freud was
faced with the puzzling fact that a number of patients
responded with intensified symptoms and suffering whenever
their analytic treatment went particularly well. He solved
this riddle by noting that these patients were behaving as
if they were feeling guilty; like a guilty person, they
denied themselves pleasure or gain, and saw to it that they
suffered. Freud was satisfied with this account of the
problem, but he could not entirely reconcile himself to
violating the common-sense view of emotion by speaking of an
unconscious guilt (Freud, 1933/1964).
Summary
In the preceding review, we have seen the succession of
Freud's views of affect and the varied conceptions he held
even at single points in time. We have seen affect fade
from its position at the center of Freud's concerns, as
instincts in particular and metapsychology in general came
to dominate. We have seen the clinical and
metapsychological theories diverge, and have seen affect
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retain an honored plaoe in the clinical writings while being
depicted as an epiphenomenon in metapsychology. Finally, we
saw Freud return to some of his earlier views, in the final
theory of anxiety.
CHAPTER Hi
POST-FREUDIAN AFFECT THEORY
Introduction
Psychoanalytic theory has sometimes been thought of as
constituting, in its entirety, a theory of affect, so that
to review the psychoanalytic theory of affect would require
a review of the whole body of theory (Mandler, 1984).
Indeed, affect is pertinent to virtually all the concerns of
psychoanalytic theory and practice, and a great many psycho-
analytic writings, from every school, have implications for
the understanding of affect. Nevertheless, it is possible
to isolate a set of writings on the theory of affect per se.
Although every psychoanalytic author encounters affect or
implicates it in the course of his or her work, only some
—
only a relatively small number, in fact—set out to devise
an understanding of affect itself. For the most part,
psychoanalytic theorists incorporate affect into their
theories without inquiring into its nature, and therefore
adopt either the common-sense views of affect (Lewin, 1965)
or some other understanding that was "in the air" at the
time.
Most of the theorists to attempt an explicit and
original formulation of affect were either directly involved
with the early Freudians or members of the predominantly
56
57
American "ego psychological- movement. The present review
is confined to these figures. Even within this relatively
homogeneous group, the range of interests and assumptions is
great enough that the various works sometimes seem to occupy
different domains. The review has been divided into four
sections, both to recognize the diversity of the interests
and make the review more manageable. In the first section,
the major post-Freudian metapsychological statements on
affect are reviewed. In the second section, a number of
prominent theoretical statements involving the relation of
affect and defense are discussed. Thirdly, several theories
are reviewed which, although devised by psychoanalysts for
use in psychoanalytic theory, are essentially biological
theories. Finally, the views of a number of authors who
include affect in the ego are reviewed, together with
related discussions of the place of cognition in affect.
At no point since Freud has there been a theory that
could be called the psychoanalytic theory of affect. This
is more than an issue of the failure of any theory to be
convincing and satisfying to the majority of analysts,
although indeed no theory has been able to accomplish this
(Brierley, 1937; Brenner, 1974b; Green, 1977; Rapaport,
1953). Beyond this, there is the question of what defines a
theory of affect as psychoanalytic. All of the theoretical
positions reviewed here were seen by their authors as
psychoanalytic, but their grounds for viewing their state-
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on
ments in this light varied greatly, m some cases, it was
because they constructed the theories out of the terms of
Freud's metapsychology (Jacobson, 1971a; Rapaport, 1953),
whether or not the theories coincided with any of Freud's
views of affect. In other cases the justification lay in
supposed consistency with the spirit of Freud's views
affect, though concepts foreign to these views were employed
(Brenner, 1974b; Schur, 1969). m still other cases the
relation of a theoretical statement to psychoanalytic theory
in general was still more varied and complex. In the end,
only historical and institutional continuity and the
intention to advance psychoanalytic theory define all these
views as psychoanalytic.
In the present chapter, the most pertinent papers are
reviewed. (A number of other important or interesting
papers are reviewed in the Appendix.) The four sets of
issues which provide the framework for the present review
will again appear in Chapter V, where each is considered in
light of the present theory of affect.
Metapsychology
No other theorist pursued the metapsychology of affect
with Freud's intensity. This is especially the case if
metapsychology is defined as it is defined here, namely, as
explanations in which psychoanalytic metapsycholog ical
concepts are the final explanatory concepts, it may be that
most Freudian authors did not feel they had sufficient
authority to enter into this discussion, while non-Freudian
analysts (i.e., "British school- object relations theorists
and post-Freudians in the United States) rejected
metapsychological concepts as explanations. In any case,
there were only a handful of original metapsychological
hypotheses of affect proposed by authors other than Freud.
One such theory is contained in a 1937 paper by
Marjorie Brierley. The paper touches on many important
topics, and it is discussed below, in the section "Object
Relations and Representations", as well as here. Brierley'
s
metapsychological proposition is that affect is a tension
phenomenon. This view, she notes, is in direct contradiction
to Freud's discharge view of affects (and, she also notes,
to the James-Lange theory). Brierley's assertion of a
tension view of affect has been the occasion for many,
perhaps most, of later references to this paper, and she
herself emphasizes the importance of the assertion by
stating it early in the paper, as preliminary to her later
argument and as part of its basis.
Brierley states that affect represents instinctual
tension that has risen beyond a certain threshold; below
this threshold, she implies, tension does not emerge into
consciousness as affect. As instinctual tensions rises
still further, affect becomes intolerable and discharge
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becomes imperative. In this way, Brierley reconciles her
premise with the concept of instinctual energy, but raises
further problems, which she must then address.
Freud initially equated tension with pain (precisely,
"unpleasure") and discharge with pleasure. This view fit
neatly with his fundamental conception of the mind as an
apparatus designed for the discharge of tension. However,
he was compelled to acknowledge the difficulty caused for
this theory by the pleasurable nature of erotic tension. He
never fully resolved this contradiction. Brierley resolves
it within her own framework by adopting a premise from the
psychology of emotion, one that was at variance with the
Freudian psychoanalytic tradition. Citing McDougall (1918),
she adopts the view that there exist multiple instincts, and
that each instinct is associated with its own affect.
Tension derived from some instincts is pleasurable, and that
derived from others is painful.
Brierley is unable to maintain her positions on the
relation of affect and instinct. Early in her paper, she
had stated that affect corresponds to instinctual tension
raised beyond a certain threshold, and that different
affects result from different instinctual impulses. In her
account of affect in development, however, she reverts to
the more firmly established psychoanalytic view: "The
affect manifested is... the index to the fate of the
impulse.... A good external object is one which satisfies
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instinct and so produces a state of contented feeling."
(Brierley, 1937, p. 262). m other words, the nature of an
affect is determined by whether instinct is discharged
("satisfied-); good affect ("a state of contented feeling")
results from either the process of discharge or the
consequent state of low tension. Brierley- theory, then, is
inconsistent. She did not resolve the conflicting trends in
psychoanalytic thought, the one toward affect as primary
tension, the other toward affect as secondary discharge.
To address affect within the context of tension and
discharge, as Brierley does, is to address it in terms of
the most fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic theory.
Freud's original theory of the mechanics of mental life
(Freud, 1895/1966b) was based tension and its discharge.
But the issue is not a "purely theoretical" one, a mere
exercise in manipulating terms. As we saw in Freud's
discharge theory of affect, it is—or can be—a translation
of basic positions on emotion into the language of
metapsychology
.
The relevant position here can be stated in
this way: If affect is discharge, it is an epiphenomenon , a
secondary consequence of the fundamental factors
(instinctual energy, and ideas), whereas if affect is
tension, it is of causal importance in its own right, and
can be a basic explanatory concept. Thus, Brierley'
s
assertion of the tension view of affect is an attempt to re-
establish the importance of affect in psychoanalytic theory.
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The first major metapsychological studies of affect
after Freud's later papers appeared in a symposium on affect
theory held at the 1952 meetings of the American
Psychoanalytic Association. Two of the three papers
delivered there, one by Edith Jacobson and the other by
David Rapaport, were subsequently published, and they both
became major works in the metapsychology of affect.
However, they were not followed by a significant renewal of
interest in the Freudian metapsychology of affect, in fact,
they are perhaps the last papers to deal with affect in a
purely metapsychological framework.
Edith Jacobson produced a study of psychoanalytic
affect theory as part of her extended study of affective
disorders (i.e., depression and manic-depression or,
currently, "bipolar disorder"). In 1953 her symposium paper
appeared as a book chapter, "The Affects and Their Pleasure-
Unpleasure Qualities, in Relation to the Psychic Discharge
Process". In 1971 a revised and expanded version appeared
under the title "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects",
as the first chapter of a book in which Jacobson collected
her views on depression. The earlier title gives the more
accurate indication of Jacobson's concerns. Her discussion
centers on basic metapsychological issues; in fact, she
makes a consideration of affect the occasion for an argument
for altering basic psychoanalytic assumptions.
Jacobson's concerns are particularly with Freud's
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Pleasure principle and its connections with discharge and
with affect, m Freud's metapsychology
, the pleasure
principle held that the ultimate determinant of all mental
events was the tendency toward pleasure. Pleasure, however,
was defined by Freud in an abstract way, as the discharge of
energy or tension, in Freud's writings it is often unclear
whether such pleasure is necessarily consciously
experienced. By the same token, he did not draw an equation
between this pleasure and affect. Pleasure and affect tend
to be considered separately in Freud's work, and in fact
they are theoretically opposed to one another in the
discharge theory of affect; there, affect arises when direct
gratification—pleasure—is blocked. Jacobson, on the other
hand, takes pleasure as the prototypical affect. She
asserts that the "pleasure" in the pleasure principle must
refer to a conscious feeling, asserting also that Freud
agreed on this point (see Jacobson, 1971b, p. 25; see also
Rapaport, 1953, p. 193, where he emphatically disputes
Jacobson 's interpretation of Freud).
Jacobson 's attention to pleasure as a prototype for
affect leads her to focus her theoretical interest on the
relation of affect and discharge. One might have
ticipated that Jacobson would advance a discharge view of
ffect, given the traditional Freudian equation of pleasure
and discharge and Jacobson's equation of affect and
pleasure. In fact, she takes a different direction. She
an
a
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disputes the equation of pleasure and discharge, aware that
she is seeking to overturn Freud's most fundamental
metapsychological assumption, she cites the doubts that
Freud himself expressed on this issue in his paper on
masochism (Freud, 1924/1961). she also points to the
Pleasure associated with increasing tension (e.g., sexual
arousal), which Freud had also cited as throwing doubt on
the theory.
Jacobson seeks to substitute a "constancy principle"
for the pleasure principle as the basic determinant of
psychic functioning. Jacobson's "constancy principle"
states that the psychic apparatus seeks to maintain a
generally constant level of tension, not to reduce tension
to a minimum. Her wish to make this change in
metapsychology appears to have been a reaction against
Freud's Hirvana principle, which was the logical—and
extreme—extension of the pleasure principle, and which
stated that the ultimate tendency of the mind was toward
death. In any event, Jacobson seeks to unseat pleasure as
the primary motivation.
In addition to altering the place of pleasure in
psychoanalytic theory, Jacobson seeks a more refined
metapsychological understanding of pleasure itself, and it
is this aspect of her writings on pleasure that bears
directly on affect theory. Jacobson denies that pleasure
can be equated with discharge. However, she does not
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depart from the "economic- view of pleasure, that is, the
view that pleasure is based on psychic energy, instead, she
proposes that pleasure (and unpleasure) can be the result of
either increases or decreases in psychic tension. Instead
of increase or decrease in tension as the determining factor
of the quality of feeling (pleasurable or unpleasurable)
,
she suggests the rate of increase or decrease as a more
relevant factor. She proposes that tension simultaneously
rises on one part of the "psychic apparatus" and is
discharged elsewhere, and pleasure corresponds to optimal
fluctuations in tension.
Although Jacobson points to the importance of affects
other than pleasure and unpleasure, her theory of affect
focuses almost exclusively on these. Thus, her theory of
affect is essentially a complex re-alignment of the psycho-
analytic concepts of tension, discharge, pleasure, and
unpleasure.
Rapaport's paper at the 1952 symposium (Rapaport, 1953)
has been cited most often for its review of Freud's affect
theories. Rapaport himself seems to be more interested, in
this paper, in making an original statement on metapsycho-
logical affect theory, within the "structural" version of
metapsychology he favored. Thus, he proceeds from his
review of Freud, in the first part of the paper, to a review
of such theorists as Brierley (1937) , Jacobson (1953)
,
Fenichel (1941/1954), and Landauer (1938), praising or
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faulting each according to whether their formulations are
compatible with his own. Finally, he attempts to "sketch
the outlines of a theory as it seems to emerge from this
review" (p. 194).
The main terms of Rapaport 's theory are: 1) inborn
affect channels, 2) inborn affect thresholds, 3) similar
channels and thresholds for drives, and 4) progressive
taming of drive-based motivations during development.
Rapaport maintains that affect exists in early life in the
form of inborn channels for drive energy. These channels
direct the energy that cannot be directly discharged through
satisfaction of drives into either the interior of the body
(i.e., Freud's "secretory and motor innervation") or perhaps
to the exterior of the body in the form of instinctive
adaptive responses (e.g., the infant's smiling or startje
responses)
.
As new obstacles are placed in the way of drive
gratification, greater and greater use is made of these
affect channels to carry off energy.
In the course of development, there is a progressive
"taming" of affects, as the inborn affects are supplemented
by subtler, more complex, and less "peremptory" ones. This
process is the result of three factors. First, the drive
energy which affects dispose of becomes tamed itself, and
the tamer quality of this energy is passed on to the
affects. Second, new affect-channels are developed.
Rapaport provides no examples of such acquired affect-
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channels, so one can only surmise what they might be.
Third, there are changes in the affect-thresholds (that is,
the amount of energy that must be diverted into affect-
channels before discharge occurs), m the mature adult, one
therefore finds "mobile" affect energy, evident in the form
of "affect storms", and more restrained, controls, and
subtle affects.
Rapaport is reluctant to accept affects as motives or
as objects of defense. He acknowledges that in some cases
affects appear to play a role similar to drives, and admits
that it may not always be possible to attribute these
features to the underlying drive. He states that one may
have to adopt some aspects of Freud's first (tension) theory
of affect to accommodate these instances of affects playing
the part of drives.
Rapaport emphasizes that in his view, affects have an
actual existence even when they are not in the process of
discharge. He criticizes Freud's discharge theory for not
accommodating this fact, and argues that his own concept of
affect-thresholds does so. He also favors Freud's concept
of signal affects which are freed from dependency on energy
and can be "actively produced" by the ego.
Like Jacobson, Rapaport in this paper vigorously
pursues a metapsychological account of affect. He does so
with an even greater disregard of clinical utility or
intelligibility. His constructs have no clear everyday
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referents, and deliberately so. They are intended to relate
only to one another, so as to build a system of inter-
dependent postulates and hypotheses, m evaluating his
theory, then, it is important to distinguish between its
success in terms of Rapaport's goals and success in
elucidating affect in more generally accepted terms. For
the former, one may accept Rapaport's own estimation that
the theory was only "one possible interpretation" of where
psychoanalytic theory stood at that time, to which one may
add that Rapapcrt was one of the foremost systematize! s of
the abstract principles of psychoanalytic reasoning. For
the latter goal of elucidating affect per se, however, it is
difficult to identify any real contribution in Rapaport's
original formulations.
Defense and Affect
Psychoanalytic theory has been ambivalent about the
relation of affect and defense. On the one hand, many
theorists have routinely referred to defenses against affect
and to affects employed as defenses (Novey, 1959). Freud
himself did so, when he was writing in a "clinical" vein,
unconstrained by metapsychological formalities (e.g.,- Freud,
1922/1955). On the other hard, Freud and others have denied
that affect could either be defended against or serve as a
defense. Only instincts or drives could be the legitimate
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objects of defense, according to this reasoning, and as for
affect serving as defenses, this fit neither with the
discharge theory of affects as epiphenomenal residues of
other processes nor with the signal theory, which described
anxiety as a signal for defense but not as itself defending
against the dangerous internal situation.
The four writers discussed below raise various aspects
of the issues in the relation of affect and defense. The
early paper by Earnest Jones is widely cited on this theme.
The Zilboorg paper is almost never cited, and yet it
develops important specific possibi
]
? t j es
. Fenichel's paper
has been an important statement on the relations of the ego
and affects. Finally, Schafer's writings on affects as
"disclaimed actions* are included here.
In 1929, Earnest Jones published "Fear, Guilt and
Hate," one of the very few papers by early members of the
Freudian movement directly to address emot Jons
. The paper
is most often cited by later analytic writers in connection
with its discussion of the "layering" of affects (e.g.,
Brierley, 1937; Novey, 1959). Jones begins the paper with a
formula: Each of the "emotional attitudes" of the title
exists in three "layers", the surface one of the apparent
(and conscious) emotion, a deeper one consisting of one of
the remaining two, and a still deeper one consisting of the
initial emotion in an ego-dystonic
,
primitive, and
threatening form. This layering reflects a developmental
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progression as well as a continuing dynamic interaction
(though these two are not clearly distinguished by Jones).
Matters soon become less orderly as Jones develops his
argument, specifying the interactions among pairs of the
three, then analyzing each emotion separately, it emerges
that only fear and hate conform to the three-layered pattern
described in the paper's opening paragraphs, and that
moreover the nature of the layering involved-developmental
progression, dynamic conflict, or some combination of the
two—varies from one emotion to the other, in ways that
Jones makes no attempt to systematize.
Jones examines first hate, then guilt, and finally
fear. Hate is described as a three-layer construction, in
which only the first layer—anger— is conscious. This anger
covers guilt or anxiety (or fear), which in turr is produced
by an infantile "primary hate n
,
composed of frustration-
generated rage and sexual sadism. Developmentally
, Jones
describes the eventual overtaking by guilt and anxiety of
early satisfaction in hate. In order to overcome this state
of impotence
" , the guilt is projected outwards—some person
is viewed as guilty of wrong-doing—then this person is
"identified with" the originally thwarting person, the
object of the primary hate. This primary hate thus finds a
modified expression in conscious anger or righteous
indignation, with the added benefit of relief from guilt,
owing to the projection of the forbidden impulses (i.e./
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"I'm not bad f s/he is")
.
Jones postulates two functions of conscious anger, to
defend against guilt and anxiety and to express primitive
hate. Each postulated function carries important
implications. To claim that affect per se serves as a
defense was a departure from the prevailing view of defenses
as occurring in the domain of meanings, thoughts, symbols,
and other specifically mental or cognitive contents, with
secondary effect on affect. This continued to be, and
remains, a minority view, and contrasts both with Freud's
discharge view of affect as a release of instinctual energy
and with his later view of signal anxiety. In Jones*
formulation of anger, anxiety and guilt are defended against
(rather than being signals for defense) , and the defense is
itself an emotion, though an emotion based in part on mental
operations (viewing some person as guilty and in terms of an
earlier, thwarting object— i.e., projection and displace-
ment)
.
Following hate/anger, Jones takes up guilt. The
account of guilt differs from that of hate in that Jones
does not describe a layering of the same sort. Instead, he
describes two developmental stages of guilt. The first, a
preliminary, "pre-nefar ious" form, consists only of the
renunciation of libidinal strivings when these are
frustrated and therefore produce unbearable anxiety. (Here
Jones employs a version of Freud's view of anxiety in his
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theory of anxiety neurosis.) Jones' terms the second stage
of guilt "true guilt", and states that it is constituted by
the turning against the self of the rage and sadism evoked
by frustration, this turning against the self being
motivated by dread of punishment and by love for the person
who is simultaneously hated.
Jones cites his clinical experience that guilt is, for
most people, virtually intolerable, and poses a question:
How can guilt be both more and less intolerable than the
emotions—fear and hate—that it defends against? His
answer is that "guilt" refers to both the "pre-nefarious"
stage and to guilt in the full sense. However, his account
grows confused at this point, in part due to a failure to
maintain the distinction between developmental and dynamic
issues—he implies that guilt becomes intolerable when, in
the course of development, it becomes true guilt, whereas at
another point he describes the defensive layering in
question as a dynamic, ongoing one, and therefore not one in
which one form of guilt is supplanted by a more mature one.
For present purposes, two points are particularly
noteworthy. First, guilt, unlike fear and hate, is not
depicted in a primitive, basic, unacceptable form. This is
consistent with other psychoanalytic views, in which guilt
is described as an amalgam of more basic forces, constructed
to solve a conflict. Second, in Jones* account of guilt we
find indications of aspects of the process by which one
emotion can defensively replace another. Guilt emerges when
the hated and feared object is internalized, that is, when
there is a re-arrangement of self- and object-images and the
relations between them.
Finally, Jones discusses fear. Be begins by inquiring
whether hate and guilt are necessary conditions for fear,
since in clinical situations fear is accompanied always by
hate and usually by guilt. He concludes that it must be
possible in earliest infancy for fear to occur alone, and
his evidence is that such seems to be the case in animals.
In making this phylogenetic connection, he is compelled to
note that he js using the term
^fear' in this paper in the clinical sense of anxiety
and apprehension, not necessarily in the biological
sense of alertness with its appropriate responses
(Jones, 1929, p. 389n)
.
Jones proceeds with his discussion of fear with a
reference to Freud's 1926 discussion of anxiety, in
particular the distinction between primal, pre-ideational
anxiety caused by traumatic libidinal over-excitation and
signal anxiety deployed by the ego in response to the danger
of an approaching traumatic over-excitation. Jones rejects
Freud's claim that primal anxiety is purely a product of
undischarged libido, and argues instead that, although it
has no ideational content, it does constitute a defense.
Here Jones introduces an original concept: aphanisis.
Aphanisis "means total annihilation of the capacity for
sexual gratification, direct or indirect" (Jones, 1929, p.
391). By sexual gratification Jones means any satisfaction
or pleasure resulting from any activity in life. Jones
seeks with this concept to unite castration anxiety, fear of
loss of love, and the quasi-physiological concept of libido.
For both Jones and Freud, the fundamental danger posed by
castration or loss of love—that is, the reasons these
constitute catastrophes for the "personality" (Jones) or the
"psychic apparatus" (Freud)— is that they make discharge of
libido impossible. According to Jones, the infant undergoes
an exhaustion of libido after prolonged build-up (similar to
the cessation of hunger after prolonged fasting), and this
provides the infant with an experience of aphanisis against
which all subsequent defenses are ultimately directed,
including the defense of primal anxiety. This anxiety
offers a defense against dangerously mounting excitation
through mental and physical inhibition and over-excitation.
Inhibition "isolates the ego" from the excitation, and is
akin to repression; over-excitation provides some measure of
discharge.
In Jones' conclusion, he notes that there exist two
stages in the development of each of the three affects under
discussion; in all three cases the external world of object
relations plays a greater role in the second stage. Next,
Jones calls attention to the lack of inhibition in hate,
which distinguishes it from fear and guilt and which Jones
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relates to the deleterious social and psychological
consequences of hate. Finally, he formulates the paths of
inhibition and defense as the two alternatives available
when libidinal excitation accumulates beyond the infant's
capacity to tolerate it, and describes as the aim of
psychoanalytic therapy to induce tolerance of guilt, hate,
and fear, which requires increased confidence on the
analysand's part that wishes can be held in abeyance without
being inhibited (i.e., renounced) forever.
In this bold formulation, we find the familiar mingling
of psychological and physiological reasoning, in the context
of which an affect can exist without an object and yet serve
a defensive function, we find a new process through which
emotion provides a defense; it is a relatively automatic
process, relatively mechanical and non-purposive. Inhi-
bition and avoidance play a role, as does partial discharge.
Finally, it is worth noting, given the controversy in
psychoanalytic affect theory over whether affect signifies
tension or discharge, that Jones' description of primal
anxiety includes excitation itself as a form of discharge,
and includes also inhibition (which may be seen as a third
possibility, neither tension nor discharge) as a basic
component of anxiety.
In 1933 Gregory Zilboorg, a Mew York analyst, published
"Anxiety Without Affect", which he had delivered as a paper
to the New York Psychoanalytic Society the previous year.
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Zilboorg gives little preface to his remarks, and gives no
indication of whether any current controversies prompted
them. He states that the formulations he offers grew out of
thoughts on a particular case, which he reports on in
detail.
Zilboorg has to justify his surprising title, since
anxiety was considered an affect; indeed, this was perhaps
the only aspect of anxiety that was not in question.
Zilboorg was compelled to bring even this into question by
one analytic case, in which the patient described every
aspect of his life—homosexual and heterosexual experiences,
his difficulty devoting himself to a career, details of his
medical studies, his father's progressive illness— in the
same flat, unemotional tone. As the analysis proceeded, the
patient described dreams and thoughts representing
castration in symbolic forms, which Zilboorg regarded as
inevitably anxiety-provoking. The patient's aplomb,
however, was undisturbed. During the same phase of the
analysis the patient experienced several episodes of
physiological responses corresponding to acute anxiety; his
pulse raced, his face paled, his breathing quickened, and so
on. He was aware of these changes, but denied any feelings,
describing the episodes as "purely physiological".
Zilboorg described this man's thoughts and responses as
"anxiety without affect". He considered the dreams and
thoughts with implied connections to castration as the
"ideational component" of an anxiety response, and the
physical reactions he considered the physiological
component. Despite these factors, the patient had no
subjective sense that he was anxious; this subjective sense,
or "feeling tone"
,
Zilboorg considered the affective
component of the anxiety reaction.
Thus, in Zilboorg »s formulation, anxiety is something
to be defended against. He implies a specific mechanism for
accomplishing this, namely, splitting up the normally
unitary anxiety reaction and suppressing the "subjective
experience", which Zilboorg believed was possible even if
the physiological reactions take place. Freud had
emphasized the possibility of splitting affect from
cognition, but Zilboorg was the first to suggest that
affective phenomena could themselves be split in the process
of defense.
Otto Fenichel, best known for his comprehensive
textbook The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, was also a
prolific author of articles in clinical and metapsycho-
logical theory. Among the latter is "The Ego and the
Affects", written in English after Fenichel had emigrated
from Berlin to Los Angeles, and published in 1941. In this
paper, Fenichel depicts affects as closely similar to
instincts, and in particular as having similar relations
with the ego, such as pressing for expression and being held
back by defensive efforts of the ego.
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Like Brierley's 1937 article, Fenichel's elevates
affects to a central importance, but unlike Erierley, he
does not set out to do so; instead, the centrality of affect
emerges in the course of Fenichel's coordination of
observations on emotional behavior with basic features of
psychoanalytic theory of ego and neurosis. He readily
concludes that, in practice, there is a virtual isomorphism
between instinct and affect. He states that defense against
instinct is always defense against affect, that a "weak" ego
is overwhelmed by primitive affects, just as it is with
instincts, whereas a strong ego treats affects as it does
instincts, modulating them, sublimating them, and employing
them toward its own ends. Unexpressed affects, like
unexpressed instincts, accumulate and press for discharge,
requiring energy to contain them and betraying themselves in
derivatives, in lability or rigidity, or in general fatjgue.
In short, the parallels between instinct and affect are so
complete that one is left wondering what necessity is served
by instinct theory.
Fenichel was a knowledgeable and careful exponent of
Freudian metapsychology , with the result that the
contradictions and ambiguities of classical psychoanalytic
affect theory are highlighted in the article. For example,
Fenichel must reconcile his description of affect as
virtually equivalent to instinct with the firm distinction
drawn by Freud between affect and instinct. In Freud's
:ce
view, instincts and their associated energy are the sour,
of psychic tension, and affect is one form of the discharge
of such tension. Affects, per se, cannot be repressed,
since they are active processes of discharge; only a
"disposition" toward affect can be repressed. Fenichel, in
his equation of affect and instinct, is hard pressed to
maintain these views of Freud's. He affirms them (Fenichel,
1941/1954, p. 221), but virtually all the implications of
his position stand in contradiction to them. He is closer
to Freud's earliest views of affect in the theory of
hysteria (cf. Fenichel, 1941/1954, p. 220).
An even more fundamental ambiguity of the classical
view emerges with clarity in Fenichel' s paper.
Irrationality is regarded with considerable ambivalence in
psychoanalysis. The instincts are the enemy of psycho-
logical health, and reducing their influence is the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment—"where id was, there shall ego
be"
—
yet Freud also advocated the view that all the acti-
vities of human life were expressions of the instincts, and
insofar as they are gratifying, are so for this reason. In
Fenichel 's paper, affects largely take the place of
instincts, and a similar ambiguity emerges. He begins by
describing fully discharged affects as always representing a
loss of the ego's usual control over the body, and therefore
a regression from healthy adult functioning. Affects are
described as embattling the ego, forcing their way through
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despite the ego's efforts, and consuming energy that is then
unavailable for adaptive pursuits. However, Fenichel also
depicts affects as beneficial, within a strong ego. a
strong ego is capable of "synthesizing" the affects, that
is, integrating them within its overall functioning, to its
considerable benefit. This situation makes itself manifest
in the "autonomous, active, free play of the victorious ego
with its multiplicity of affects- (Fenichel, 1941/1954, p.
226). Defenses against affect should be secure but not
rigid.
Roy Schafer has produced a large body of theoretical
and metatheoretical psychoanalytic writing, in which affect,
although not a consistent theme, has received considerable
attention. His most sustained treatment of affect is in his
1976 book, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, in which he
advocates abandoning the traditional psychoanalytic meta-
psychology in favor of what he calls "action language". One
aspect of this action language is to regard emotions as
"disclaimed actions", that is, actions for which the person
does not wish to take responsibility. This process of
disclaiming action is the model, for Schafer, of all
defense, and emotions, therefore, are all involved in
defensive operations.
The consideration of emotion in the context of action
language was preceded by an earlier paper. Here, I review
that paper, then discuss emotion in action language.
In his first major discussion of affect, "The Clinical
Analysis of Affects" (1964), Schafer comments on a broad
variety of issues; the comments are unified mainly by the
proposition that the theory of affect had suffered from far
too much abstract, metapsychological formulation and a
neglect of the actual thoughts and actions of clinicians in
the analytic situation. The paper benefits from Schafer >«
exceptional appreciation for subtlety, nuance, and
ambiguity, and the view of affect that emerges is
extraordinarily rich and multifaceted
. Few summarizing
remarks or central tenets are attempted. Schafer's intent
in the paper is not to advance a theory but to "re-examine
the means by which we learn about affects in the clinical
situation" (p. 275). He explores eight categories which, he
believes, analysts "have in mind" when they do analytic work
with affects. These include affect existence, affect
formation, affect strength, affect communication, and
others. The explorations provide a context for many remarks
on the nature and importance of affects, their development,
and the central role of the analysis of affects in
psychoanalytic treatment.
Schafer is able to make his points without taking a
position on any of the controversies that had gone on for
years or decades in the psychoanalytic literature on affect.
For example, he does not discuss whether affect represent
tension or discharge, and he describes patients avoidance
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and defense against their affects without pursuing the meta-
psychology of unconscious affect. This neglect of
theoretical disputes is not through lack of familiarity or a
disinclination to theoretical discourse, as Schafer's later
work (1968, 1976, 1983) makes clear, it seems instead to be
a demonstration of his point that clinicians function every
day in intimate interaction with affects, without requiring
answers to the controversies that had been pursued with such
vigor in metatheoretical discussions; and therefore the
everyday conceptions, far from depending on metatheory,
could be the basis for it.
Schafer does take an implied position on one basic
issue. Nowhere in his discussion are affects depicted as
physiological entities, nor as automatic or innate. Ever
when he discusses affect "location" in terms of areas of the
body, there is no implication that affects actually occur in
distinct parts of the body, or that if parts of the body
become specially involved in an affective experience, that
this is a necessary part of experiencing that affect. It is
clear that for Schafer, psychology is the basis for all
aspects of affective experience, and that he believes
physiology to be extraneous to clinical work with affects,
and probably also to a satisfactory psychoanalytic theory of
affect.
Turning now to the action language book (Schafer,
1976), we find that in this instance Schafer's work is
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guided by a specific purpose apart from expanding the
understanding of emotions. A polemical interest guides the
presentation, as Schafer was arguing that a technical
language in which all psychological entities are described
as groups of actions and modes of action could and should
replace psychoanalytic metapsychology
. Emotions posed a
critical test for this system, and Schafer endeavors to show
not only that they can be rendered in his action language
but that this rendering clarifies our understanding of them.
Schafer objects strenuously to the reification and
substantialization of emotions. He describes all references
to emotions doing things—"having effects" on people's
thoughts and actions—as crude metaphors at best, and more
commonly as concretistic
, infantile ways of thinking and
talking incorporated into psychological theory. He has the
same criticisms of the entities of psychoanalytic meta-
psychology, such as id, ego, and superego. He argues that
it is critically important for psychoanalysts to stop using
such metaphors as if they corresponded to real entities, and
proposes that they employ instead a comprehensive set of
terms in which all references to entities other than the
person are specifically excluded.
For emotions, this means eliminating references to a
mythical entity which is "expressed", "controlled",
"experienced", "built up", and which "overwhelms" us,
"poisons our hearts", "lifts our spirits", "energizes" us,
etc. instead, he offers examples of translations into
actions and modes of action. For example,
embrace on self *Ln?o™illl ll^'AoT. "
(IchaL^m^ p?' 27?) P°tentia11* *ble to say so.
The action language was a proposal for a truly radical
change in psychoanalytic theorizing, and it called for an
equally fundamental change in the ordinary-language ways of
conceptualizing emotion. In the above passage, the
influence of Ryle (1949) is evident, both in Schafer's
objections to the concept of an entity "behind" or "within-
observable actions, and in his use of dispositions to
actions ("to be likely. ..to smile, laugh, sing, and dance",
etc.) as b means of eliminating concepts of entities. He
denies that there is an experience of emotion that is
private in principle and inaccessible to others, and
discusses the personal experience of emotion as one possible
interpretive description of a set of actions.
The notion of "disclaimed action" is Schafer's way of
translating the psychoanalytic concepts of the impulses and
mechanisms that make up the "psychic apparatus". Impulses
or drives are "conditional actions" (i.e.- actions a person
would do under different circumstances), and many such
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conditional actions are disclaimed by thinking and speaking
of them as concrete entities. Similarly, "mechanisms-
, such
as defenses and symptoms, are also often disclaimed by
referring to them as things that happen rather than chosen
means of coping and/or experiencing satisfaction. There are
many reasons people disclaim so many of their actions.
These include protecting relationships, protecting one's
image or self-image, and reducing the "excitement and
violence" of life. The reasons, in fact, include all the
motives for defense.
Emotions are, for Schafer, the epitome of disclaimed
action, because they are invariably spoken of as things
which are passively experienced or -undergone", and never as
modes of action that are chosen for various reasons.
Schafer insists that emotions are best thought of as
"enacted", rather than undergone. For all of the many
reasons that other actions are disclaimed, people often
prefer to avoid identifying with and taking responsibility
for the actions and modes of action that make up emotion.
Unconscious Affect
The issue of unconscious affect is conceptually related
to that of defense and affect, and its history in
psychoanalysis has been similar as well. On the one hand,
Freud stated flatly, in the context of the discharge theory
of affect, that affect could by definition not be
86
unconscious.
sLuld^awarl
°th2? W"Known to consciouLess."^^
^HftJ^STSh.
concerned. (Freud, 1913^4^1^77)
Some authors have followed Freud on this point, at least
when they have attempted to be conceptually rigorous (e.g.,
Blau, 1955; Fenichel, 1941/1954; Moore & Fine, 1968), and
analysts continue to be uncomfortable with the concept of
unconscious affect. However, uncomfortable they may be,
though, they employ the concept readily, just as Freud did.
There is, as we think, no doubt about the origin ofthis unconscious need for punishment if only thewords went together better, we should be justified forall practical purposes in calling it an "unconscious
sense of guilt". (Freud, 1933/1964, p. 109)
Jealousy is one of those affective states, like grief,that may be described as normal, if anyone appears tobe without it, the inference is justified that it has
undergone severe repression and consequently plays allthe greater part in his unconscious mental life.(Freud, 1922/1955, p. 223)
In discussing affect and defense, we have already
encountered references to unconscious or repressed affect.
Jones' (1929) concept of layered affects implied unconscious
affect in some instances, and Fenichel (1941/1954) addressed
the issue specifically. In the present section, though,
unconscious affect is the specific focus. That is, the concern
of the present section is affect that has an "actual existence"
without being conscious (as opposed to a "potential to develop",
as Freud [1915/1957d] described it), that is actively kept out of
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awareness, and which in addition iq kk ftl1„u f . .uo 1S thought to have important
consequences while unconscious, a few r PnrMan f •r representative discussions
are reviewed.
To return first to Jones' (1929) paper, we find that he
depicts hate, guilt, and anxiety as possibly or even typi-
cally unconscious. The theoretical necessity of unconscious
emotion in Jones' argument is less clear than it might be
due to the lack of a consistent distinction between
development and intra-psychic dynamics, if the hate-guilt-
anger relation is one of individual development, it is not
necessary to view the earlier emotions as unconscious; they
could simply be supplanted over time. However, Jones is
clear in stating that he does view hate and guilt as
unconscious, not supplanted, which, together with the
metaphor of "layering", leaves no doubt that Jones is
departing from Freud on this point.
Brierley's (1937) discussion of affect includes a
consideration of unconscious affect and its role in neurosis
and its treatment. Her advocacy of a concept of unconscious
affect is consistent with her metapsycholog ical position on
affect as a tension phenomenon, tension being something that
can have an actual existence without being active. Brierley
considered the making conscious of unconscious affects a
central part of psychoanalytic treatment. She regarded
repressed affects as dissociated fragments of the ego (or
"self", as it might be called today in this context), and
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making these affects conscious, she felt, constituted a
crucial bit of integrative analytic work. Her description
of this process startlingly anticipates Schafer (1983) and
other present day writers of the psychoanalytic construction
of the personal "narrative" (e.g., Spence, 1982).
What happens when a repressed fragment of eqo-experience comes into consciousness? The oatienf fpe1ethe emotion he was formerly unable to endure! It Itcan reconstruct for him by transference interpretation
^n^?}tl02S WhiCh finally provoked ?hIsPfeefinc
SIES S^h" T Can . recover the infantile reality- 9 'bases of the phantasies, the experience will fall intoperspective as a part of his personal history. Tnstructural terms, the dissociated ego-fragment can
do^
m
n^
ln
S
egrated Wi
^
h the ^ality4go. LSactiSnoes ot do away with the liability to feel, though itS the pathological intensity of the infantile
h^rr^S *
ma3
?5 f
uncfc ion is to open the hithertoba ed path from id to personal ego. Working-throughis, in part, a drainage of residual affect pockets,but, in essence, it is a stabilizing process of eqo-
265-266
atl °n re'integration
-
(Brierley, 1937, pp.
There have been a small number of papers devoted
specifically to the question of unconscious affect (Knapp,
1957; Pulver, 1971; Reid, 1956). Of these, Pulver 's has
been the most frequently cited. Pulver argues that
unconscious affects exist. He explains Freud's theoretical
objections to this concept as a result of the discharge
theory of affect, and suggests that Freud retained these
objections despite discarding the discharge theory because
of the influence of linguistic conventions linking affect,
"feelings", and conscious awareness. Pulver believes such
conventions are misleading.
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Pulver does not base his case on conceptual analysis,
but instead provides empirical evidence for the existence of
unconscious affects. However, he requires a definition of
affect that does not rely on subjective experience. He
argues that we are justified in inferring an affect when an
"individual shows physiological, ideational and motor
behavior usually associated with a central feeling state"
(Pulver, 1971, p. 350). The feeling state at such" times
can be conscious, preconscious
, or unconscious; that is, the
individual may be aware of it, may be capable of becoming
aware of it with "an ordinary effort of attention", or may
be incapable of becoming aware of it through ordinary
efforts of attention.
Among Pulver's examples of preconscious affect are the
constant feeling states he asserts we are in, usually
without being aware of it, as well as stronger feeling
states aroused by particular events (e.g., an argument)
which eventually come to our awareness by intruding on some
other focus of attention or which are evident to others if
not to ourselves. Among his examples of unconscious affect
are analytic patients who behaved angrily or elatedly, in
situations that would warrant these feelings, but denied
having these emotions,
Pulver successfully demonstrates that there are
affective phenomena that correspond to the descriptions of
conscious, preconscious, and unconscious ideas in psycho-
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analytic theory. However, he does little to resolve the
conceptual anomaly of unconscious affect. As noted, he
operationally defines affects as a set of physiological,
ideational, and motor phenomena "usually associated with a
central feeling state". He argues that we are justified in
inferring the central feeling state, whether or not the
individual feels it. We are left with a definition of
affect as a central feeling state that one may or may not
feel. If Pulver provided a conception of affect that did
not rely on the unexplicated concept of "feeling state" he
might have provided a solution to the theoretical problem,
but on the contrary, he is careful to state that his
definition of affect refers solely to the "pure feeling",
not to associated "affective phenomena", in the ideational,
physiological, or motor spheres.
Biological Theories
Biological theories of affect occupy a special place in
psychoanalytic theory. In a broad sense they are meta-
psychological, in that they offer explanations of
psychological phenomena which are not themselves in
psychological terms. However, Freud's metapsychology was
not a biological theory. Rather, it was a para-biological
theory, one might say. Its structure and logic were
biological, but its terms were sui generis—they occupied a
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special category between the realms of biology and
psychology, and between the realms of the literal and the
metaphorical, in contrast to Freud's theories of affect,
some of which were partly biological and some of which were
purely in terms of his own metapsychological
, there have
been several analytic theories of affect which have been
biological in a simple sense; that is r these theories have
employed explanatory concepts current in biology and have
not used metapsychological concepts as explanations.
Like Freud, other analysts have freely referred to
biology in their discussions of affect, and have sometimes
taken considerable liberties with biological fact. For
example, Jones' (1929) paper exemplifies certain aspects of
the connections frequently drawn in psychoanalytic theory
between psychological and biological reasoning and evidence.
A continuity and basic identity is assumed between non-human
responses and psychological ("clinical-) ones, and the non-
human responses are assumed to indicate the nature of the
earliest, perhaps pre-psychological human phenomena. These
earliest phenomena are further thought to remain at the
deepest regions of the psyche throughout life, either as
mental phenomena or at the boundary of the physical and the
mental (as in Freud's definition of instincts).
Similarly, Franz Alexander, in a paper that is
discussed in more detail in the Appendix (Alexander, 1935),
effectively equates emotions and psychosomatic conditions,
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continuing a theme that had begun with the Studies on
Hysteria concerning the ambiguously psychological and
somatic character of emotions, where Freud and Breuer held
that psychological energy—affect—could be dissipated
through physical emotional expression or physical conversion
symptoms, Alexander maintained that an unconscious logic
could cross the mind-body boundary and disturb somatic
functions. Questions about how such a transition could be
possible, and concomitant questions about the nature of
emotion, did not arise or were ignored.
There have been frequent occasions in the analytic
literature in which a distinction has been drawn, in effect,
between biological and psychological affects; in some
instances, this contrast has been considered identical with
the contrast of id and ego. For example, Rapaport (1953)
refers to Freud's discharge theory as an "id-theory",
because of its emphasis on physiology. Similarly, Novey
(1959) contrasts primitive, primary affects with later
affects that are based on psychological object images, and
Zetzel (1949) proposes a similar distinction. Rangell
(1955) argues that anxiety must be biological, since it is
"suffered" rather than voluntarily initiated, and Blau
(1955), in a paper discussed below, effectively divides
unpleasant emotions into biological and psychological
categories. In each of these instances, no new psycho-
analytic theory has been proposed. Instead, relatively
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unquestioned assumptions are made about physiological
Processes or innate behavioral sequences, and these are
applied to existing psychoanalytic formulations.
In the Appendix, a controversy over the theory of
anxiety which revolved around issues of the relation of
biology and psychoanalysis is reviewed, m the remainder of
the present section, several other instances of biology i„
the psychoanalytic theory of affect are reviewed.
Landauer 's (1938) paper exemplifies the casual use of
biological speculation that characterized some of the work
of early analysts. Blau's (1955) paper, as noted above,
shows a combination of biology and psychology. Erode (1980)
provides a more recent example of biological theory brought
to bear on the psychoanalytic theory of affect. Finally,
Bowlby (1969) provides an original synthesis of biology and
Freudian metapsychological
, including a specific account of
emotion.
In 1936, Karl Landauer delivered
-Affects, Passions and
Temperament" at a meeting of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical
Institute on the occasion of Freud's 80th birthday; it was
published soon after (Landauer, 1938). Glover (1939) cites
it as an important paper, and Jacobson (195 3) includes it
among her selective review of psychoanalytic papers cn
affect. Among recent authors, Emde (1980) in particular
cites the paper with approval.
Even among works of psychoanalytic metapsychology , the
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Landauer paper is unusually obscure. Few passages can be
interpreted with confidence, and the principal points of the
Presentation remain elusive even on careful reading.
Hapaport (1953) understates the case when he refers to the
paper as "not easy to follow-. One suspects the paper
acquired its importance through historical context, that is,
that Landauer 's varied speculations and suggestive but
undeveloped themes achieved some lasting impact owing to
their having been delivered in Vienna, possibly in Freud's
presence, at a time when Vienna remained the center of
psychoanalytic thought. One presumes that the meaning of
the remarks was clearer to those present than to later
readers less familiar with the issues most urgent at that
time. As for Emde's (1980) praise, he appears to have seen
in the paper indications of a view similar to his own
"organizational" view of affect.
Among Landauer 's concerns in the paper, the theme of
affects as compromises in a conflict is prominent. Landauer
ascribes the view to Freud that all affects are the product
of conflict, on the basis of Freud's description of affects
as "inherited hysterical attacks". In fact, Landauer's view
seems quite distant from Freud's. Whereas Freud thought of
affect either as a means of disposing of tension when other
forms of discharge are inhibited by conflict or as a signal
that a conflict has become active, Landauer described the
affective expression as itself incorporating the enactment
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of two opposing instinctive impulses, ftlJcb ^ ^^ ^
-pulse to conceal and the unconscious impulse to display.
Thus, Landauer breaks down Freud's distinction between
emotion and action. Affect becomes, for Landauer a for, of
action, and fails to achieve the aim of the unconscious
impulse only because the impulse and its opposite are
confounded in the same set of actions.
Landauer's classification scheme-affects, passions,
and temperaments-is one of the earliest in the psycho-
analytic literature of affect, it is of little use,
unfortunately, since Landauer »s definitions elude under-
standing. Passions, for example, are defined as those
affects which are libidinal, meaning their activation
involves sexual zones of the body; included are "sympathy,
longing, jealousy, modesty and similar emotions" (p. 405).
Temperaments are described as combinations of affects which
are more enduring than simple affects. All three categories
derive from biological, inherited tendencies.
Landauer concludes with a discussion of affective
zones, aims, and objects. He draws a very close parallel
between these aspects of affect and instinctual zones, aims,
and objects as defined by Freud (1905/1953).
Abram Blau presented his views on affect in two papers
(Blau, 1952, 1955). The earlier of the two presents a
purely physiological view of anxiety; this paper is reviewed
in the Appendix. In 1955, Blau attempted to give an account
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of all unpleasant affect-* tk^rr cts. The account takes a very
different direction fro, his earlier effort, and suggests
that Blau was unable or unwilling to sustain his
physiological view of emotion.
in his hypothesis of emotion, Blau emphasizes the need
to make distinctions between various aspects of emotion. He
argues that "inner and outer manifestations" of emotion
should- be distinguished, and that among inner manifest-
ations, physiological and psychological components should be
differentiated. He further divides the inner manifestation
'into "enteroceptive, proprioceptive, and verbal" components;
he does not specifically classify these three components
into physiological and psychological, but does imply that
the first two are physiological and the last, psychological.
Blau's hypothesis is essentially an expansion of his
1952 view of anxiety as a distinct, inherited physiological
entity. However, while the 195 2 paper was an advocacy for
increased attention to physiology in psychoanalytic theory
and practice, physiology is depicted in 1955 only as
emotion's primitive basis. Only a part of any emotion is
physiological, and this part takes on less and less
importance in the more highly developed emotions.
Regarding the three components of emotion, it is only
the "enteroceptive" one that is clearly physiological. Blau
defines this component as "an awareness of visceral
reactions, such as accelerations of the heart rate, muscular
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tension, or a feeling of faintness" (p. 81J . At some
points, Blau seems to regard this as the most basic
component of all emotions, as when he states "affect
consists of inner kinetic perceptions of a pleasant or
unpleasant quality- (p. M ) . The source of these
Physiological processes is in the autonomic nervous system;
the sympathetic system is responsible for unpleasant affect,
and the parasympathetic system gives rise to pleasant ones.
Blau defines the proprioceptive component as "an
awareness of an action or an impulse for some motor action"
(P. 82). He states no position on whether these actions are
innate; the use of terms like "avoidance" and "flight-
suggest that Blau had inherited action patterns in mind when
he wrote his discussion of the concept, but nothing about
the concept rules out voluntary action or acquired impulses.
In his discussion, Blau acknowledges the similarity of his
formulation to the James-Lange theory (as he might equally
well have done in discussing the enterocept ive component);
The verbal component is depicted by Blau as a label
which is attached to the first two components "relatively
late" in development. He emphasizes the relative poverty of
words as compared with the variety of affects. Clearly Blau
does not believe the verbal component alters anything
essential in an affect.
The outward signs of emotion are given less attention
than the inner, and Blau seems to feel that they lie outside
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the domain of his hypothesis of emotion. He emphasizes,
though, that few of them are innate, most iearned. The
learned aspects of emotional expression include facial
expression; citing Landis (1934)
, Blau states that cross-
cultural uniformities in facial expression of emotion do not
exist. (Given Blau's predilection for biological
explanations in the 1952 paper, one might have anticipated
he would be an advocate of nativist theories of emotional
expression.
)
Blau distinguishes between primary, secondary, and
tertiary emotions. The primary emotion of displeasure is
anxiety, and it is innate. Secondary and tertiary emotions
of displeasure are acquired modifications of anxiety;
secondary and tertiary emotions differ in terms of the
greater maturation and autonomy implicit in the latter. The
secondary emotions of unpleasure (or rather, the categories
of these) are rage, fear, and depression. Blau identifies
three groups of tertiary emotions of unpleasure—guilt
,
shame, and disgust—but states that there may be more. Most
significant for present purposes is that all secondary and
tertiary emotions are, implicitly, psychological entities,
in that they incorporate thoughts, images, memories, social
norms, and other distinctly psychological components.
Robert Emde (1980) has provided a more recent effort to
create a biological theory of affect for application in
psychoanalysis. He draws on biologically oriented theories
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in the psychology of emotion (e.g., Ekman
, Priesen s
Ellsworth, 1972, Izard, 1977, to devise what he calls an
"organizational" view of motion. Fro* this perspective
^^^^^^^^ inclode
Emde isolates a wide variety of views in psychoanalytic
writings which he considers to be evidence for the
pervasiveness of an organizational model of affect. These
views include attributing positive functions to affect,
viewing affects as indicators of intrapsychic functioning,
and considering affects to be continuously present. These
various views seem united primarily in opposing a view of
affect as a unitary and disruptive agitation.
In the course of Ep.de' s exposition it becomes clear
that he regards affects as biologically given patterns of
thought, behavior, and feeling which have generally adaptive
consequences. Once they are triggered, these patterns, as
he describes them, have an autonomous life, and influence
all aspects of functioning. They are inherited, presumably
in the form of templates which, singly and in combination,
organize responses in functional ways. This view of emotion
is as fully biological as the physiological theories brought
into psychoanalysis by Blau (1952) and Brunswick (1954) more
than two decades earlier, but it reflects the changes in
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biology in the interim, particularly the influence of
ethology.
Bowlby's (1969) studies of attachment are also an
outgrowth of modern ethology. Bowlby set out to study
infant attachment and separation within a broadly psycho-
analytic perspective, and soon had recourse to the
developing field of ethology (Hinde, 1966; Lorenz, 1963;
Tinbergen/ 1951). By bringing together British
psychoanalytic views and ethological thought, he created a
new view of instincts, which he hoped could substitute for
Freud's dated theory of the instincts. Bowlby offered a
radically new theory of emotion on the basis of his instinct
theory.
Bowlby's view of instincts was inspired by the
information processing metaphors which were exercising a
widespread influence. He termed this the "control systems-
viewpoint. He proposed replacing the concept of instincts
as "hard-wired" sequences of stereotyped movements with a
concept of "goal-corrected behavioral systems". Such
systems are organized around a goal with clear adaptive
significance for a species (e.g., mating, nestiro, raising
young) and subsume a number of behavior patterns which may,
depending on the circumstances, contribute to achieving the
goal. Rather than calling such behavior systems "innate",
he proposes adopting Hinde »s (195 9) 0 j st inction between
"environmentally stable" and "environmentally labile"
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behavior systems, the former are relatively uninfluenced by
different environments.
Bowlby's view of emotion is derived from his concept of
behavioral systems and of the role of "appraisal" in
initiating and guiding these systems. The concept of goal-
corrected systems holds that behavior is initiated when it
is likely to lead to a goal, and is corrected constantly to
make success most likely. This process requires constant
monitoring and appraising of both the situation and the
progress of the behavior sequence. Bowlby's conclusion is
that
affects, feelings, and emotions are phases of anindividual's intuitive appraisals either of his own
organismic states and urges to act or of the succession
of environmental situations in which he finds himself.(Bowlby, 1969, p. 104)
At some points during the unfolding of a behavior
system, the appraisals of internal tendencies and urges
(which are part of the system) and of the external situation
rise to consciousness, and are felt. This feeling of
ongoing processes, Bowlby argues, should not be construed as
having a causal influence on the process; at least, there
are no grounds for assuming that it does. To assume this,
Bowlby writes, is to make the category mistake of assuming
efficient causality when there is only dispositional
causality (Ryle, 1949; see also Fridhandler & Averill,
1982). That is, feelings are a reflection of the process
that gives rise to behaviors, not a cause of the process or
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the behaviors. Bowlby cites Ryle (1949, on the correct
dispositional interpretation of emotions.
The statement "Tom bit hia Hm«
e was
ement "the
likely to attack h?« ?0t to Tom ' Tom wou^ be
in other words, Tom does not hit his sister because he is
jealous, but his hitting his sister is part of being
jealous, as is his particular appraisal of his mother's
tending to her (as opposed to an appraisal linked to
indifference, or to helping mother).
Bowlby's characterization of emotion, then, is as a
reflection of a complex process involving physiological and
psychological components organized toward some end. The
concept of the emotion causing or being caused by aspects of
this process, such as appraisals of a situation or
introspective appraisals, becomes meaningless in this
conception. The emotion is a reflection of all these
processes, and serves to summarize them for the individual
or for others.
Ego and Cognition
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The history of the theoretical views on affects and the
ego is not easy to trace, owing to the many meanings that
have been attached to the concept of ego. when Freud or
other theorists have drawn connections between affects and
the ego it has not always been clear on what basis, and when
authors have not specifically related affect to the ego it
has been difficult to say whether such a connection is
implied. The connections to the ego have been in three
broad areas—consciousness, adaptation, and cognition. In
some cases, it has been enough that affects are generally or
always conscious for authors to place them in the ego.
Freud, though, had more in mind when, in the later periods
of his work, he placed affect in the ego (Freud, 1923/1961).
In his earlier work, his views of affect would have placed
them in the id, had the latter concept been formulated,
although the conscious nature of affect would have led to
complications. In the same work in which he formulated the
concepts of the ego and the id (Freud, 1923/1961), Freud
delivered his well-known formula "The ego is the actual seat
of anxiety." That, in Freud's view, anxiety was always
conscious, was one reason he included it within the province
of the ego. A more important reason was that he was
beginning to develop the signal theory, in which anxiety
formed an integral part of the ego's intra-psychic adaptive
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efforts, a third factor was Freud's conclusion that anxiety
was a psychological product, based on cognitive processes.
Formerly, he had retained his special view of anxiety as an
automatic transformation of libido, without psychological
participation. These themes were expanded by the authors
reviewed in the present section.
Charles Brenner has offered an ego-based theory of
affect (Brenner, 1974a, 1974b, 1975). The cornerstone of
the theory is the proposition that affects include ideas and
can only be identified through a consideration of these
conscious or unconscious ideas. Brenner regards his theory
as a substantial departure from Freud's major proposals and
from highly influential metapsychological statements by
Rapaport (1953) and Jacobson (1971a). The departure is in
Brenner's emphasis on ideas. Rapaport, Jacobson, and at
times Freud offer accounts of affect that depend primarily
or entirely on the concept of psychic energy and its
expression in physiological processes. Certainly these
theorists emphasized an opposition between affects and
ideas; for them, this distinction was fundamental. Brenner,
like Lewin (1965), denies that affects exist without ideas,
and gives ideas pre-eminent importance in determining the
nature of affect.
It is a measure of the distance between psychoanalysis
and academic psychology that Brenner's paper omits any
reference to the work of Stanley Schachter (1964), as
on
<
Brenner's main thesis duplicates Schachter's proposals,
which had preceded Brenner's by ten years. Schachter, too,
argued that emotion had to include physiological and
cognitive components--*!* Schachter, like Brenner, failed to
go beyond this statement to a consideration of affect as a
whole, as opposed to its component parts. Brenner's
theoretical definition of affect closely echoes Schachter's:
I believe that af fects.
. .are complex mental phenomena
o^a
h
mlxtirf
e
o^h Se?Sati °nS ° f Pleas^e, un^asure?r a i u e f the two, and (b) thoughts, memories/
toa^hl
f6
K
rfr in a word ' id*as.... ideas and sensat i\both conscious and unconscious, constituteand affect. (Brenner, 1974b, pp. 534-535) »cax™
Brenner offers an indication of what sorts of ideas are
associated with affect, by referring to theoretical and
clinical psychoanalysis. Although he states that the ideas
may be conscious or unconscious, all his examples concern
unconscious ideas deriving from childhood. For instance, he
cites Arlow's paper on smugness (Arlow, 1957) to suggest
that the thought in smugness is have it better than you.
I have my mother all for myself. »" in triumph, he suggests,
there is an unconscious idea that one has defeated a rival
or rivals. Borrowing from Fenichel (1934) and Greenson
(1953), Brenner suggests that boredom depends on an
unconscious attempt to convince oneself that one does not
want to gratify one or another forbidden wish. These
examples leave it an open question whether Brenner believes
an affect's idea can be wholly conscious.
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Brenner does not provide a theoretical account of the
relation between affects and ideas, except to assert that
they go together. His examples confuse matters, since they
include instances in which an idea characterizes an
affective state and could be considered a constitutive part
of the affect, and instances in which the ideas play only a
causal role. The first two examples above-smugness and
triumph-are of the first type, and Brenner's theory
requires that all his examples conform to this description.
But his example of boredom already confounds the issue-one
is not bored about the forbidden wish, one is bored because
one desires to avoid the wish-and further examples confuse
matters still more, as when he implies that euphoria
contains similar ideas as depression, when in fact he seems
to be referring to a causal relationship (i.e., euphoria as
an avoidance of depression). His more detailed clinical
examples only add to the ambiguities.
Despite its shortcomings, Brenner's views represented
an important advance. For virtually the first time, a
prominent psychoanalyst had, in an explicit theoretical
statement, emphasized ideas and meaning as essential parts
of affect, departing radically from the ambiguous,
physicalistic, "economic" explanations. By doing so,
Brenner dissolved a significant barrier that had obstructed
psychoanalytic understanding of affect, namely, the
artificial distinction between affect and ideas. His
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examples, although confused, demonstrate one benefit of this
achievement-he is able to bring the familiar methods of
psychoanalytic reasoning about ideas, symbols,
interpretations, and so on, to bear on the analysis of
affect. Even more broadly, he placed affect in the context
of the ego, and thereby implied a new set of fundamental
assumptions about affect. These assumptions concern not
only the cognitive involvement in affect, but include issues
of adaptiveness, relation to purposes, relation to
unacceptable wishes, and the role of affect in internal
psychological "regulation" and coping. These assumptions
are reflected in the present theory of affect, and are
discussed further in Chapter IV.
Max Schur's views on the relation of affects and the
ego are distinctive and were influential (Schur, 1953,
1969). in the earlier of his two papers dealing with this
topic he was concerned to systematize and clarify Freud's
views on anxiety, and in addition Schur took issue with some
of Freud's positions and suggested improvements. Schur's
basic proposition is that anxiety is a "response of the ego"
to danger or potential danger, but contrary to Freud, it is
not "produced" by the ego. What Freud called the production
of anxiety by the ego (as a "signal"), Schur argues is
better described as the ego producing danger (through
direction of attention or through fantasy) to which it then
responds with anxiety. Different "parts" of the ego are
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held responsible for the production of danger, the
experience of anxiety, and the use of the signal.
It is not immediately clear why Schur insists that the
anxiety is in the ego, since he depicts anxiety as a
natural, pre-programmed response to the perception of
danger, much as Blau (1952) had. Schur's reason seems to
have been his concern to eliminate Freud's concept of
"automatic- anxiety, which held out the possibility of the
production of anxiety through purely physiological
transformations. Schur regards psychological recognition of
danger as essential to anxiety, and this is evidently enough
for him to call anxiety an ego-response, as it was not for
Blau.
Schur distinguishes different types and degrees of ego
regression in anxiety. The first type is regression in
terms of the misperception of danger and the second is
regression in the form of the anxiety response. Neurotic
anxiety involves regression in the first sense or in both
senses. The most adaptive, least pathological form of
anxiety is one which Schur regards as "genetically related
to anxiety" but better called "awareness of danger" (with
little or no physiological discharge).
In a later paper, Schur turns specifically to the issue
of affect and cognition. His thesis is that all affects
intrinsically involve cognition, by which he means "mental
processes" such as "scanning, evaluation, judgement,
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repression, etc.- He argues that this view was implicit in
Freud's signal view of anxiety, and that it may be readily
extended to all affects. Regarding the particular relation
of the cognitive aspect of affects and the "feeling- aspect,
Schur is less clear. On the one hand, he states that the
cognitive process occurs first and the feeling consists of a
response to the cognitive element-a similar concept to that
of "appraisal" in the psychology of emotion (Lazarus,
Averill & opton, 1970)
-but then emphasizes that
the cognitive process and the response to it occur
In addition to these two writers, several authors
incorporate the ego, in one or another aspect, into their
account of affects. Brierley (1937) emphasized that affects
are "ego-experiences". Initially, her statement seems to
refer only to the fact that affects are typically conscious,
but as she develops her various themes (which are reviewed
above, in the sections on metapsychology and unconscious
affect, and in the Appendix) it becomes evident that she has
in mind a richer thesis, namely that affects encapsulate
aspects of one's identity or self, and that to experience an
affect is to acknowledge that part of oneself. Since for
Brierley, the ego or self develops out of relationships,
affects are by the same token internalized relationships.
Novey (1961) advances many similar points to
Brierley 's; he, too, regards affects as reflecting aspects
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of the self and of internalized relationships. Like Brenner
and schur, he stresses that no rigid distinction should be
drawn between affect and cognition, since every affect
involves processes that are ordinarily considered cognitive.
Lewin (1965), too, argues forcefully that no affect can
exist without cognition, and extends this argument to cases,
such as meditative ecstasy, where cognitive content seems to
be absent.
Rapaport's (1953) metapsychological propositions
include a type of affect he calls "completely
structuralized". By this he means an affect that involves
no consideration of psychic energy but which is entirely
under the "command" of the ego. In this formulation, he
implies an identification of physiology with the id.
Schafer (1964) emphasizes the adaptive potential in affect,
particularly when adaptation is construed in broad terms, as
referring to effectiveness, fulfillment, and meaningfulness
.
Rapaport (1953) also stressed the adaptive importance of
affect in reality testing, arguing that without affect, one
cannot have reliable knowledge about the external world.
(Unfortunately, he does not elaborate this claim.) Emde
(1980) places very great emphasis on the adaptive importance
of affect, although approaching the issue from a very
different perspective than Rapaport or Schafer. Emde's
perspective on affect, as noted above (in the section on
biological theories) is essentially biological, and this
excludes his concept of affect from most psychoanalytic
conceptions of the ego, though certainly not all. Finally,
Bowlby (1969) also connects enotion with adaptive processes,
again in a biological vein.
CHAPTER iv
A PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OP EMOTION
Introduction
In the present chapter, I offer a theory of emotion.
The theory's main purpose is to throw new light on old
questions, mostly psychoanalytic ones, it employs some
psychoanalytic concepts, but defines these in broader terms,
because using psychoanalytic terms without defining them
makes a theory psychoanalytic in the narrowest and most
sterile sense—meaningful only to the true believer. This
theory is meant to be psychoanalytic in a broader sense, and
so addresses issues that are meaningful to a wider audience,
in terms which this audience uses or could use.
The theory concerns only some of the phenomena that
have been studied under the term "affect" in the psycho-
analytic literature. This theory does not purport to
explain all affective phenomena; some of these it merely
classifies in new ways, and it ignores some altogether.
Psychoanalysis has sought in vain for a unitary theory of
affect, without recognizing that it had set itself an
impossible task. Like Rapaport (1953), theorists of affect
have often noted the heterogeneous phenomena that
psychoanalysis calls "affective", then pressed ahead with an
attempt to unify them under one theory. One can only devise
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a unitary theory for unitary phenomena.
Therefore, the present theory's domain is restricted to
emotions. Moreover, I am using the term in a specific
sense. Like "affect", "emotion" has been used in a great
variety of senses (Rorty, 1980). it is used here to refer
to a complex and relatively well formed entity, with certain
special components; emotion is further defined in the
discussion below. The theory will have its clearest
application to emotions in this sense; these will be its
paradigm cases. However, it will have something to say
about related phenomena, in particular about how they
approach and differ from full-fledged emotions.
The most important single influence on the present
theory is Averill's social constructivist view of emotion
(Averill, 1976, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1982, 1983,
1984). Many of its propositions are drawn from Averill's
work, and most, I believe, are in harmony with it. No
single psychoanalytic theory of affect has exerted a
predominant influence on the present theory. It resembles
Brenner's (1974b) in the emphasis on the ego in emotion, and
Bowlby's (1969) in its approach to components of emotion.
In most respects, though, the present theory is a departure
from previous psychoanalytic approaches to affect. At the
end of the chapter I discuss the reasons I believe the
present view constitutes a psychoanalytic theory despite
having few conspicuously psychoanalytic features.
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First, the theory is stated and an overview is given of
the basic propositions. Then
-emotion" is defined, and the
concept of the ego is defined as used here. Then the
concept of emotions as organizations is explored in detail,
and elaborations and implications of these views are
described. Finally, the place of the present view in
psychoanalysis is discussed.
Statement of Theory
The core of the present theory is the view that an
emotion is a schematic organization contained in the ego and
activated by the ego, of psychological, physiological, and
social responses, according to individually adapted,
socially based rules. The basic propositions are that
emotions include different kinds of responses, and that is a
mistake to argue that one type is "the emotion" and that the
others are appended to this. Although some previous
theories have recognized this, very few have then addressed
emotions at the level of a whole made up of parts. Instead,
most have merely addressed the parts. In the present
theory, emotions are addressed as organized wholes. The
concept of a schema is employed as an aid in conceptualizing
emotions as organized wholes.
The correspondence between emotions viewed in this way
and psychoanalytic theory is developed from two directions.
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The concept of the ego is used in an explanatory context.
Other concepts in psychoanalytic metapsychology are used
informally to structure aspects of the discussion, but are
not accepted as explanations, instead, I argue that the
present view of emotion entails certain fundamental psycho-
analytic assumptions and is at least compatible with all the
fundamental assumptions of psychoanalysis.
Emotion Defined
In the present section the term "emotion" is defined,
as it is used here. For the theorist, the definition is a
specialized one. That is, it is restricted to a small
subset of the phenomena that have been studied under
theories of affect or emotion. For the layperson, though,
it is not really a specialized definition, or at least is
not intended to be, because it is guided by common sense and
ordinary language. Ordinary language is the authoritative
reference for the present definition, and the definitions of
emotion and related concepts are accurate insofar as they
reflect the distinctions and usages of everyday life. Of
course, ordinary language is not always internally
consistent, and it lacks answers for some of the questions a
theorist must ask, so there are points where it must be
supplemented or refined.
Occasionally, ordinary language has been explicitly
taken as the standard for the psychoanalytic definition of
emotion (e.g.. Alexander i q-5c \ My., , 1935). More commonly, theorists
have relied on the common-sense definition without
recognizing or acknowledging it. Freud, as Lewin (1965)
argues, let the common-sense definition stand by default.
This is clearest in the clinical writings, but is true even
in the metapsychological works, where the notion, for
example, of "discharge" is never clearly defined and rests
in part on an "appeal to common sense" (Lewin, 1965, p. 28).
Often, psychoanalytic theorists have begun with a common-
sense definition, then gradually altered it over the course
of a theoretical exposition, ending with an entity that
corresponds to theoretical imperatives but not necessarily
to a phenomenon that exists outside of that theory. Jones
(1929) concept of aphanisis is a good example; some phases
of Freud's work, such as the discharge theory, also fit this
description.
Once this route has been traversed, one no longer has a
theory of emotion, but instead a theory in which emotion (or
some hybrid entity which carries the name) serves a
supporting function for other propositions. The greatest
advantage of maintaining a common-sense definition, and
doing so explicitly, is that one's theory then concerns an
entity that most people, whether as laypersons or as
theorists, would recognize as emotion.
No theory can cover all the many phenomena that are
called "emotional". Only a body of theory could do that.
The present theory takes for its focus a class of entities
that a layperson would identify clearly as emotions. It is
a fairly homogeneous class, so it is relatively manageable.
Also, it is representative of the phenomena that have been
studied as emotions by psychoanalysts, psychologists, and
philosophers.
Consider the following: anger, fear r sadness,
disappointment, pride, shame, guilt, grief, envy, jealousy,
remorse, regret, indignation, annoyance, gratitude, hope,
pity, resentment, contempt, dread, shame, and embarrassment.
What are their defining characteristics?
States
First, they are all states. Despite the prevalence of
state concepts in psychology, the conceptual category has
not been clearly defined. Webster's Dictionary defines
"state" as
a set of circumstances or attributes characterizing a
person or thing at a given time; way or form of being;
condition.
This definition points to the temporal dimension of states—
a state is present at a given time, which is to say, for
some definite and limited period of time. A state also
"characterizes" a person or thing. Beyond this, though, the
dictionary definition is not especially informative.
It may be most helpful to consider states in contrast
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with a related category, traits. One difference between
them is duration, states characterize a person only at a
given time, traits for much longer or permanently. Beyond
duration, though, one can identify two other important
differences. (For further details, see Fridhandler, in
press.
)
First, there is a difference in the frequency of
manifestations. A trait may not demonstrate its existence
over a very long period of time without raising doubt about
whether the trait is still present, so long as circumstances
do not warrant a manifestation. A genuinely cheerful person
may not look, feel, or act cheerfully for many months after
the death of a loved one, say, without calling the trait
into question. A state, on the other hand, must show itself
frequently or we are apt to assume it has ended, it is hard
to conceive of someone being in a happy state yet not
looking, feeling, or acting happy for hours at a stretch.
In fact, it is most typical for one or another aspect of a
state to be manifest for the entire duration of the state.
Second, states are more concrete than traits. States
imply some tangible, palpable referent; a quality of
immediacy is implied. Traits are thought of as more complex
and inferential entities.
Intentional Objects
In all these respects, emotions are like sensations,
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which can also be states. The resemblance is so strong that
emotions are often called "feelings" and are thought of as
if they simply were sensations. Theorists make this mistake
with dismaying frequency, and laypersons make it as well.
However, there is a clear distinction between emotions and
sensations in everyday linguistic usage.
Emotions differ from sensations in that they require
intentional objects (Pitcher, 1965). [ 4 ] An emotion is
about something, and logically has to be, in order to be an
emotion. A sensation may or may not refer to something in
this sense—may or may not have an object—and yet still
count as a sensation. Being about something is part of what
makes a state an emotion, and part of what makes it whatever
particular emotion it is. m order for a state to count as
anger, for example, one must be angry at someone about
something, but one could have a headache without it
referring to anything beyond the sheer sensation, in order
for a state to count fully as anger, it must have an object.
An emotional object is a complex of particulars. The
object of anger is not only a person, but some act that
violates some principle of right and wrong and for which the
person can reasonably be held responsible (i.e., it was done
knowingly or with culpable carelessness). Averill (1982)
divides the object of anger into the target (e.g., person),
instigation (e.g., wrongful act), and aim (e.g. redressing a
grievance)
.
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Emotional objects are called
"intentional- objects
because the objects of emotions are mental, not physical.
(The term was promulgated by the philosopher Franz Brentano,
who took it from the medieval scholastics.) The fact that
an emotional object is mental is clearest when it does not
correspond to objective reality. x can be angry at John ^
stealing my car even if he was not the one who stole it f or
if it was not stolen at all but towed away, m order for me
to be angry, it is only necessary that I believe John stole
the car. John stealing the car is the intentional object of
my anger
,
but it never happened. Even when an emotional
object corresponds to objective reality, it is the
intentional object that helps constitute the emotion, not
the physical things and events that the intentional object
refers to. Psychoanalytic theory knows the concept of an
intentional object under the term "mental representation"
(cf., Beres & Joseph, 1970; Novey, 1958; Sandler &
Rosenblatt, 1962). Freud may have been influenced in his
use of the concept by his studies with Brentano while a
medical student (Jones, 1953).
Emotions are Understood to be Involuntary
Emotions are interpreted by the emotional person and by
others as involuntary. Without this feature, they cannot
count as emotions (Averill, 1980a, 1982). This does not
mean that emotions are in fact voluntary, and that
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portraying them as involuntary is a deception (contrary to
de Rivera, 1984). Emotions are an organization and
interpretation of a number of elements, some of which are
readily interpreted as voluntary, some as involuntary, and
some not clearly as one or the other. The organization and
interpretation themselves, which constitute the emotion, are
ambiguous regarding volition, and this is the reason to
apply the concept of the ego to them.
The interpretation of emotions as involuntary is a
distinct issue from the "facts" of the matter, in this
interpretation, the involuntariness is highlighted. The
question of volition actually arises only rarely for psycho-
logical processes. When one "uses one's intelligence" to
solve a problem, one does so neither voluntarily nor
involuntarily. It just happens, usually, without conscious
intent to be intelligent, but on the other hand, one would
never say, "I couldn't help it." Emotions wear their
involuntariness on their sleeves, so to speak.
Other Affective Phenomena
The significance of the preceding attributes of
emotions should become more apparent when we turn our
attention to the affective phenomena that are excluded.
The list of emotions presented above omitted several
items that have been widely and routinely discussed as
emotions or affects in the psychoanalytic literature. Of
these omissions, probably the most glaring is anxiety.
Anxiety differs from the items on the list because it lacks
a clear object. According to the present definition, then,
anxiety is not an emotion.
Anxiety has been the focus of more psychoanalytic
theoretical study than any other affective state, but the
present theory does not apply directly to it. it does apply
indirectly, though. In the next chapter, I argue that
anxiety has been so intractable in part because it is like
an emotion (in the present definition) but is not exactly
like one, and I argue further that a better understanding of
anxiety can emerge from a consideration of its differences
from emotions.
Defining emotions so that anxiety is excluded may
depart from lay usage. If asked, most people would probably
say that anxiety is an emotion. Yet most people would
probably acknowledge a difference between anxiety and most
other emotions, even if they were unable to articulate that
difference. We know that we cannot say what we are anxious
about as clearly and specifically as we can say what we are
angry about or proud of. Sometimes when we try to say what
we are anxious about, we point to what is making us anxious
rather than what we are anxious about; that is, we point to
a cause rather than an object. (The distinction between
objects and causes is discussed later in the present
chapter.) when anxiety acquires a clear object, when one
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"figures out- what one is anxious about, the anxiety becon.es
an emotion
—fear.
Two other omissions from the list of emotions may be
conspicuous-love and hate. These are omitted because the
terms refer to both emotions and sentiments-more commonly
to the latter. Sentiments can be distinguished from states,
in the sense defined above. Sentiments do not come and go
like states, and do not have their palpable immediacy. One
can love or hate someone without feeling it at each and
every moment. More formally, sentiments are made up of a
complex of acts, feelings, and commitments, extended over
time (Brierley, 1937; Novey, 1961; Shand, 1914).
Finally, moods are excluded from the present definition
of emotions, because they, like anxiety, lack clear objects.
Moods are dispositions to see, feel, and act in certain ways
toward everything and everyone. The distinction between
emotions and moods has often been observed in psychoanalytic
theory (Brierley, 1937; Jacobson, 1971a).
Ego
The only term of the theory that is specifically
psychoanalytic is "ego". For psychoanalytically oriented
readers, the term will provide a context for addressing the
major psychoanalytic controversies about affect. For non-
psychoanalytic readers—that is, those who do not make
psychoanalytic theory their world view-the term reouires
definition in order for it to add to the statement of the
theory.
The concept of ego r although it has differentiated and
broadened vastly since the beginnings of psychoanalysis,
remains true to its origin as the repressing side of the
personality in conflict, when it was an id-psychology,
psychoanalysis investigated principally forbidden impulses;
the ego comprised the acceptable parts of oneself, and also
was the agency of repression. Consciousness was centrally
involved in the distinction, also. The impulses were
unconscious, and the ego (by default, as it were) was
conscious. The distinction between logical, rational,
"secondary process" thought and illogical
-primary process-
was also added relatively early to the central dualism
(Freud, 1911).
In its beginnings, psychoanalytic theory and treatment
paid relatively little attention to whatever was responsible
for repressing impulses, for the therapeutic technique was
simply to expose these impulses to the patient, in
principle, the "split" was thereby undone, that is, the
impulses had become part of the conscious system and had
lost their pathogenic force. As long as therapeutic success
was thought to be so straightforward, the parts of the
personality apart from the impulses seemed not to require
investigation.
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When psychoanalysis began to study the test of the
personality, the ego was defined as the
-agency- responsible
for negotiating rational "secondary process" solutions to
the problems presented by impulses, on the one hand, and by
people and things in the environment, on the other (Freud,
1923). m other words, the ego was defined as the agency of
adaptation.
To speak of emotion as being "in the ego"
, then, is to
make a claim that emotions are adaptive. It does not
specify what emotions help one adapt to, who or what
benefits from emotions and at what cost, or whether emotions
are the best possible way of adapting, it says, mainly,
that emotions have predominantly positive results for the
individual.
Emotions serve a variety of adaptive functions.
Socially, they aid in societal integration, and specific
emotions serve specific societal functions (Averill, 1982).
Emotions may also be helpful in an individual's social
relations. Interpersonally
,
they may benefit the individual
(for example, through a clearer communication of needs), the
other in a dyad, or a family or small group. The focus of
the present theory where functions are concerned, though, is
on functions for the individual. These functions can be
divided, heuristically at least, into promoting good
outcomes and minimizing disruptive effects of other
psychological entities. Emotions gain these benefits by
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integrating disparate elements. (These functions and the
means of achieving them are discussed later in the present
chapter and in the following one.)
There is a second connotation to the statement that
emotions are in the ego. m addition to being the adaptive
part of the personality, the ego has also been, from the
beginning of psychoanalytic theory, that part of the
personality which develops in response to the environment.
The theoretical precursor of the ego was the "system Cs-
Pcpt", standing for Conscious-Perception (Freud, 1895e,
1900). Freud "located" this system at the periphery of the
psychic apparatus, where it supposedly developed as a "cap",
due to its "contact" with the environment. He retained this
notion when, much later, he introduced the concept of ego
(Freud, 1923).
In the later work Freud specified that the ego's
development is based on a series of identifications with
significant others. [5] This concept, which formed the
basis for the object relations school, emphasizes the ego's
social nature, its dependence on interactions with others
for its content, in addition to the British object
relations theorists, Erikson (195 9) and to some extent
Kernberg (1976) have developed this theme.
In the present theory of emotion, the social nature of
the ego occupies a central place. The theory holds that
emotions are based on social rules, as adapted by the
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individual. Since the ego is primarily social, the
statement that emotions are in the ego is consistent with,
and already argues, the claim that they are socially-based.
My statement is not only that emotions are in the ego
but also that they are activated by the ego. This clause is
in particular need of elaboration. To say that emotions are
in the ego gives them a metaphorical location (in the manner
of Freud's "topographical point of view"), which in turn
asserts that they have certain characteristics, it
describes them. The latter statement, that they are
activated by the ego, speaks to the issue of what causes an
episode of emotion, and is in an active voice. The ego,
then, is doing something when we have an emotion. What does
it mean to state that the ego does something?
Some authors have rejected such theoretical statements.
Schafer (1976) has criticized the notion of the ego doing
anything, arguing that such statements are nonsensical,
since only persons can do things. Hartmann (1964), too, has
objected to the anthropomorphic nature of this concept, and
has sought a more consistently mechanistic scheme.
Waelder, however, (1967) takes an equally incisive but
more sophisticated view. He, too, notes that the concept of
ego is of an entirely different order than that of the
drives; he draws the contrast in terms of "teleology" versus
"mechanism", that is, explanations based on goals and
purposes versus ones based exclusively on efficient
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causality. He states that Freud became progressively more
acceptant of teleological concepts, but nonetheless never
relinquished his preference for mechanistic concepts, m
this, waelder writes, Freud was consistent with the dominant
trend in Western scientific thought.
Waelder sees in modern analysts' acceptance of the
concept of ego an acceptance on an equal footing of both
mechanistic and teleological models of explanation.
Although in Waelder 's view it remains an open question
whether this situation is ultimately satisfying from a
scientific point of view, he states, he believes this
duality necessary for psychoanalytic theory at present and
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. He argues
that psychoanalytic theory is not the only scientific area
to accept teleological models, pointing to Darwinian
evolutionary theory and American behaviorism.
Like many other issues in psychoanalytic theory, the
problem at hand calls for a teleological model of
explanation. In the present theory, an episode of emotion
is, in part, a means of achieving certain goals (to be
described later)
. The general character of an emotion is
based on a pre-existing pattern or schema, but having an
emotion on a particular occasion and the details of the
episode (who is the emotion's target, the intensity of the
emotion, how lnong it lasts and what is required to
terminate it, etc.) coincide, to a considerable extent, with
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current goals and with many aspects of the current situation
which relate to these goals. A coherent account of these
relationships requires a teleological mode of explanation,
and in psychoanalysis, teleology is the province of the ego.
The classification of emotion or affect as an ego
function has a long but irregular history in psychoanalytic
theory. Freud at one point (Freud, 1923) stated
dogmatically that anxiety, and by extension all affects, are
situated in the ego. His reasons for stating this seem to
have been, first, that affects are conscious, and
consciousness is restricted to the ego. Second, and more
important, Freud was in the process of developing the signal
theory of anxiety, in which anxiety is functional and is
under the ego's control, other analytic theorists, notably
Brierley (1937), Schur (1969), and Brenner (1974a, 1974b,
1975) have classified affects in the ego, for similar
reasons and due to the involvement of "cognition" in affect.
In other cases, affect has clearly not been included in
the ego. This was true for Freud, prior to the signal
theory. Other early theorists, such as Landauer (1938) and
Jones (1929), saw affects as more or less automatic
reactions, closely tied to the drives. Fenichel (1941/1954)
understood affects in terms very similar to the classical
psychoanalytic view of drives, and opposed them to the ego.
Some recent theorists take a view that cannot be easily
classified, but in any case do not view affects as ego
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functions in the sense of the ego which is being employed
here. Emde (1980) is an example. He regards affects as
organizing entities, and thus they are "on the side" of the
ego f so to speak. But he, like Basch (1976)
, regards
affects as essentially automatic, biological entities, and
such entities, if they are ego functions, are so in only an
extended sense. Finally, there are mixed models, such as
Blau's (1955). Blau holds anxiety to be simply a biological
function, but describes other negative affects as secondary
and tertiary elaborations, on the basis of cognitive ego
functions.
In the present theory, the classification of emotion as
an ego function refers to the cognitive, synthesizing
activity involved in emotion, to the elaboration beyond
physiological givens, to the adaptive significance of
emotion, and to the importance of a teleological model of
explanation.
Emotions as Organizations
In psychoanalytic and psychological theory, emotion has
been identified with biological, psychological, and
occasionally social entities. Even within a relatively
homogeneous field such as psychoanalysis the dispute over
whether emotion is essentially physiological or cognitive
has continued to repeat itself, without signs of resolution
or even progress. In the field of psychology, viewpoints
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are If anything even more polarized, and the opposing camps
predominate successively, in the continuing s«ing of a
pendulum (Aver ill
, 1983).
The study of emotion in both fields has been the victim
of a category mistake. The search for a single nature of
emotion is misguided, and when we engage in the search we
are "barking our way up the wrong gum tree" (Austin,
1950/1979). Ryle (1949) explicated the concept of a
category mistake. He defines a category mistake as
representing something of one logical type or category as if
belonged to another (Ryle, 1949, p. 16). He gives as an
example a foreign visitor to Oxford who, after being shown
the various colleges that make up Oxford, said, "This has
been very nice, and now I would like to see the University
itself." The visitor made the mistake of thinking that the
University was another entity like the colleges, when in
fact it is the collection of colleges, an entity of a
different logical category.
Emotions are physiological entities, and they are
cognitive entities also. They contain elements of both
these types, but they cannot be reduced to any single
element. To some extent, the story of the blind men and the
elephant provides an analogy. (Several blind men confronted
by an elephant set out to discover what an elephant is like.
One says it is cold, smooth, and tapers to a point; another
says it is like a wall made of leather; another says it is
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round like a tree trunk and must be glued to the ground as
it cannot be lifted, and so on.) Emotions contain many of
the elements that have been attributed to them, but no one
element is the emotion to which other elements are
accidental accompaniments. Emotions are superordinate
organizations of their elements.
There have been a few theories which regarded emotions
as superordinate organizations, but only a few. in the
field of psychology, Leventhal (1979), de Rivera (1977),
Schachter (1964) have been among the few to define emotions
as organizations, prior to Averill (1980a). m psycho-
analytic theory, Freud (1916) originally described affect as
being made up of distinct components.
[An affect] is in any case something highly composite.An affect includes in the first place particular motorinnervations or discharges and secondly certainfeelings; the latter are of two kinds—perceptions ofthe motor actions that have occurred and the directfeelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say,give the affect its keynote. (Freud, 1916, p. 395)
This view was in keeping with Freud's view of instincts as
made up of constituent parts (Freud, 1905). However, Freud
did not hold to a concept of affect as a composite entity.
A few psychoanalytic theorists since Freud have
endorsed a view of emotions as composites, and some others
have favored some related (and usually ambiguous) view.
Zilboorg (1933) broke emotions down into components as an
aid in understanding his patient's "anxiety without affect".
Blau (1°55) proposes a view of affect as made up of three
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major classes of components, although he offers no account
of how these components are united. Bowlby (1969)
implicitly advances a similar view when he argues that
emotions are unfolding behavior systems that are felt, since
these behavior systems are composed of multiple elements.
Brenner (1974b) advocates a view of emotions as composites
of id and ego components (in this case meaning, biological
and cognitive)
.
He argues that the two classes of
components are both essential. Other theorists have been
less clear. Pine (1980) in effect uses a composite concept
of emotion, but nonetheless attempts to separate a pure
"psychobiological" emotion from ideas and verbal labels, and
Pulver (1971) perceptively enumerates important components
of emotion, only to exclude most from the "pure feeling".
Although some psychoanalytic theorists of affect have
suggested that affect is composed of distinct components,
only Emde (1980) seems to have realized that this requires
addressing affects or emotions as superordinate
organizations of their components. Of these theorists,
most, like Blau (1955) and Brenner (1974b), have enumerated
affective components but have given no account of how these
are unified. In fact, they have thus failed to given any
theory at all of affect or emotion; at best, they have given
a theory of affect's components, or a catalog of items to be
accounted for by a theory. Blau's begging of the question
is characteristic.
We are all familiar with the difficulty of
STSSS3 til tSr^^Bl£^^
The neglect of the emotion itself in favor of its
components is a symptom of the category mistake which has
vitiated the study of emotion. Blau's impotent perplexity
in the face of "elusive" affect reveals his assumption that
affect or emotion is of the same logical category as its
components, and that one experiences affect in the same
sense as one experiences the "visceral reactions" that he
considers among affect's components. The affect, he
assumes, is simply a more subtle, ephemeral experience—
a
more ghostly one, as Ryle (1949) might have said. This is a
theoretical dead end. One cannot build a theory of an
entity that has no possible logical existence; one can only
invent a myth or elaborate a reification.
The present theory of emotion explicitly adopts a view
of emotions as organizations of component responses. This
view is taken from Averill, who calls the organization of
components a "syndrome". Within such a view, it is possible
to accommodate the various biological, psychological, and
social responses that have been identified by psychoanalytic
theories of affect, and to then address the virtually
ignored issue of how these elements are unified into some
entity which we can refer to as an emotion.
In the following section, some specific components of
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emotions are discussed, and in the subsequent section th
logic and implications of emotions as organizations are
further examined.
Component Responses
There are many components in emotions. They can be
roughly broken down into biological, psychological, and
social ones, at least for purposes of exposition. (Often,
the difference between these categories is only a matter of
the point of view one adopts. See Averill, 1982, on "levels
of analysis".)
The biological, nativist theories of emotion have
produced many hypotheses about the nature of emotion. The
physiological theories (e.g., Wenger, 1950) have favored
autonomic nervous system functions and the associated end
organ changes. The James-Lange theory included such
autonomic functions, but implicitly also included
instinctive motor action. More recently among psychologists
and a few analysts, innately patterned facial expressions
have been cited as a basis of emotion (Basch, 1976; Ekman,
Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962,
1963)
.
There is no reason that any such biological responses
cannot be components of emotion, assuming they conform to
the general features of emotion. None of them constitutes
the emotion, but they may surely be included among the
elements. Biological responses that are automatic and
noticeable are especially well suited to become elements of
emotions. Automatic responses provide an experience of
palpable, literal passivity, which helps to establish and
confirm the theme of involuntariness in emotion. Responses
that are noticeable to the emotional person or to others
( e «g./ gastric activity, blush-inn^ ...ux fan g; aid the communicative
functions of emotions and make the evidence of
involuntariness more compelling. (See Averill r 1984 for an
example, drawn from Bateson, 1976, of the use of reflexes in
the socialization of trances in a Balinese society.)
The role biological responses play will vary in
different emotions, persons, and occasions. For a
particular emotion, a particular response (e.g., sympathetic
activation or a facial expression) may be essential,
optional, or even proscribed, it may be emphasized by a
particular person and not by another. A person may include
it on one occasion and not on another, and the meanings of
the response may vary from one person, dyad, family, or
group to another.
In short, one can affirm the reality of biology and
provide an important place for biological responses in a
theory of emotion while still denying that emotions are bio-
logical
.
There are as many different psychological elements
involved in emotions as there are biological ones, perhaps
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-any more. No a priori classification of these elements can
be given, since they include representatives from all
categories of psychological contents, such as thoughts,
beliefs, desires, intentions, images, needs, and memories,
as well as psychological reflections of physiological
processes, such as sensations and perceptions, in the narrow
sense. Psychoanalytic theory has developed conceptual
categories for these psychological contents; the principal
such categories are id, ego, superego, and self and object
representations. (The concept of mnemic trace was important
in Freud's metapsychology
, but has mostly been abandoned in
favor of self and object representations).
Unlike biological elements, which are rarely if ever
essential to an emotion, certain psychological components
are necessary constituents of emotions. First, emotions
must have intentional objects. Emotions as a class are
partly defined by having intentional objects, and particular
emotions are partly defined by having particular intentional
objects. These objects are made up of various thoughts,
beliefs, and intentions. Second, emotions are experienced
with a special sort of involuntariness , and this is another
necessary psychological component.
Because of the regularity in intentional object,
generalizations can be made about some psychological
elements of particular emotions. As a first example, let us
consider guilt. Guilt depends on internalized prohibitions
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and other principles (Pine, 1980), and the experience of
guilt involves a number of psychological elements related to
such principles. Among these are belief that one has
violated such principles, anticipation of disapproval from
some legitimate authority should he or she learn of the
violation (a disapproving internal object, in psychoanalytic
terms), perhaps memories of such disapproval in the past,
and an intention to atone and regain the anticipated
approval of the internalized object.
To take another example, consider disappointment. This
involves memory of a desire, a belief that this desire will
not be fulfilled, and a further belief that one's efforts
could not lead to the fulfillment of the desire.
Anger will serve as the final example. Like guilt,
anger involves internalized principles. In anger, there is
a belief that someone else has violated these principles, an
image of the other person as being disapproved of by
legitimate authority (which psychoanalytic theory considers
often a projection of one's own guilty self representation;
see Bychowski, 1966), and an intention to "set things right"
either by forcing a change or by counter-aggression.
Apart from these universal elements, the types and
particular psychological contents vary, just as biological
ones do.
The social components of emotions include what psycho-
analytic theory refers to as relations with the "external
world-
.
These would include ones that have been emphasized
by some theories, suoh as facial expressions, and also
include elements that are not specifically emotional but can
be contained in emotions just like "non-emotional-
psychological components. These latter social elements
include such things as verbal formulas and conventions,
enactments of hierarchical relations, conventionalized
management of interactional episodes, and so on. These
social components are to be distinguished from the socially
based rules that guide the integration of all the elements
of an emotion.
Schematic Organizations
Once one speaks of components of emotion, the emotion
per se is at the level of a superordinate organization and
must be addressed at that level. Organizations, though, are
extremely difficult entities to conceptualize. For whatever
reasons, we are accustomed to thinking of far more concrete
entities. When we refer to an "it", as we do with an
emotion, we expect to be able to point to it, in some sense.
Emotions are not elusive experiences— it is difficult to
think of more compelling ones—but they elude being pointed
to. One is little helped by the concept of a superordinate
organization. It does not offer familiar possibilities for
comprehension and elaboration. If one is to advance beyond
the previous efforts to comprehend emotions, one requires
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conceptual tools for address i no <-v™aa essmg them as organizations.
The concept of a schema offers such a tool. This
concept, introduced into psychology by Bartlett (1932)
, has
in recent years received growing attention as part of the
interdisciplinary field of "cognitive science", of the
several computer-influenced metaphors that have been so
widely applied in the past two decades, such as control
systems (see Bowlby, 1969)
, plans (Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram, 1960), and scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977),
schemas are perhaps the most general and therefore the least
tied to engineering and computer programming. Bartlett
(1932) used the concept to combat the concretistic
understanding of memories as "traces" of previous experience
stored somehow in the brain (Paul, 1967). In its more
recent applications, the concept of a schema has been
applied to knowledge in general (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977)
and, most broadly, to all mental phenomena (Mandler, 1984).
Here, it offers a means of conceptualizing emotions as
subtle, dynamic organizations.
Despite its wide use, the concept of schema has rarely
been defined. The meaning has usually been allowed to
coalesce out of a series of applications (in fact, in just
the way schemas themselves are said to develop)
. It is used
to mean several different kinds of frameworks or skeletal
organizations which bring order and relationship among
elements. When applied to memory, it suggests that memories
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are stored as abstract forms or outlines. Most uses of the
concept imply that schemas may be viewed in both static and
active aspects. They are spoken of as being
-stored"
, but
also as doing things ("performing cognitive operations")
once they are "activated".
The concept's usefulness in the present context derives
from the fact that it is a conceptualization of a super-
ordinate organization, which has been applied and elaborated
in a variety of settings. It offers some precedents in
comprehending and using a notion of a psychological
organization of elements—some footsteps to follow, so to
speak. Rumelhart (1980) has offered an introduction to the
current uses of the concept of schema in cognitive science
in which he attempts to convey the major features of the
concept and to define some of the major associated terms.
He provides no single definition of schema, but instead
gives a series of analogies.
Rumelhart first likens schemas to plays. The chief
analogy here is that both schemas and plays have component
parts that have stable general definitions but which, on
given occasions, can be filled by different specific items.
In a play, these are the roles and the actors. In a schema,
these are commonly termed the "variables" and their
"values". Rumelhart gives the example of the schema for a
purchase, that is, the concept of purchasing or buying. We
know that a purchase involves a buyer, a seller, some medium
of exchange, and merchandise. These are the variables. On
any given occasion, they can be filled by any of a large set
of items. The schema gives the relation among the items,
which imparts the meaning to the series of events, or, to
put it another way, the schema gives the set of instructions
for accomplishing an act of buying.
Although each of the "variables- in a schema can be
filled by any one of a number of items, there are limits on
what can fill the variable. These limits, according to
Rumelhart, are usually called "variable constraints", in
buying, the buyer and the seller are typically persons and
the medium of exchange is typically money. These "values"
for the "variables" are prototypical, and they suggest that
there is a prototype for each schema. As more and more
divergent items fill the variables or roles of a schema, the
schema fits less and less well, and at a certain point,
ceases to be an instance ("instantiation") of that schema.
For example, in buying, generally, the merchandise and the
medium of exchange covary in value; that is, the more one
buys, the more one must pay. This is typical of buying, but
not absolutely essential. Nominal payments fall just within
the schema of buying. If a non-profit institution buys a
building from a philanthropic corporation for one dollar,
this may qualify as a purchase for some purposes (corporate
taxes, perhaps), but it is far from the prototype for
buying. Examples like these suggest that variants of the
ideal instance of a prototype can still be recognized.
Rumelharfs second analogy for a schema is a theory.
Schemas provide a model of a situation that may aid in
comprehending that situation, depending on how well the
model fits, as with a theory, Rumelhart proposes, one tests
the fit of one's schemas with the current situation, through
making observations, when some critical number of
observations fit, the schema is accepted, and from that
point guides assumptions about the situation.
Once accepted, a schema not only provides assumptions
about what further observations would reveal, but also
provide a course of action, and this feature leads to
Rumelharfs third comparison, to the procedures in computer
programs. Like such procedures, schemas are sets of
instructions that, once activated, provide a sequence of
actions oriented to some goal. The goal Rumelhart specifies
is evaluating the "fit to the available data", but in other
uses, schemas have been described as having a variety of
goals. (Rumelhart need not have turned to computer programs
for the feature of prescribing a course of action, since a
play also does so.)
Of the features of schemas highlighted by Rumelhart,
the four of most interest here are: they are organizations
of elements; they are frameworks that fit situations more or
less well; they are organized by an ideal instance or
prototype; and once they are accepted, they organize
in
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perception and guide action. Each of these features is
useful in conceptualizing emotion. Rumelhart and others who
employ a concept of schema (e.g., Mandler, 1984) speak of
the "activation" of schemas and by implication of two
possible states for schemas, active and inactive. This
feature is also useful for the present discussion. Of these
five features of schemas, the importance of the concept
conceptualizing emotions as organizations has already be,
described. Let us review the remaining four features
they apply to emotions.
Emotions fit situations more or less well. This is
clearest with regard to the object of emotion, when one
levels an accusation in anger, the accusation is well or
poorly justified, the target of anger is or is not the
guilty person, and the redress one seeks is either suitable
or not. The relevant situation includes many other factors
than these, however. It includes also the internal
situation, what Freudian theory calls the state of the
psychic apparatus. This situation can be broken down into
current needs and goals (in Freud, drives in a state of
cathexis) and the degree of current conflict between
impulses and prohibitions. In ways that are detailed below,
all these factors are part of the situation that an emotion
fits more or less well.
Rumelhart and others consider schemas to be organized
around a prototypical case; for each schema, there is in
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principle a "classic" example, although this classic example
may never have actually existed and may never exist. De
Sousa (1980a) suggests a similar and very useful notion for
emotions-the "paradigm scenario", such a scenario
specifies characteristic objects and responses in emotion,
and one learns these scenarios as children through personal
experiences (as one is led by adults to understand them) and
through cultural products, such as stories and fairy tales.
Paradigm scenarios lend themselves to a very similar line of
reasoning to the one being advanced here in connection with
schemas.
Learning to "gestalt" situations in terms of suchscenarios is learning to attend differentially tocertain features of an actual situation, to inquireinto the presence of further features of the scenario,
ano to make inferences that the scenario suqqests.(oe Sousa, 1980a, p. 143)
Emotions, once activated, organize perception and guide
action. Rumelhart's comparison of schemas with theories is
germaine.
Once we have accepted a configuration of schemata, the
schemata themselves provide a richness that goes farbeyond our observations. On deciding that we have seen
an automobile, we assume that it has an engine,
headlights, and all of the standard characteristics of
an automobile. We do this without the slightest
hesitation. We have complete confidence in our little
theory. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 38)
It is a commonplace that emotions influence the way one sees
things. For the most part, the everyday assumption is that
emotions tend to distort perception of events, that is, to
introduce irrationality. Equally often, emotions highlight
valid perceptions and lead to a deepened, *ore complete
view, in either case, emotions lead beyond the "observable"
and the already known.
Many emotions do more than influence perception of the
external situation; they lead to action. These actions have
an intricate structure. In anger, for example, it Is
possible to isolate patterns of aggressive and nonaggressive
action organized toward solving problems (Averill, 1982).
An emotion plays a role, potentially, in everything one does
and says while in its "grip", and one's actions and words at
such times are not disorganized. They cohere around the
theme of the emotion, around its structure. The schema-
concept helps to conceptualize this organization.
Finally, we need a way of referring, in the language of
schen&s, to the state of having an emotion. The concept of
the activation of a schema establishes this link. If we
employ the concept of schema for emotions, we can speak of
being in a emotional state as having an active schema, and
the analogy inclines us toward conceptualizing an
organization that has pervasive influence during distinct
periods of time. The "operations" and directions in a
schema correspond to the set of dispositions that make up an
emotional state (Fridhandler & Averill, 1982), which can
also be described as a set of rules (Averill, 1982, 1984;
Cornelius, 1984).
A note on origins of emotions. The issue of the
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origins of emotions is largely outside the scope of the
present effort. This theory takes up primarily at the point
where emotional schemas are available for the ego's use,
having been acquired over the course of development, it is
assumed, though, that emotions are cultural products, as
proposed by Averill. In his "social constructivist"
perspective, as just noted, emotions are thought to be based
on- socially developed rules. These rules include rules of
interpretation (constitutive rules) and rules of procedure
and action (regulative rules), which parallel the meanings
and procedures included here as part of emotional schemas.
The schema-concept used here and the concepts of rule
and role in Averill are parallel terms for roughly the same
entities. The concept of schema is chosen here to
emphasize: the presence of prototypes for each emotion; the
possibility of variations on, and distortions of, this
prototype; the evaluation of the internal and external
situation vis-a-vis the activation of emotion; the imposing
of the intentional object on external reality; and the
organizing functions of emotion. The assumption that
emotions are sociocultural products is more strongly
connoted by the role-rule terminology, but it is accepted
here as well.
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Some Elaborations and Implications
Objects, Causes, and Activation
An important aspect of this view of emotions as
schematic organizations is that the object of an emotion is
part of the emotion, rather than simply its cause. Among
psychoanalytic theorists, only Bowlby (1969) has explicitly
espoused such a view, in his discussion of emotion, he
argued, on the basis of Ryle (1949), that the intentional
object of an emotion should not be considered its cause, but
should instead be considered one part of the emotional
state, alongside all the others, m Bowlby's account, the
emotional state is part of an activated behavioral system.
In the present account, the emotion is itself a schematic
organization.
With this view of intentional objects as a constitutive
part of an emotion, rather than its cause, some tradition-
ally difficult problems become far less meaningful. For
instance, it has long been a difficult problem for theories
of emotion to account for the fact that one's emotional
state seems to effect the way one perceives the situation
that underlies the intentional object. For example, in the
usual view, one becomes angry when someone has done
something wrong. However, often one's anger makes an act
seem to be a wrongful one, so that the anger causes one to
misperceive the act. In fact, in all episodes of anger, the
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wrongful act comes to seem more clearly and thoroughly
wrongful. Therefore, if the wrongful act, or even the
perception of the wrongful act is considered to be the cause
of the anger, we have the difficult situation of something
(the anger) causing its own cause. However, if the
intentional object (the wrongful act as perceived, in its
perceived context) is part of the schematic organization,
this problem is much less meaningful.
This feature of the present theory—that the
intentional object is part of the emotion-provides a new
understanding of an old and central theme in psychoanalytic
theory of affect. Freud often considered affects to be
inherently justified, as discussed above in Chapter II. m
order to account for this, he had to assume an unconscious
object, which could be "replaced- by another in
consciousness. Freud had difficulty providing a grounding
for this assumption about emotion. At one point (1915d) he
abandoned it, and when he moved to restore it (1923), he
could give it only an awkward and provisional account,
referring to a "something- in the unconscious. (See above,
Chapter II, "The Signal Theory of Anxiety".) m the present
view, affects or emotions are inherently justified because
an intentional object is part of the emotion; they are
inseparable. Thus, the present theory incorporates one of
Freud's central views of affect, and provides a new account
of it.
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If the object does not cause the emotion-if the
wrongful act does not cause the anger--*, are left with the
question of what causes an emotion, since the term "cause-
is so ambiguous, referring to many factors besides the
immediate efficient cause, it may avoid confusion to
substitute the term "activate". This latter term also fits
well with the concept of a schema. The question, then, is
what activates an emotional schema on a given occasion?
It is the ego. The ego activates an emotion when it
"judges" the situation to be right for that emotion. The
"situation", in this case, includes the internal, psycho-
logical situation, as well as the external, interpersonal
and social situation. Many factors go into this "judgment".
The internal factors can be roughly grouped into, first,
needs and goals, and relevant aspects of the external
situation, and second, internal dangers and potential
disruptions. The external factors are the ones more
commonly thought to cause an emotion, and include everything
referred to in the intentional object, and much else. When,
in the ego's "judgment" (which is fallible), enough factors
indicate that an emotion would be adaptive, it is activated.
Certainly, the concept of the ego judging factors and
activating a schema is a theoretical convenience. It is a
metaphor, drawn from psychoanalytic metatheory, for complex
processes of monitoring and self-monitoring. We have no
"literal" way of describing these processes, yet we have no
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choice but to assume that some such processes take place; in
other words, we have no choice but to assume that something
analogous to conscious monitoring underlies all the
accomplishments of human intelligence, from reading a word
to following a map to having an emotion, it becomes a
question of choosing the best metaphor for the purposes. In
the present case, the judgment of the ego becomes the
metaphor of choice because it resolves some difficulties and
because it is a familiar part of psychoanalytic theory.
The needs and goals monitored by the ego are numerous.
A comprehensive accounting of them would require a theory of
needs and goals, and such a theory would be cumbersome and
inessential here. Several theories of needs have been
developed in psychology, some of them with psychoanalytic
inspiration (e.g., Murray, 1938). Within psychoanalytic
theory, many needs and goals have been recognized, none
unanimously. Some have derived from concepts of instinct,
but only Freudians have insisted that all needs and goals be
traced to instincts. In ego psychology, the concept of
conflict-free parts of the ego opens the way to needs and
goals with no relation to repressed instincts, and various
special needs and goals have been formulated, such as
Sandler's goal of safety (Sandler, 1981) or Kohut's need for
admiration (Kohut, 1971). For the present purposes, the
best approach is an pluralistic one; that is, there is no
need to restrict the list of needs and goals which are
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relevant to emotions. Instead, we can clarify the rolg Qf
needs and goals in the present view of emotion by surveying
examples.
Regarding the internal dangers and potential
disruptions that emotions help to contain, the traditional
division of the ego's adversaries provides a useful guide.
That is, we may usefully divide the dangers and disruptions
into id and superego factors, id factors are chiefly
unacceptable impulses, whereas superego factors involve
primarily self-criticism and "attacks" on oneself. The
concept of the ego using emotions to help it deal with
dangers and disruptions includes the concept of emotions
acting as defenses.
A good example of this process can be drawn from
Freud's paper on jealousy and other topics (Freud, 1922).
Freud describes three forms ("layers") of jealousy: normal,
projected, and delusional. In projected jealousy, one
projects one's own unacceptable impulses toward unfaithful-
ness. In this way, one disowns the impulses and escapes
from damaging self-reproaches. In "delusional" jealousy,
unacceptable homosexual impulses are expressed. "As an
attempt at defence against an unduly strong homosexual
impulse it may, in a man, be described in the formula:
^Indeed I do not love him, she loves him!'" Freud regards
this as a defense, but in fact it is better characterized as
a defended expression of the impulse, since it provides a
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license to dwell on thoughts of the other man, including
sexual thoughts.
To take another example, it is customary to think of
the aggressive impulses of anger as caused by the anger.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, though, one is more
inclined to think of aggressive, destructive impulses as
existing prior to the anger and using the anger as a
rationalization. This assumes a displaceability of
impulses, and assumes psychoanalytic concepts of
transference as well, m other words, it is possible for
distorted destructive impulses to have an active existence
while remaining unconscious, and to be activated in complex
ways. When such is the case, the ego can make use of anger
to provide a structured and more acceptable vehicle for the
destructive impulses, which can then be expressed with less
disruption and less self-criticism.
In the detailed example below, a further instance of
the ego's use of an emotion in adapting to internal dangers
is presented. Here, we turn to an exploration of the
special adaptive value of emotion, and to the related issues
of irrationality and maladaptiveness.
Adaptiveness and Irrationality
Psychoanalysis has not been particularly successful in
treating the question of the adaptiveness of emotions. On
the one hand, most of the major psychoanalytic theories of
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affect have considered affect to be adaptive to internal
circumstances. In Freud's discbarge theory, affect provides
a "safety valve" when more direct drive gratification is
impossible, m his signal theory, anxiety serves the
crucial purpose of signalling a need for defensive efforts,
and Brenner (1975) has carried this analysis over to other
affects. Rapaport (1953) retains the discharge
understanding of the function of affect, and Jacobson
(1971b) adds an account of affects mediating interactions
between the ego, id, and superego that parallels the one
presented here. Some other theories have not attended to
the question of functions, while at least one has attributed
practically every imaginable functional benefit to them
(Emde, 1980)
.
On the other hand, although no theorist has explicitly
argued that emotions are entirely maladaptive, psycho-
analytic theory has not been particularly comfortable with
the notion of emotions holding a unique value. Intellect-
ualism and high regard for rationality pervade the logical
structure of psychoanalysis, through the basic dualities of
conscious and unconscious or ego and id. Within this
structure, it has been difficult to give a theoretical value
to affect. Thus, Schur (1953) finds himself compelled to
reserve his theoretical endorsement for the most thought-
like affects, and neither Fenichel (1941/1954) nor Rapaport
(1953) can formulate good theoretical reasons for their
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conviction that there is an optimal degree of affectivity
and that affect has crucial roles to play.
In the present theory, the ego activates an emotion
when it considers that this particular emotion will further
its own adaptive efforts. The adaptive efforts to which
emotions may contribute involve a wide range of internal and
external ends. Perhaps the most inclusive of these is
increased understanding and organization, which is primarily
an internal end. A need for increased meaningfulness and
organization arises when situations, particularly
interpersonal situations, are evidently important yet
ambiguous. Such situations present one with such questions
as: what is the meaning of this occasion? what will be its
impact on me and on others? Of the different aspects of
this situation, which are the more and less important? what
are the best things to do and say? How do I know whether
others are participating in the same event I am, and if they
are not, how can I best communicate a wish that they do so?
Emotion-schemas offer answers to such questions. They
provide a coherent set of interpretations and instructions,
connecting the present situation with other situations and
social institutions, so that one's own understanding is
increased and so that one may make oneself understood to
others. To take one example, a wedding is an ambiguous
situation. The emotion of happiness can provide a unifying
theme, allowing coherent shared understandings and a shared
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construction of an event with implications.
An increase in the comprehensibility and organization
of ambiguous situations, then, is one of the goals toward
which the ego employs emotions, m the previous section,
the major factors in the ego's decision to activate an
emotion were described, and each of these corresponds to
further adaptive goals. Needs and goals in the common-sense
definitions are included, when the ego is relatively free
of constraining demands, in relation with its capacities
(concepts to be elaborated on at various places below)
, it
may employ emotions toward any of one's ordinary needs or
goals. In the example provided later in the present
chapter, these are chiefly prestige, autonomy, self-respect,
and interesting work.
Reduction in disruption from id-impulses and superego
criticisms constitutes the final major class of functions to
which the ego applies emotion. Id-impulses press toward
consciousness until some form of gratification for them is
found; the ego sometimes uses emotions to provide the
required masked gratification, as described in the previous
section. Superego criticisms can lead to depression,
"pursuit of unhappiness" (Schafer, 1984), exceedingly
painful attitudes of self-hatred, and so on. Emotions can
be of use in avoiding these outcomes by providing other
targets for the criticism, as in anger or contempt, by
sheltering the self-image from criticism through affiliative
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emotions such as happiness, by providing a structured means
of repairing the damage the superego accuses one of causing
or the inadequacies it accuses one of having, as in
disappointment, gratitude, and some instances of guilt, and
so on. m some instances, these id and superego pressures
continue over time and the ego continues to employ the same
emotions against them, leading to chronic emotions. [6]
Emotions may or may not lead to success in the efforts
in which they are employed, and even when they lead to
success in one context, this may mean adaptive failure in
another setting. For example, the ego may activate guilt as
a means of finding suitable penance so that the superego (as
the parents* representative) offers forgiveness, but the
superego may prove obstinately harsh and the ego's efforts
to avoid the criticisms may fail. Or the emotion may
succeed in its primary, intrapsychic aim but disrupt
functioning in the external world, as when guilt leads to
excessive passivity in the face of aggression.
Beyond these functions, and partly on the basis of
them, there are the benefits of emotion that common sense
would point to. Emotion imparts meaning and sense, brings
vitality to endeavors, consolidates commitment to activities
and to people, and is the substance, guide, and goal of
relationships and of much else that essential to a fulfilled
life. Emotion provides conviction and energy where
intellect might yield only passionless and dreary
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obligation. Emotion sweeps aside constriction and restraint
and allows the boldness of creativity, intellect provides
means; emotion holds promise of ends.
in the present theory, a more complete theoretical
account can be given to these values of emotion than has
previously been possible in the psychoanalytic literature of
affect. The account is based, first, on the fact that
emotional schemas derive from the past, generally in
childhood; second, from the fact that emotions are schematic
organizations; and third, from the constitution of emotions
by social rules, particularly the socially sanctioned
interpretation of involuntariness.
Emotion carries forward some of the characteristics of
childhood, through the schema and the interpretation of
involuntariness. Among these characteristics are the sense
of urgency and un-self-conscious investment in relationships
and activities. Emotions can also impart childhood's
readiness to change and grow—that is, to review and alter
some part of one's identity, if perhaps only a small part—
and the concomitant readiness to risk personal failure. All
these characteristics lead to an unhesitancy, a reduction of
doubt. They lead, too, to a sense of meaningfulness and
importance of the moment, in itself, with little reference
to its outcome.
Emotions carry these features of childhood, in part, in
the same way memories do. In fact, they are memories of
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childhood, although they are condensed memories, not unlike
Freud's concept of screen memories (Freud, 1899/1962).
There is nothing new, obviously, in suggesting that a schema
can constitute a memory, since the concept of schema was
introduced into psychology to understand memory (Bartlett,
1932). when an emotional schema is activated, these
characteristics of childhood are, by the same token, re-
awakened and available.
These characteristics of emotions are also produced in
part by the fact that they are schematic organizations,
regardless of whether the schemas date from childhood.
Schemas impart clarity and certainty, and these can
constitute a sense of meaningfulness
. in de Sousa's (1980a)
terms, emotions are "determinate patterns of salience" which
can lead to choices where logic is inadequate, where logic
is indeterminate, choice is difficult and conviction is
impossible. Emotion can bring both choice and conviction,
yielding meaning.
The possibilities offered by these characteristics of
emotion are realized, in part, through the socially
sanctioned interpretation of involuntariness
. Choice and
conviction can be obstructed by obsessive demands for
"rationality", demands imposed by oneself or others. Norms
of "responsibility", too, can re-introduce doubt and
obstruct forthright action. The interpretation of
involuntariness, when successfully made and "played"
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CAverill, 1982)
,
offers a means of protecting conviction
from doubt and protecting coherence from analytic
dissection, if the many aspects of an emotion-its
interpretations, expressions, and actions-are understood to
be involuntary, then voluntary choices are not being made.
If voluntary choices are not being made, then doubt and the
more restrictive norms of responsibility cannot take hold.
Emotions can miscarry, however. Many of the same
features that lead to the adaptiveness of emotions can lead
astray. One can embark with clarity and conviction in what
is at least in some respects the wrong direction. Though
the ego activates an emotion for reasons, it is fallible in
its judgment; that is, it is misleading to conceptualize the
ego as infallible and omniscient, in principle, emotions
can be activated when they serve the goals of internal
adaptation only poorly. Since it is impossible to observe
these internal interactions—or rather, since these internal
interactions are purely conceptual constructions—there is
no independent way of judging when an emotion serves
internal adaptation well or poorly.
Matters are different regarding the external situation,
where it is possible to form a judgment about how well an
emotion fits. Most conspicuously, an instigation of an
emotion can fail to fit the facts of the matter. One can be
angry at an imagined wrong, jealous over trivial flirtation,
hopeful without reason, and so on, De Sousa (1980a)
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provides a useful framework for comprehending the fit and
failure of fit between the intentional object of an emotion
and the real external situation, when the fit is good, we
call the emotion "appropriate", and de Sousa terms this the
form of rationality in emotion, when the fit is poor, the
emotion is inappropriate, and we have irrationality in
emotion. And if emotions guide action as well as organize
perception, a poor fit can lead to action that is misguided,
misplaced, or destructive, and which is impervious to the
lessons of experience.
As Handler (1S84) notes, the concept of schema leads to
a Freudian notion of transference, if understanding is
based on schemas, then we tend to understand current
situations as reproductions of past ones. Under the present
view of emotion, emotions are one kind of schema that
carries forward the perceptions and reactions of the past.
The interpretation of involuntariness reinforces emotional
transference reactions by undermining appeals to norms of
rationality. Such preservation of the past, and therefore
the possibility of irrationality, is inherent in the make-up
of emotions, and the liability to irrationality in emotion
is strengthened by the internal, psychological factors in
their activation.
Repression
Under the present view, emotion can have two relations
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to the repressed unconscious. First, it can be used by the
ego as part of its repressive operations, and second, it can
itself be repressed. The first of these has already been
implied by the proposition that the ego incorporates id-
impulses into emotions when these impulses threaten to
disrupt functioning. These impulses press for some kind of
expression, and the ego can adapt to this by incorporating
them in emotions, where the specifics that make the impulses
unacceptable can be disguised. Examples were given above of
sexual and aggressive impulses incorporated, respectively,
in jealousy and anger. The liability to transference just
discussed also can serve the repressive role of emotion, by
transfering impulses directed at forbidden objects to
contemporary ones.
For Freud, a central instance of emotion's involvement
in repression was provided by the emotions in obsessive-
compulsive neurosis, particularly the self-reproach over
trivial matters (e.g., the "Rat Man's" self-reproach ever
leaving a rock in a path, since his fiancee's carriage might
hit it). In Freud's account, the emotions "belong to"
unconscious impulses— in the Pat Man's case, to sexual and
aggressive impulses toward his fiancee and his father. In
the present terms, this would be a case of the ego
misrepresenting in consciousness the object of the emotion,
with the result that the emotion is malformed, that is, it
departs substantially from the paradigm scenario or ideal
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case of the schema, although it is still structured by that
schema.
in Freud's account, the emotion is generated by the
unconscious impulses, and is then split off from its
ideational content as part of the repressive operations
directed at that ideational content. (These aspect of the
account were instrumental in the development of the concept
of libido as a displaceable energy.) m the present
account, too, the impulse plays a role in the generation of
the emotion, but in a mediated way. Certain configurations
of impulse and prohibition place severe restrictions on the
ego and virtually require it to activate a certain emotion.
When the Rat flan had his particular impulses in the presence
of strong prohibitions against them, an emotion of shame or
self-reproach was virtually required in order to accommodate
them. By the same token, under such conditions, the ego is
unable to include the impulse itself in the instantiation of
the schema, since this would imply conscious acknowledgment
of the impulse. Therefore it selects a substitute object
and produces a distorted instantiation, that is, one that is
quite different from the prototype of the schema.
In this way, emotions can be caused by conflict.
Instead of the more mechanistic account of Freud's discharge
theory and similar theories (e.g., Jacobson, 1971a;
Rapaport, 1953), the present account centers on an ego whose
choices are drastically narrowed by internal conflicts. In
principle, emotions caused by conflict are produced in the
same way as other emotions, as adaptive organizations. They
preserve the element of teleology in this account. However,
the more the ego-s choices are narrowed by conflicts, the
more it is possible to sr>Mirf peaK of an emotion caused by
conflict.
The topic of unconscious emotion in the present theory
is considered in the next chapter, m brief, emotions in
the present view are conscious or preconscious. However,
these emotions may be substitutes for others which would be
more consistent with circumstances and needs but are being
defended against.
An Example
An example may illustrate the range of possibilities in
the composition of an emotion and the type of organization
provided by the schema. The example is designed to be
detailed enough to approximate the complexity of an everyday
emotion. Like everyday emotions, it involves other
emotions, within the broader episode of a single emotion—in
this case, disappointment.
Alex has been hoping for a promotion. He works in a
business consulting firm, where he handles statistical
analysis. He got the job after graduating from college,
with a major in economics; he had a general familiarity with
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the kinds of statistics he handles, but he learned most of
what he needs to know for his job in this office. He
handles the mechanical aspects of the projects of his
immediate superior, and he has been in the same position
since joining the firm three years ago.
Alex's superior, Harry, announced a few weeks ago that
he would be taking a partnership in another firm. There had
been rumors for some weeks that he had been offered this
position, which represents a substantial advance in his
career. A week before he made the public announcement,
Harry told Alex that he would be leaving, and said that he
hoped Alex would be selected to replace him; further, he
told Alex he would be recommending this to the firm's
managing director. Alex was surprised and enormously
excited. Harry had an MBA and had gotten his position after
two years with another company. Alex had imagined from time
to time taking Harry's position, but had never thought of it
as a realistic possibility.
In the days following Harry's announcement, the
director conferred with him about a replacement. Harry had
cultivated a set of accounts that he was highly familiar
with, and these companies had remarked to the director on
how valuable Harry's familiarity with their operations was.
Harry pointed out that Alex was also familiar with these
companies' needs, and that anyone from outside the firm
would require many months before he or she had comparable
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knowledge. The director agreed, but noted that the position
had always been filled by an MBA.
Some days before Harry was scheduled to leave, the
director spoke with aipy n fl uv * n Alex. He said he assumed Alex was aware
that Harry was leaving, and that he had suggested Alex as
his replacement. Ee had given careful consideration to this
possibility, the director continued, and he was genuinely
impressed with how quickly Alex had learned and how well he
did his work. But he had decided that it would not be
feasible to have Alex in Harry's position. He felt that the
position required broader familiarity with business
practices than Alex could have without more experience, and
ideally an MBA. Father than bring in someone from outside
to replace Harry, the director said he intended to
restructure the position's responsibilities, distributing
Harry's accounts among other account managers but farming
out greater responsibility for report writing and client
relations to subordinates, particularly to Alex. This would
involve a pay raise for Alex and a chance to learn new
aspects of the business.
Alex felt deeply disappointed, more so that he expected
he might feel. His wife had told him to try not to get his
hopes up too high, and he had thought he had been realistic,
but now he felt so crestfallen and discouraged that he
realized he'd almost become confident he would get the
promotion. In his meeting with the director he had said
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almost nothing, mainly nodding and at the end saying he
understood the director's reasons. He'd wanted to argue, to
point out how much he knew about Harry's accounts, but he
had stifled the impulse, when he left the director's
office, he went back to his desk, but his cubicle was open
to view, so he went across the street to a restaurant where
he could be more or less alone.
Sitting in a booth, he started to cry. Not copiously;
only a few tears fell. Continuing in his job seemed futile
and dreary. He realized he was not proud of his job r and
that he had been picturing telling his wife and his parents
exuberantly about his promotion. He saw himself as a
failure—incapable, undeserving, and inconsequential. He
felt disgusted with himself, or with his job; he wasn't sure
which. He breathed in deeply, and for a moment thought he
might begin to sob.
Alex cried for a time. Then he smiled, a bit.
Smiling, for a while, he cried more, but as he smiled and
cried a tightness in his chest relaxed, and he felt better.
He dried his eyes and his cheeks, took a few more deep
breaths, and started back to the office, a little
embarrassed about not ordering anything and turning to see
whether anyone might have watched him drying his tears.
Later, he spoke briefly to the director, to let him
know he hadn't meant to seem angry and that he appreciated
the new responsibilities and the raise. The director said
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he hoped Alex wasn't disappointed; Alex laughed and said,
"I'll get over it."
In the afternoon, Alex took a long break and went to a
college nearby where one of his friends had gotten an MBA.
He checked into course requirements and loans. He began
working out in his head how long he would have to go to
night classes until he could afford to quit work and finish
up during the day. He had never been sure he wanted an MBA,
and he still wasn't, but he felt practically buoyant when he
went back to work.
Let us first examine the intentional object in this
emotional episode, then turn to the other elements and their
organization.
The example is an episode of disappointment. Its
intentional object—what Alex is disappointed about— is that
he will not be promoted to Harry's position. It is an
intentional object (i.e., mental, representational) in that
Alex is not disappointed about "objective" external events,
which consist only of the managing director deciding not to
give him a job. Rather, his disappointment depends on an
interrelated set of personal meanings, some of which were
longstanding (e.g., Harry's job was "better" than his own),
some of which were recent (he might be able to get Harry's
job)
,
and some of which were partly created in the course of
the emotion itself (his own job was dreary and possibly
humiliating). A better approximation of the intentional
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object would be "not getting Harry's job which it seemed he
could conceivably have gotten and having to stay in his
current job which now seems much less desirable".
The objective event-the director's decision-is the
occasion for Alex's disappointment, but it is not the cause.
The schema for disappointment is activated on the basis of
the ego's assessment of current needs and goals (vis-a-vis
the external situation), the status of internal conflicts,
and the range of intentional objects the current external
situation could support, in the case of Alex's disappoint-
ment, the needs were for mastering new skills and knowledge,
for praise and pride from his wife, his parents, and Harry,
and for "prestige", which is perhaps the admiration of a
generalized other. In keeping with these needs, Alex's
current goals include professional advancement. (For
present purposes we are not required to settle the complex
question of whether these needs and goals are based on
infantile needs of the past or on "deeper" current needs.)
The most prominent inner danger seems to be an
intensification of punitive criticism from the superego.
Among the elements in the emotion apart from its
intentional object, one cluster involves another emotion,
namely hope. Hope itself is not an element in Alex's
disappointment (although emotions can be elements in one
another); it is a causal precondition. Alex would not have
been disappointed by not getting the promotion if he had not
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been hoping for it. This hope itself can be broken down
into elements in a specific configuration. These elements
include Alex's beliefs regarding work and accomplishment,
his desire to advance and to get praise and appreciation
from his wife and parents, the value he places on money and
position, his assessment of his own and Harry's job and of
his chances of promotion, and so on. Alex's hope had placed
these elements in a state of flux and uncertainty; they had
been static and now they were active. These same elements
formed part of the disappointment.
Self and object representations, in the psychoanalyt ic-
sense, form another, overlapping set of elements. The self
representations include an ideal one (having obtained
Harry's job, successful, capable, deserving) and a now-
devalued actual one (incapable, undeserving, inconse-
quential). Object representations might include a
rejecting, attacking director and a more realistically seen
accepting director.
Numerous memories are involved in the episode of
disappointment. Among the more recent ones would be
memories of hopes, of his wife telling him not to be too
hopeful and of his own thoughts at that time, of Harry's
encouragement, and so on. More distant memories of earlier
disappointments, including childhood ones, would also be
involved. These more distant memories would include images
of depriving and crue] persons, comforting persons, shameful
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self images, and memories of how he had "gotten over" the
disappointments, that is, how the sense of an irreplaceable
loss had faded, together with the accompanying sense of
worthlessness or deprivation.
Among the desires involved in the disappointment are
the desire for the promotion, the desire ("impulse") to
argue with the director, and the desire to be alone after
speaking to the director.
Several physiological events form elements of the
disappointment. These are created, in a form in which they
can be incorporated into the disappointment, by complex
processes of initiation of reaction patterns, self-
interpretation, and social self-consciousness. Some of
them, such as the deep breaths and smiles, are often
interpreted as voluntary, although Alex must not. Others,
such as the tightness in his chest, are readily seen as
self-interpretations. Some, such as his tears, are
generally seen as involuntary, as Alex must see them in
accord with the schema, but from a theoretical viewpoint one
must assume that they are generated by the operation of the
schema, through complex processes.
These many elements must be organized into a whole, if
they are to be other than an assortment of unrelated items
in the context of many other unrelated items (such as what
Alex had for breakfast, what color his director's eyes are,
whether Alex sat at a booth or at the counter in the
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restaurant, whether he had any asthma attacks that day,
etc., etc.). This is provided by the schema, which is
employed by the ego to this end.
The schema provides a set of legitimate causal
assumptions, such as that the tears were caused by the
director's decision. It provides justification for
recovering memories of old, surmounted disappointments and
using these to replace images of worthlessness and
dreariness, it provides a template of the course of such
emotions-one "gets over" them, i.e., the elements form a
new and less painful alignment, it provides a particular
meaning to the memories of hopeful anticipations, namely
that one is suffering a painful process that cannot be
evaded. Finally, it offers a conviction of lasting internal
change, as the elements of hopeful anticipation, altered
personal values, more conscious values and beliefs, and the
knowledge of the director's decision combine to lead to a
new set of possibilities (an MBA, a new job), which Alex
begins to pursue with an increased sense of autonomy. In
these various respects, the schema helps provide coherent
organization.
Beyond the general need for coherence, the ego in this
example is confronted with a set of problems, to which it
applies the emotion of disappointment. There are two chief
problems. First, Alex, in the context of his hope, has
acquired a new set of active needs and goals, and this has
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created a situation in which he cannot return to his former
adjustment around his job. His needs for mastery, praise,
and prestige now have a new job as their object, and the
previous adjustment in which these needs were deployed
elsewhere or defensively avoided has been disrupted. The
problem is how to continue in his current situation when his
needs are focused on what he does not and will not have.The second problem, suggested by psychoanalytic assumptions,
is that superego criticisms have become more intense. This
may have been due to the possibility of new gratifications,
if these possibilities activated self-punitiveness and the
"unconscious sense of guilt" that Freud referred to. The
intensified superego criticism emerges most directly in the
conscious self-image as incapable, undeserving, and
inconsequent ial
.
The disappointment helps resolve these adaptational
problems. It provides a template for "getting over it",
that is, re-orienting needs and goals to renew the
possibility of their satisfaction, in Alex's case, the new,
tentative focus is an MBA and other jobs. This new focus
helps restore a livable degree of favorable self-regard.
But such a resolution could be readily undermined by the
strengthened superego criticisms. These are workably
resolved through the shifting of criticisms from the self to
the job, which then seems disgusting. The disappointment-
schema offers the possibility of this shift, and makes it
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more successful through the interpretation of involuntari-
ness, which neutralizes the criticism that Alex might
otherwise direct at himself, to the effect that he is making
excuses and that the problem is not with his job but with
himself.
The schema provides the outline or set of
possibilities. The individual, through a set of ego
processes (self-reflection, action and interpretation
according to the internalized rules), puts these
possibilities into effect, toward the primary goal of
forming a meaningful, organized integration of elements and
the secondary one of achieving some greater satisfaction of
strivings toward an ideal self, personal integration, or
desired relationships with external or internal objects.
How is the Theory Psychoanalytic?
Of the terms of the theory, only ego is drawn from
psychoanalytic theory. Certain of the conceptions in the
theory can be found in previous psychoanalytic affect
theories, but not exclusively there. On what grounds, then,
can the theory be called psychoanalytic? First it js
necessary to consider what it means for a theory to be
psychoanalytic, and for a theory of affect to be psycho-
analytic.
Psychoanalytic theory has undergone several radical
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transformations during its history, and it has spawned other
schools of thought and therapy. At times, there has been
bitter controversy over whether new approaches were
genuinely psychoanalytic (Fairbairn, 1962; Freud, 1914;
Guntrip, 1961; Kohut, 1977). it becomes clear in the course
of such controversies that there is no universally accepted
definition of psychoanalysis, and that one is not likely to
be devised.
Even within orthodox circles, firm definitions are
elusive. The issue of psychoanalysis versus psychotherapy
is instructive. In the early 1950's, American analysts
became particularly concerned to distinguish psychoanalysis
proper from psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy (Gill,
1954; Fangell, 195 4; Stone, 1954). The concern derived, at
least in part, from the increasing number of psycho-
therapists who were not trained in psychoanalytic
institutes, and in many cases were not physicians. Analysts
sought to clarify their professional identity, both to
orient themselves as to the particular value of their
arduously acquired method, and to reinforce their pre-
eminence
.
In the course of this discussion, Merton Gill (1954)
formulated a distinction between psychoanalysis and psycho-
therapy which has become the most definitive (Kernberg,
1984). Gill's definition of psychoanalysis rested on the
analyst's neutrality, on the techniques designed to induce a
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-regressive transference neurosis", and the "resolution of
the neurosis by techniques of interpretation alone" (p.
775). This definition remains the most widely agreed upon
(Kernberg, 1984). Gill himself, however, now dissents, m
fact, he has completely reformulated the distinction, as a
consequence of his new positions on psychoanalytic technique
(Gill, 1984). He has come to view each of the main elements
of his earlier distinction differently, and no longer
regards all of them as essential or even desirable.
The uncertainty of definition that attaches to psycho-
analytic treatment is much surpassed by the difficulty in
defining psychoanalytic theory, m the early decades of the
movement, this task was carried out by Freud, who maintained
rigid control over the definition of the truly psycho-
analytic, and employed this authority in excluding those
whose ideas challenged his own conceptions (Freud,
1914/1957, 1925/1959) even when he eventually incorporated
these heterodox propositions (e.g., Freud, 1933/1964, p.
87). In effect, Freud's authority substituted for
principles of definition.
Initially, the most important authors whose work was
expelled from psychoanalysis by Freud, such as Jung and
Adler, did not dispute the issue, but instead developed
their thought and technique outside of orthodox
psychoanalysis. Later, as Freud's predominance over the
movement waned and after his death, advocates of various
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schools of thought made claims on the title of psycho-
analytic theory (Fairbairn, 1952; Kardiner, Karush
Ovesey, 1959; M
.
Klein, 1975; Kohut, 1977; Homey, 1937;
Sullivan, 1953). m some cases (e.g., m. Klein, 1975) the
originators of these schools felt themselves to be directly
extending Freud's work
--although these claims were often
rejected by others (Kernberg, 1980)
-whereas in other cases,
schools of thought emerged in spirited opposition to Freud
(Fairbairn, 1952; Kardiner, Karush & Ovesey, 1959).
The profusion of different schools, differing over
fundamental issues and yet all considering themselves
psychoanalytic, raised in a new and deeper way the question
of what could be identified as the essence of psychoanalytic
theory.
In the context of such differences, one can attempt to
identify guiding principles and assumptions underlying most
or all of the schools which identify themselves as psycho-
analytic. This approach avoids sectarianism,
authoritarianism, and the arbitrary reliance on peripheral
features of theory. On the other hand, it is a highly
subjective approach, and one that is more likely to generate
disputes than to resolve them. Still, there are no
alternatives if one wishes to arrive at a meaningful
definition which is not determined by sectarian commitments
or by loyalty to inessential ideas. (Schafer [1976] makes a
similar argument.)
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in my own view, psychoanalytic theory can be defined by
the proposition that adult thoughts, actions, and feelings
are ordinarily based in large part on potentially distorting
interpretations and coping strategies of which one is
unaware. Seemingly senseless thoughts, actions, and
feelings become comprehensible when the underlying
interpretations and coping strategies are known. These
interpretations and coping strategies derive from childhood,
which included both distorted and accurate interpretations
of significant others. The lack of awareness of irrational
interpretations and coping strategies is not accidental, but
is explained by the personal unacceptability of
alternatives. Certain kinds of irrationality are striven
for, for reasons which are themselves out of awareness.
Symbolism and interpretation are crucial in all these
processes. Finally, the of irrationality can be reduced, in
ways which involve becoming aware of these processes in some
coherent set of terms.
I think this definition captures essential elements in
the various schools of psychoanalysis—Freudian, ego
psychological, object relations, interpersonal,
culturalist—without depending on features not shared by all
genuinely psychoanalytic perspectives. For example,
concepts of instinct and of the fundamental importance of
sexuality are not shared by most schools. However, all
schools share a concept of unacceptable parts of the self
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which have a crucial and problematic impact. For Freudian
schools, this unacceptability is due to the involvement of
infantile, perverse, or incestuous sexuality, other schools
attribute unacceptability to other factors, but the logic is
parallel, and is essential to a psychoanalytic theory.
If a body of theory is defined as psychoanalytic by
these features, it remains a separate question what defines
an affect theory as psychoanalytic. Three possibilities can
be isolated:
1) An affect theory is psychoanalytic if it is drawn
from established psychoanalytic theory and metatheory.
2) An affect theory is psychoanalytic if it is
consistent with the essential features of psychoanalytic
theory and can be readily applied to psychoanalytic issues.
3) An affect theory is psychoanalytic if it
specifically entails the essential features of psycho-
analytic theory, so that adopting that theory of affect
entails adopting the essential features of psychoanalytic.
The first possibility has perhaps the greatest
simplicity and the most immediate appeal, but it can be
readily eliminated by two considerations. The first has
just been discussed, namely, that most specific theoretical
terms, and all metapsychological terms, are tied to specific
versions of psychoanalytic theory. Secondly, the history of
psychoanalytic affect theory strongly suggests that psycho-
analytic theory does not provide an affect theory but, on
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the contrary, needs an affect theory. Host of Freud's
affect theories, for instance, were either borrowed from
elsewhere (or from assumptions originating elsewhere).
Despite repeated efforts over several decades, attempts to
devise an affect theory based on metapsychology produced
almost universally dissatisfaction (Brenner, 1974b; Green,
1977). It would be unwisely restrictive to confine the
title of psychoanalytic affect theory to theories based on
established terms.
The second of the three possibilities specified above
for determining whether a theory of affect is psychoanalytic
is more meaningful and holds more promise for a satisfying
affect theory. In this definition, an affect theory is
psychoanalytic if it is consistent with the essential
features of psychoanalytic theory and can be readily applied
to psychoanalytic issues, in favor of this definition, one
may note: first, in order for a theory of affect to be
adequate to the needs of psychoanalytic theory it need only
be compatible with the basic tenets of psychoanalysis;
second, if it can be readily applied to psychoanalytic
questions, it can be recognized as an especially useful
theory; and third, if it is not drawn from metatheory , it
does not depend on inessential components of one or another
school, and does not suffer from the vitiating effects
Freudian metapsychology has had on affect theories.
The shortcoming of this definition of a psychoanalytic
affect theory is that it includes too much; it makes no
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distinction between psychoanalytic affect theory and a non-
psychoanalytic affect theory that can be applied in psycho-
analysis. This is a worthwhile distinction to be able to
draw, even though it has often been ignored (cf. Basch,
1976; Emde, 1980). if we seek a way to make this
distinction in meaningful ways, without resorting to
arbitrary and restrictive metatheoretical connections, we
arrive at the third possibility described above.
In this third possibility, an affect theory is psycho-
analytic if it specifically entails the essential features
of psychoanalytic theory. in other words, there would be a
close logical correspondence between such a theory and the
basic assumptions of psychoanalysis. This would include
compatibility, but would go beyond it, so that the affect
theory would be most coherent and most compatible within
psychoanalysis, and would tend to be incompatible with other
viewpoints. In the strongest version of this way of
defining psychoanalytic affect theory, an affect theory
would only be psychoanalytic if it logically entailed all
the essential features of psychoanalytic theory, so that
adopting that theory of affect would require adopting some
version of psychoanalysis.
The present affect theory, I now argue, qualifies as
psychoanalytic under this third definition. It does not
meet the strongest requirements of this definition, but jt
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is not clear that any affect theory could; that is, it may
not be that any affect theory would logically require all
the essential features of psychoanalytic and be incompatible
with any viewpoint that did not include all of these.
However, the present affect theory does, as I attempt to
show, imply some crucial aspects of the essential psycho-
analytic assumptions, and is compatible with all of them.
Some of this discussion is undertaken in the next
chapter, in conjunction with the discussion of specific
issues in psychoanalytic theory, particularly the
discussions of unconscious emotion and emotion in therapy.
For the moment, let us return to the issues discussed above
in "Some Elaborations and Implications". The first
subsection there dealt with the ego's role in the causation,
or activation, of emotion, and also addressed the
implications of inclusion of the intentional object as a
constitutive part of an emotion (rather than as its cause).
On the basis of these views, one is led to the psycho-
analytic proposition that interpretations of external
reality are based on many factors which are not a part of
that current reality, and that therefore interpretations of
external reality are readily distorted. The objects of
emotions are imposed on external reality when, in the ego's
judgment, that emotion is needed, and often the emotion is
needed for reasons that have little to do with the real
current situation. Like psychoanalytic theory in general,
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the present view of emotions sees the possibility for many
degrees of validity in interpretations and of adaptiveness
in coping strategies, when internal conflict is relatively
low and superego prohibitions are less stringent, these
factors impose fewer constraints on the ego in activating
emotions, and the ego is then free to form emotions in close
accord with current reality and with current needs and
goals, in the highest degree of adaptiveness.
The factors in the ego's decision to activate an
emotion include repressed impulses, and this means that
emotions are partly in the service of such impulses.
Irrationality, then, in the form of divergence of emotion
from external reality and from other needs and goals, is a
systematic part of emotion, in the present account. Part of
the character of repressed impulses is to demand loyalty, so
to speak. That is, one acts as if no satisfaction could
substitute for the satisfaction of these impulses, clinging
to them and retaining them in repression. Freud called this
the "conservative character of the instincts" or the
"repetition compulsion" and it was one of the factors that
lead to the formulation of the death instinct. Emotions
serve this process of conservation of repressed impulses by
providing them with some limited expression and with a
continuing disguise.
Emotions, in the present theory, contribute to the
preservation of more than impulses. As discussed above,
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they help preserve, in active forms, some features of
childhood, such as the sense of urgency of the moment and
the un-self-conscious investment in relationships and
activities. They help preserve, too, images of self and
others formed in childhood. As noted above, this aspect of
emotions can be derived from conceptualizing them as based
on schemas which are formed, for the most part, during
childhood. The lasting influence of childhood, of course,
is a key notion of psychoanalysis.
The concept of repression, or purposive unawareness, is
not specifically entailed by the present view of emotion,
but we have seen how emotion as understood here can play a
role in repression, and in the next chapter a more detailed
account of repressed emotion is given in terms of the
present theory.
In short, some of the essential features of psycho-
analysis are entailed by the present theory, and some,
though not specifically entailed, can be accommodated. The
former include the vulnerability of distortions in
interpretations of current reality and in coping strategies,
the preservation of repressed impulses, and the pervasive
influence of childhood. Among the latter are concepts of
repression.
Summary
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A theory of emotion has been proposed, which takes
emotions to be schematic organizations, in the ego and
activated by the ego, of physiological, psychological, and
social responses, according to individually adapted,
socially based rules. Emotions were defined as states to
which intentional objects are essential and in which an
interpretation of involuntariness is highlighted. The
psychoanalytic concept of the ego was discussed and its
central role in the present theory was described. The
conceptualization of emotions as schematic organizations was
explicated. A number of elaborations and implications were
presented, including an account of the factors involved in
the activation of emotion and the functions of emotion
vis-a-vis these factors, a discussion of adaptiveness and
irrationality, and an initial discussion of repression. A
detailed example was given. Finally, the relation of the
theory to psychoanalytic theory in general was explored.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OP ISSUES IN PSYCHOANALYTIC AFFECT
Introduction
in the second and third chapters, I reviewed many of
the major statements on affect within psychoanalytic theory.
Freud's work took pride of place, as is traditional. Later
authors, reviewed in Chapter III, addressed a variety of
issues, some of which Freud had been concerned with and many
of which he had not. m the present chapter, we return to
this history of affect theory in psychoanalysis. We turn to
each of the themes that emerged in the review and bring to
bear on each the original conceptions of emotion just
outlined, in an effort to determine what degree of
clarification and further insight these conceptions can
offer. The chapter closes with a consideration of two
topics, anxiety and psychotherapy, which although they were
not selected as major themes in my review of theories, are
of sufficient importance to warrant inclusion here.
Freud
In the review of Freud's theories, his views in the
context of the theories of hysteria and "anxiety neurosis"
were considered first. Then the "discharge theory" and the
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"signal theory- of anxiety were reviewed, and finally
Freud's clinical theories were sampled. Here, this
succession of topics win pr0vide the organization as we
attempt to see how Freud
-s theories appear in the light of
the present conceptions.
Hysteria
"Strangulated affect" was the cornerstone of Freud and
Breuer's theory of hysterical neurosis, in Chapter II i
surveyed the many implications for affect theory in their
conception of hysterical symptoms. To re-state these in
summary form, the theory of hysteria depicts affect as
energy with quality. The theory holds that this energy is
created when a person meets affect-provoking situations, and
that normally it moves through the psyche and is expressed.
However, on occasion the energy is not released in this
immediate, optimal way, but is retained in the psyche, most
often because a person finds expression unacceptable and
defends against it. This situation produces disturbances of
functioning, typically including physical functioning, until
such time as the energy is released in the optimal way, that
is, until it is "abreacted".
A clear divergence of the present views from Freud's
emerges immediately in connection with the concept of
energy. Energy, in Freud's sense, has no place in the
current understanding of emotion. Freud explained an
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enormous range of phenomena with his successive variations
on the energy concept, but for many theorists it has come to
be a hollow concept, certainly unable to bear the weight
Freud and his direct successors placed on it (Holt, 1976;
Klein, 1973b; Schafer, 1976; Swanson, 1977). David Hume
said of explanation that it is a place where the mind comes
to rest; it is a rare mind today that finds rest at the
concept of energy. Few would be inclined to offer a simple
reference to energy as the explanation for the manifold
patterns of thought, memory, perception, sensation, action,
and interaction that we class as emotional; it would seem,
to most, an unenlightening tautology. Even though the
related concept of id-impulses pressing for gratification is
retained in the present theory, the core of Freud's energy
concept—hypothetical energy as explanation— is not
employed.
What, then, becomes of the concept of abreaction in the
context of the present views? Freud and Breuer's conception
of the central role of abreaction in treatment collapses
without their specific concept of psychic energy. Freud
himself would not have regretted the loss of the concept of
abreaction, since he abandoned it as a therapeutic technique
and developed other explanations for the therapeutic
successes it had seemed to provide. However, not all of his
followers shared his attitude (Reich, 1933/1949) and some
current non-psychoanalytic figures continue to argue the
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therapeutic and theoretical value of abreaction (Jackins,
1965; scheff, 1979). Are aspects of the concept tenable,
and can these be rendered in terms of the present
conceptions?
Reduced to its basic elements, the concept of
abreaction supposes that certain situations and events-
"emotional" ones-produce some kind of disequilibrium, and
that this state lasts until the emotion is energetically
expressed. Until the abreaction is accomplished the
accumulated emotion has untoward effects of some kind;
conversely, energetic emotional expression has direct
benefits. According to the view of emotion I have proposed,
emotions offer answers to questions or solutions to
problems. I have asserted that emotions, in most cases,
leave things better than they were, or simply, that emotions
are efforts toward adaptation. My view, then, offers a
parallel to viewpoints advocating abreaction. In both, the
emotion-inducing situation presents a problem, and an
emotion contributes to its resolution.
Certainly, though, the differences outweigh the
parallels. First and foremost, in the present view, nothing
is expelled in the expression of emotion. Abreaction
theories have not always been specific as to what is
expelled during emotion, but the implication is that
something detrimental is cleared from one's system. Under
the present theory, emotions are organizations, not
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substances or energies that could be excreted or discharged.
Second, in the present view, it is not the expression
of the emotion that is beneficial, but the entire emotion,
of which expression is a part. The possible benefits of
emotion are too varied to be attributed to emotional
communications alone. Advocates of abreaction, moreover,
are referring to something apart from the values of
emotional communication. Expression, for them, has some
direct benefit, not mediated by the responses of others.
The closest parallel within the present view is the benefit
in approximating the prototypical instance of an emotion.
Schemas for emotions include prototypes. Many of these
prototypes include energetic expression, at least within
most cultures and subcultures. When one has an episode of
an emotion that is close to the prototype for that emotion,
one is well understood by others, one knows what to do and
how each element is related to the other elements, and one
does not feel chaotic, nor does one suspect that other
people are likely to see one as "crazy" or "falling apart".
In episodes of emotion that are far from the prototype, one
is on uncharted territory, with the concomitant
unpredictability and need for improvision. For such
reasons, approximating the prototype for an emotion carries
direct benefits, and emotional expression, where it
completes an emotion in the sense of bringing the episode
closer to the prototype, is directly beneficial, as the
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concept of abreaction implies.
Freud's theory of hysteria incorporates the view that
affect is generated, automatically in a sense, when one
encounters an affect-prevoking situation. Though this
assumption may appear tautologous, there are many views of
affect that have not shared it, among them most of Freud's,
with the exception of those in the theory of hysteria and in
his later
-clinical- writings. The present theory shares
the seemingly tautologous view only to a limited degree.
That is, the theory retains the common-sense view that
emotions are typically occasioned by certain corresponding
situations, but interposes an intermediary set of factors
(i.e., the ego and the bases for its decision to activate an
emotion-schema), allowing for inappropriate or irrational
emotions.
Two remaining central propositions in Freud's theory of
hysteria—the possibility of suppressing affect and the
pathological effects of suppressed affect—are discussed
later in the present chapter, in the discussions of defense
and therapy.
Anxiety Neurosis
Freud's theory of anxiety neurosis assumed a very
different route for the production of affect than was
posited in his account of hysteria. In the theory of
anxiety neurosis, anxiety is produced by the blocking of
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"somatic excitation" at the "scna-psyche" barrier. The
excitation then proceeds along paths that do not involve
connections with ideas, and a normally somatopsychic process
becomes an abnormal, somatic one. m this view, affect can
result from a purely physical process and does not
necessarily bear the marks of ideas or of the external
situation.
in my view, physiological processes may predispose,
perhaps strongly, toward emotion, but emotion is never the
direct product of such processes. Emotion, in the
restricted definition applied here, always involves complex
interpretations, to which physiological processes often lend
themselves. The construction of an intentional object, the
setting up of various dispositions to action and expression,
the adoption of conditions for ending the episode, the self-
reflective construction of relations between these aspects
of the emotion and one's physiological state— in short, all
the things I have attributed to the operation of the
emotion-schema—require an elaboration beyond physiological
givens. Some emotions, such as the sadness and despair in
apparently biological depressions, suggest that physio-
logical processes can strongly predispose to emotion, but
even in these instances elaboration is required.
The Discharge Theory
In the discharge theory of affect, as it emerged
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between 1900 and 1915, affect was described as a discharge
of psychic energy, a
-safety valve" employed when more
complete discharge was impossible. The discharge theory is
thus a conflict-based theory; under it, affect is only
produced under conditions of conflict between impulse and
prohibitions, it is also a theory in which affect is based
on energy without quality, so that the qualities of affect-
everything that differentiates one affect from another-are
determined by chance associations with conscious ideas, in
other words, the quality of affect, and thus affect itself,
was regarded as relatively inconsequential. By the same
token, since the energy underlying affect was considered to
have no quality, affect could no longer be repressed or be
contained in the repressed unconscious, when a person is
not in an emotional state, only the potential for affect
exists, and defense against affect can only mean prevention
of the development of affect, not repression in the Freudian
sense of confining existing entities in an unconscious
domain.
Certain of the tenets of the discharge theory are
rejected in the present conceptions. The concept of energy,
as noted already, does not appear here. Second, emotions
are viewed here as far more consequential than in Freud's
discharge theory. In the present theory, a wide variety of
interpretations and dispositions are attributed to activated
emotions. In Freud's discharge theory, emotion has only
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indirect influences on interpretation and action, and the
experience of emotion is determined by chance connections
with ideas. Third, the present theory differs from Freud's
discharge theory in its treatment of defense and affect, and
of unconscious affect (both to be discussed later.)
However, some important assumptions from Freud's
discharge theory appear, in altered forms, in the present
theory. These assumptions concern the relation of affect
and conflict. Although in the present theory, emotion does
not depend on conflict to the same extent-conflict is not a
necessary condition of emotion, here— I have described
emotions as frequently consisting of attempted resolutions
of internal, psychological conflicts involving either id-
impulses or superego-criticisms. Emotions can contribute to
such resolutions by providing more acceptable routes for the
limited satisfaction of id-impulses. For example, anger
forms a convenient vehicle for the expression of destructive
impulses, and jealousy can provide some satisfaction of
homosexual interests. The more an episode of emotion is in
the service of such impulses, though, the less appropriate
it becomes to the evoking situation (in de Sousa's [1980a]
phrase) and the less it is possible for the emotion to serve
less conflictual needs and goals.
Thus, the present theory incorporates from the
discharge theory the view that the concept of emotion may
indirectly satisfy id-impulses, although it provides a
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different account of the process than Freud did. For Freud,
the satisfaction took the form of releasing energy, which
occurred along somatic discharge
"channels", m the present
view, no energy is invoked (although a parallel concept of
impulses pressing for satisfaction is perhaps implied.)
Instead, the account turns on the notion of the ego
incorporating impulses in emotions, and activating emotions
partly to satisfy impulses (making some episodes of emotion
"compromise formations"), whereas for Freud, conflict was a
necessary condition for all affect, it is here only one of
the possible factors that leads the ego to activate an
emotion. Moreover, conflict can be involved to many
different degrees in a particular episode of emotion, in
some episodes, the ego's need to provide satisfaction for an
impulse or to contend with superego criticism may be so
dominant that the emotion is grossly inappropriate to the
external situation, impervious to influence, and contrary to
other personal needs and goals. In other instances these
influences may play only a small role, or no role at all, in
the choice of emotion.
The Signal Theory of Anxiety
According to the view introduced by Freud in his 1926
book Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety, anxiety is a signal
given by the ego when it recognizes a danger situation.
This signal provides an indication that defense is needed
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against an external or internal danger, and the anxiety, or
the unpleasure associated with it, provides the motive for
defense.
The present theory is r in a sense, founded on the
signal theory of anxiety, or rather on a specific aspect of
it. One of the central tenets of the present theory is that
emotions are activated by the ego in the service of its many
adaptive goals. The signal theory of anxiety introduced
such a notion into psychoanalysis. The notion was a break
with Freud's previous thinking and with the assumptions of
psychoanalysts in general, without it, the present theory
would have far less precedent in psychoanalytic theory. In
short, the present theory is an expansion of Freud's signal
theory. First, of course, Freud's theory is expanded to
apply to all emotions, not just anxiety. (Actually, anxiety
is a special case for the present theory, and will be
discussed below.) Second, I have claimed that emotions can
serve many functions, where Freud only postulated one. In
fact, the signal function is not among the functions I have
described.
Freud's "Clinical" Theory
Two of the themes covered under the heading of clinical
affect theory figured prominently in the theoretical
presentation in the last chapter, and therefore require no
further exploration here. Freud's view that affect is
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inherently justified was discussed in the course of
Presenting the schema-concept and its relation to psycho-
analytic principles. The relation between the present
theory and the issue of transference in emotion was also
treated briefly there, and was further discussed as an
aspect of irrationality in emotion.
A further theme of interest here arises in some of
Freud's clinical discussions of affect. We encountered it
in his comments on normal and pathological jealousy. Though
he never formalized the distinction, in such places Freud
distinguished between normal or rational episodes of affect
and abnormal ones. Only abnormal, irrational affects, he
stated, required psychoanalysis to understand them. Freud
follows common sense in identifying normal affects as ones
which are "derived from the actual situation" and
proportionate to it. He adds that these affects are "under
the complete control of the conscious ego" (Freud,
1922/1955, p. 223). In these comments, Freud exhibits some
of the early and most characteristic assumptions of psycho-
analysis as an "id-psychology". He assumes, that is, that
irrationality is the province for psychoanalysis, and that
what common sense calls rational is under the control of the
conscious ego, meaning not that everything rational is based
on conscious reasoning but simply that it is not part of the
special province of psychoanalysis, the repressed
unconscious.
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The present theory is intended to apply equally well to
rational and irrational emotions, and to provide a framework
for discussing this distinction and the underlying
determinants, m this theory, rationality in emotion is
understood to include appropriateness to the external
situation, just as Freud and others have understood it (de
Sousa, 1980a), but it also includes instrumental
rationality; that is, emotions can serve the needs and goals
of the individual and can serve adaptive interpersonal
functions, and the rationality of emotions can be assessed
also in terms of how well they serve these, m any case,
the present view is that both rational and irrational
emotions can be subjected to explanatory efforts, in this
respect the present theory is closer to the spirit of
American ego psychology than to the early Freud, with
respect to the former's interest in developing a "general
psychology- on the basis of, or at least in accord with,
psychoanalytic theory. The present theory, too, seeks to
frame explanatory principles for all the phenomena within
its domain, not only the irrational ones, and like ego
psychology, the present theory is based in part on previous
psychoanalytic theory but is drawn from other sources as
well.
Post-Freudian Affect Theory
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As in the previous section, the structure of the
literature review will nr/\«i"^« *.un provide the organization here. Thus,
the themes of the discussion are
.etapsychology
, defense and
affect, unconscious affect, biological theories, and ego and
cognition.
Metapsychology
The major post-Freudian metapsycholog ical treatments of
affect have turned on two related issues, psychic energy and
tension versus discharge conceptions of affect. The
rejection of psychic energy in the present theory has
already been discussed. The discussions of energy and
affect in the major metapsycholog ical papers are difficult
to translate into other terms, and indeed are generally
quite insular, that is, they have meaning only in connection
with this assumption. Jacobson's (1953, 1971a, 1971b)
papers are the principal examples. The second issue to
arise consistently in the metapsycholog ical discussions, the
question of whether affect represents "tension" or
"discharge", can be given more meaning. Of course, the
question is framed in terms that are drawn from the economic
language, that is, from the concept of psychic energy.
However, discussions of this issue seem to have been
animated by more than a desire to coordinate assumptions
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about hypothetical energy. This significanoe has already
been touched on at several points, it is the difference
between affects as epiphencnena, implied by the discharge
view, and affects as consequential entities, corresponding
to the tension view.
The correspondence of the present theory to the tension
view in this regard has already been noted. However, the
relation between this theory and the tension view of affect
can be elaborated somewhat beyond this, along lines that are
relevant to the next topic to be considered, defense and
affect. The essence of the tension view is an assumption
that an affective state is an indication that there is some
sort of pressure for something (further) to take place. A
felt affect, according to this assumption, reflects a
process that is building up to something, rather than
playing itself out and running down, as the discharge view
holds. (The same would be true for un-felt affect, although
this raises difficult complications for both the tension and
discharge views.) In the present theory of emotion, an
activated emotion represents, in part, a set of
dispositions, that is readinesses to respond in certain
ways. For example, anger represents a readiness to speak
loudly, to make accusations, and so on. Disappointment, at
least for Alex in the last chapter's example, includes a
readiness to withdraw and to weep, but also to re-organize
goals and make new plans. An emotion has a temporal course
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(Fridhandler
.
Averill, 1982), and in the present theory the
episode begins with the activation of a schema; at that
point, much remains to unfold, including even the
construction of the emotion's object. This beginning point
of an episode of emotion is a theoretical construction,
though, so it may be less obscure to refer to that point in
the episode when there has been enough organization of the
emotion's object and of its dispositions to other responses
that the emotion can become an object of reflective self-
awareness-that is, when the emotion can be felt. At this
point, too, much remains to unfold.
Defense and Affect (and Unconscious Affect)
Three topics come under the heading of defense and
affect. First, affect can be used defensively. Of the
post-Freudian works reviewed, Jones' (1929) paper and
Schafer's (1976) book dealt with this function of affect.
The place of this function in the present theory has already
been discussed in several places, although in terms of the
ego's internal adaptive efforts vis-a-vis the id and the
superego, rather than as "defense". Second, affect can be
defended against. Zilboorg's (1933) and Fenichel's
(1941/1954) papers addressed this topic. Third, unpleasant
affect can be a motive for defense (against conscious
acknowledgment of id-impulses and superego criticisms,
against activation of self- and object-representations,
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etc.). Jones (1929) describes this, and there are
references to it throughout the psychoanalytic literature.
The latter two topics are the subjects of the present
discussion, m particular, consideration is given here to
the questions of how defense against emotions is best
described within the present theory and why emotions are
defended against if they are part of the ego's adaptive
efforts. These topics lead to an account of unconscious
emotion.
One may ask whether in fact emotions are defended
against at all, or whether this topic may be dispensed with.
I think the answer is that emotions are indeed defended
against. One often encounters defense against emotion in
psychotherapy, which is to say that conceptualizing a
situation in terms of emotion and defense against it is
often extremely natural and useful for both patient and
therapist. Among psychoanalytic writers, Fenichel
(1941/1954) is unusual in affirming the phenomenon in formal
theoretical terms. In clinical writings, however,
references to defense against affect are ubiquitous.
Emotion has been described here in highly favorable
terms, and yet evidently there are things in emotion that we
often wish to avoid. There have been many psychoanalytic
hypotheses regarding the motive for defense. Most often,
these have been based on the perfectly intelligible notion
that defense is implemented in order to avoid unpleasant
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affect. This notion is well-founded for defense against
emotions themselves. We avoid emotions that are painful,
most of all. we also avoid emotions that are embarrassing,
and, with less awareness, ones that would be shameful. In
each case, the motive for defending against an emotion is to
avoid another, unpleasant emotion. This logic, though,
leaves us with the question of what makes an emotion
unpleasant, and sometimes intolerable. This difficult
question cannot be given an adequate treatment here. Any
explanation of the unpleasantness of some emotions would
have to accommodate the fact that we often seek out
unpleasant emotions in esthetic or entertainment contexts.
It may be that the emotions which provide the motive for
intra-psychic defense are unpleasant for special reasons;
possibly these are emotions that re-create, internally and
perhaps externally, the painful situations of childhood,
situations which most often have to do with separation and
loss, with rejection, or with blows to self-esteem. [7]
In some people, defense extends to virtually all
emotions. All emotions are treated as a threat. This is
particularly likely to be the case among what have been
called "compulsive characters" (Reich, 1933/1949). For such
people, it seems to be something in emotions in general that
calls for defense, rather than unpleasantness of particular
emotions. Shapiro (1965) points to the spontaneity in
emotion as the motive for defense. He describes the
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rigidity and tense deliberateness characteristic of
obsessive-compulsive style, and notes that these funda-
mentally conflict with emotion.
It must be admitted that this account of the motives
for defense against emotion leaves something to be desired
in terms of simplicity, since it assumes two steps: certain
emotions at times occasion unpleasant emotions, and these
unpleasant emotions in turn provide a motive for defending
against the original ones. (The account is simpler for the
unpleasant emotions themselves, which are defended against
due to their own painfulness. ) Moreover, a more substantive
objection could be raised on the basis of these steps in the
reasoning. If emotions depend on the ego's decision to
activate them, what is the need for defending against
unpleasant emotions, and against other emotions that would
lead to unpleasant ones, when the ego could simply not
activate these emotions? The ego, though, does not have
absolute freedom of choice in its decision to activate
emotions. At times, it is virtually compelled to activate
one or another emotion. This may be due to the character of
id-impulses or superego-criticisms present, or perhaps to
the nature of current needs and goals vis-a-vis the external
situation. On occasion, the external situation may conform
so closely to an emotion's object that activating the
emotion is virtually required if the coherence of the social
rules constituting emotion is to be preserved. Moreover,
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the repertoire of possible emotions from which to choose is
finite, we rely on "received culture" for this repertoire,
and cannot devise the structures and rules out of whole
cloth. Emotions are learned so early and through so many
avenues, and they are integrated into so many other social
institutions and psychological entities that vigilance is
required if specific emotions or emotions in general are to
be avoided. in short, the ego's choices are restricted, and
emotions carry a certain force that sometimes requires
resistance.
When the ego is in the position of resisting the
activation of an emotion, it may arrive at a compromise. It
may activate the emotion, but in a version different enough
from the prototype that painful emotions are avoided.
Probably the ego most often alters the object of the emotion
in connection with these defensive efforts. For example,
anger that is occasioned by an act of one person or by
unconscious impulses toward one kind of person can take as
its object another act or another person. Resentment can be
directed toward someone besides the "original" target, or an
offense can be fabricated to cover the shameful inadequacy
of the original. Guilt and self-reproach can be given a
trivial object rather than an all-too-weighty one (Freud,
1894/1962, 1896/1962); that is, a trivial object reduces the
degree to which guilt re-creates a painful situation of
childhood
.
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in such cases, there is a tension, so to speak, between
the object of the emotion and what the object would be
without the ego's defensive distortions, it would not be
severely misleading to refer to this would-have-been object
as the real object of the emotion in the unconscious. The
factors in the activation of the emotion, together with the
schema, press for this "real" object, and demanding efforts
are required to devise and maintain the substitute. All
these considerations apply equally when the distortion is in
terms of other aspects of the emotion instead of, or in
addition to, the object. [8]
Thus, unconscious emotion in the present theory is an
emotion toward which many factors compel the ego but for
which the ego substitutes a distortion, one which resembles
the avoided emotion but occasions less pain.
Biological theories
The present theory is hardly likely to be thought of as
a biological theory. It does not use physiology as an
explanation of emotion, as Blau (1952, 1955) did explicitly
and as many psychoanalytic theorists have done implicitly.
Nor does it make any reference to evolutionary biology, as
Landauer (1938) did so freely and as is also quite common
among other psychoanalytic theorists. In view of the degree
to which the present theory turns away from biology, the
close correspondence to two of the biological theories
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reviewed in Chapter III is perhaps unexpected. Yet, in
different respects, the present theory closely resembles
Emde's (1980) and Bowlby's (1969).
Emde (1980) calls his theory an "organizational" view
of emotion. The essential difference between Emde's view
and most previous psychoanalytic theories lies in Emde's
conviction that emotions organize behavior and thought,
rather than the opposite. This view, of course, is central
to the present theory. The major difference between Emde's
assumptions and those of the present theory is in Emde's
belief that emotions derive from biological evolution and
genetic inheritance, in contrast with my assumption that the
schemas for emotions are acquired during development and
derive from cultural and subcultural sources. This
difference in assumptions has such a pervasive effect on the
tone of our respective theories that it might be possible to
overlook the underlying similarity.
Regarding Bowlby's (1969) account of emotion, the
similarity lies in our both viewing an emotion as relating
closely to a structured pattern of perception and action.
Terminology makes the similarity somewhat obscure. Bowlby
considers emotion to be the felt awareness of an unfolding
"behavior system"; in the present theory, the concept of
emotion is more inclusive, since the emotion is the
activated schema. In both views, though, emotion is based
on the activation of a pre-existing pattern, so the
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structure of the respective theories and the handling of
causation is similar.
As with Emde's theory, a major difference between the
present theory and Bowlby «s lies in the assumptions
regarding the origin of emotion. However, whereas Emde is
clear in his implication that emotions derive from evolution
and heredity, Bowlby allows for other possibilities. He
adopts Hinde's (1959) continuum between "environmentally
stable" and "environmentally labile" behavior systems,
instead of the more traditional distinction between innate
and acquired. Highly environmentally labile patterns
correspond to acquired behaviors, since behavior patterns
may be highly dependent on the environment in which an
organism is reared and lives, socially based behavior
patterns, as posited in the present theory, can in principle
be accommodated by Bowlby' s system.
Ego and Cognition
The role of the ego in the present theory has been
discussed in some detail, and the present section is
accordingly brief. In previous psychoanalytic
considerations, the ego in affect has arisen most often in
connection with cognition. Both Brenner (1974b) and Schur
(1969) focused on this issue. Although both these authors
were emphatic in their belief that cognition was essential
to affect, neither made a clear statement on the exact
209
nature of the relation. Brenner's examples carry a mixture
of implications, and Schur is limited to general references
to processes such as comprehension and evaluation. The
present theory shares the view that cognition, broadly
defined, is essentially involved in emotion. The account
here is more specific than those provided previously.
First, the ego processes considered here to underlie the
activation of emotion— i.e.
, the evaluation of the relevant
internal and external factors and the generation of a
possible adaptive integration of these in the form of an
episode of emotion—are cognitive in the same sense as other
forms of decision-making are cognitive. Second, the
intentional object of emotion has been emphasized here, and
this is a cognitive entity.
Another theme has run through psychoanalytic
commentaries on the relation of affects and the ego.
Numerous authors have stated or implied that affects can
come under the increasing domination of the ego. Freud
implied this in speaking of "normal" jealousy (Freud,
1922/1955) and in many other connections. Fenichel
(1941/1954) was explicit about this possibility, although
providing no theoretical account of it. Rapaport (1953),
too, was explicit about the possibility of affect being
"completely structural ized" , which meant that it no longer
resulted from movements of psychic energy and was thus under
the ego's exclusive command. In the present theory, emotion
210
is regarded as the exclusive province of the ego.
Nonetheless, the theory recognizes different degrees of ego
autonomy in emotion. m the previous section, the various
factors that may limit the ego's autonomy in activating
emotions were described. Under the conditions described
there, the ego is constrained to act as the agent of factors
over which it exercises little control. The ego in the
present theory is as Freud (1923/1961) described it-faced •
with an array of adversaries which are often its master, but
capable of expanding its autonomy through development.
Anxiety
Many specific topics could be taken up beyond the ones
discussed to this point. Two which have been of particular
importance are selected: anxiety, discussed in the present
section, and psychotherapy, discussed below.
Anxiety has been discussed in the psychoanalytic affect
literature more than any other single topic. Freud
repeatedly returned to it (Freud, 1895/1962, 1915/1957d,
1923/1961, 1926/1959, 1933/1964), and his final theory of
affect was in fact a theory of anxiety. Virtually all later
writers have given at least some consideration to anxiety,
and for several years in the early nineteen-f ifties anxiety
became almost the only issue addressed in the literature
(see Appendix) . This disproportionate attention can be
211
accounted for, in part, by the particular importance of
anxiety in neurosis, as a symptom itself and as a factor in
the maintenance of other symptoms (Glover, 1939). Another
factor has been Freud's extensive attention to it and his
changing views, which stimulated further debate. An
additional factor, though, is the special nature of anxiety.
In certain respects, anxiety is an anomaly among the
affective phenomena to which psychoanalysts have addressed
themselves, it has no evident object, the role of
expression is unclear, it is hard to distinguish decisively
from purely physiological phenomena, and it often seems
arbitrary or meaningless when compared with other affects.
In their discussions of the topic, analytic theorists have
wrestled repeatedly with these features of anxiety.
In keeping with its special nature, anxiety is not
considered an emotion within the present theory. Anxiety
does not conform, in a crucial respect, to the definition of
emotion employed here— it has no object, or its object is
incomplete and poorly defined. Anxiety is related to a true
emotion, namely fear. As the object of anxiety becomes
progressively better defined the state grows to resemble
fear, and eventually merges with this emotion. In other
words, to be anxious is be afraid without knowing of what
one is afraid or with what justification.
It might be argued that one often knows what one's
anxiety is related to. In one instance it might be an
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examination, in another it might be a stage performance, or
one could be anxious about a project or about an awaited
response to some project. I suggest that such situations,
insofar as they are more than simply part of the causal
conditions for the anxiety, can be viewed as rudimentary
object-precursors. To be nervous before a performance
implies little or nothing about what one might fear; one is
simply anxious about the performance, not afraid that one
will forget one's lines, miss cues, be received badly, etc.
As these objects are specified, the state is transformed
into fear.
An emotion-schema, once activated, exerts an organizing
influence, tending to construct perceptions and responses in
line with its own structure. In anxiety, this process does
not take place. The schema for fear is activated but
prevented from completing itself. Anxiety is thus another
of the affective phenomena which, like unconscious emotions,
are the result of disruptions in the process of constructing
an episode of emotion. One way this particular distortion
can be introduced into fear is through defensive processes.
This is the "neurotic anxiety" Freud (1926/1959) described.
Because of how intolerably threatening certain fears would
be, one stops short of the full construction of fear, which
would include the natural and well-defined object toward
which one's perceptions, impulses, goals, and needs lead.
In addition to defense, there is another basis for the
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distortion of fear into anxiety or the failure of anxiety to
develop into fear. The cognitive capacities necessary to
develop a complete and coherent emotion such as fear are
subject to disruption by any number of factors, principal
among which are psychotic disorganization and organic brain
deficits (dementia, head trauma, toxic delerium, etc.).
Anxiety is common when either of these conditions is
present, and this may be due to their interference with the
complex process of organizing an intentional object.
Psychotherapy
One hardly needs to argue the importance of emotion in
psychotherapy. Affect and emotion are integral to almost
every phase and aspect of psychotherapy. Affect is
virtually always involved in the reasons people seek
treatment, and patients and therapists both chart
therapeutic progress, or lack of it, by looking to the
feelings that brought the patient to therapy and new areas
of feeling that neither specifically anticipated. In
addition to being one of the goals of psychotherapy, affect
is among its tools. Although abreaction has long since lost
the place it held in Freud's original technique, affect and
emotion are critical in the practice of psychoanalysis and
psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
Despite the evident importance of the issue, the
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psychoanalytic affect literature has had relatively little
to say about affect in therapy. Periodically, theorists
have remarked on this omission (Brierley, 1937; Schafer,
1964), but affect theory has yet to attempt a thorough
account of affect in treatment. In recognition of this
state of affairs, a convention of the International Psycho-
Analytic Association was organized around the theme of
"affect in the psychoanalytic situation" (Green, 1977), but
so far the meeting has not stimulated sustained efforts in
this area.
To give a full consideration to emotion in psycho-
therapy would require a lengthy treatment. One would want
to provide a theoretical understanding of the accepted role
of emotion in therapy, but since no consensus exists on
exactly what this role should be, a full discussion of
emotion in therapy would itself have to take a position on a
wide range of issues in therapeutic technique and in the
theory of therapy. The effort would carry important
practical implications, perhaps so many that it would amount
to an advocacy of a new variant of psychoanalytic treatment.
In comparison with such a comprehensive treatment, the
present discussion must be relatively short. It aims only
to give an indication of the direction a full consideration
v/ould take.
Several topics within the broad area of emotion in
therapy suggest themselves for attention. On the one hand,
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there are issues relating especially to technique. Such
issues include the use by the therapist of the patient's and
his or her own affective changes to select and time
interventions, follow the course of the therapeutic
interaction, and so on. A related issue is the use of
affect, as it occurs both within and outside the therapeutic
sessions, as a guide toward insight. Other issues pertain
more to the outcome of therapy. Affective changes are among
the most important results of a successful therapy. These
include changes in the set of affects a person tends to
have—who does not want to feel better as a result of
therapy?—and perhaps, more subtly, the acquisition of new
emotions.
Turning first to the technical issues, we may ask how
affect guides the form and content of therapy. From the
present point of view, the central proposition is that
emotions represent the outcome of a complex integrative
process. If one assumes that this process has products
throughout its course, then there exist a wide range of
emotion-precursors, or emotion-fragments. Suc.i 2.. cities
are, so to speak, on their way to becoming emotions, but
have not yet reached that level of coherence or completion.
Anxiety is one such entity. A whole variety of feelings,
intuitions, fleeting affective convictions, moods, affective
memories, vague impulses, and so on, may be considered in
the same light. To be sure, a full account would require a
classification of these disparate phenomena as they relate
to emotion proper. For the present purposes the important
point is that there are many way-stations on the way to
fully formed emotion, consisting of some of the components
of emotion in partial integrations.
These partial integrations constitute developing
solutions to conflicts, or reflect steps in this process.
They may or may not be fully successful solutions, and they
may eventually be superseded, but they are in any event the
patient's current solutions. By following these feelings,
then, a therapist can gain an indication of what solutions a
patient is testing and how successful an integration he or
she has found. The therapist, of course, wishes to do more
than observe this process of developing solutions; he or she
attempts to contribute to it. One form these contributions
take is interpretation. Many interpretations involve
pointing to evidence of transference, which can be defined
as perceiving and responding to oneself and current figures
in one's life (including, of course, one's therapist) as
though they were reproductions of figures in unconscious
fantasies deriving from childhood. Emotions and emotion-
fragments are the best indicators of active transference
derivatives, since they integrate memories, self- and
object-images, actions, and dispositions to actions. Thus,
they provide crucial guidance to the therapist's efforts to
interpret the unconscious and to understand the patient's
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response to these efforts.
One important factor in formulating and delivering
interpretations is the therapist's empathy, which has been
defined as temporarily feeling the same feelings as the
patient currently feels, usually to a lesser degree, with
the motive of achieving a greater understanding (Greenson,
I960). Feelings provide such an important route to
interpretive understanding because they encapsulate so much.
The empathizing therapist c«n reconstruct the factors
entering into a feeling by following the patterns of
salience and attention (de Sousa, 1980a) in the feeling, as
well as the patterns of disposition to action and
expression. The reconstruction by the therapist amounts to
an understanding of the inner world of the patient at that
moment, which provides the basis for a transference
interpretation, when such interpretations are couched in
terms of feelings, patients are often readier to accept them
and find them more useful. This may be because referring to
a feeling implies an acknowledgment that the patient's
current solutions are, or at any rate were at one time, the
best he or she was capable of. Couched in this way,
interpretations can promote, in addition to insight, the
therapeutically useful self-acceptance which Schafer (1964)
aptly termed empathy with oneself.
The above considerations have reflected the principal
that feelings which emerge during therapy are not so much
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discovered as newly created. Discoveries are certainly
involved in therapy, and the "archaeological" assumption
that therapy uncovers a hidden but present reality (Spence,
1982) has a basis, but feelings in therapy can be best
understood as reflecting progressive integrations, in light
of this principal, it is natural that a patient's affective
life changes in the course of therapy, it is not that the
components of emotion are discarded during therapy, but
their integration is changed in ways that provide greater
freedom and effectiveness, or greater adaptiveness
, in a
broad sense (Schafer, 1964). m recent years there has been
a dispute over whether therapeutic change results from
awareness of the contents of the (infantile) unconscious or
from the creation of a coherent personal narrative,
integrating personal history and disov/ned impulses and
desires (Schafer, 1983; Spence, 1982). From the present
perspective, changes in affective life may reflect both
these processes simultaneously. In particular, new emotions
may appear that integrate, in consciousness, formerly split-
off desires and beliefs. Such emotions reflect greater ego
autonomy, not only in the awareness of formerly denied
material but also in the ability to incorporate infantile
desires and images into current activities, without being
controlled by them.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A theory has now been presented and some of its
implications spelled out. In this closing chapter,
reflections on the theory and its context are offered. The
theory is in an unfinished form; thus the "outline" in the
title. Further development will inv.x. ,th refinements
and new applications, and some preview of these can be • i
here. It is possible, too, to comment on the place this
theory occupies in psychoanalytic theory and practice.
Turning first to areas where refinements could be made,
one such area is definition of concepts. The principal
terms I have in mind are schema, prototype, and variant
instantiations of schemas. In the abstract, the
distinctions among these concepts are reasonably clear. A
schema is the template for all specific episodes of an
emotion; the prototype of a schema is the classic, ideal
episode of that emotion; and variant instantiations are
episodes of that emotion that depart significantly from the
prototype but not by so much that they are no longer
recognizable as that emotion. In practice, though, making
these distinctions is difficult, and never more so than when
one attempts to separate one emotion from another or
emotions from related entities. Anxiety presents these
problems. I have argued that anxiety is not an emotion in
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view of its lack of an object. Yet I have defined
intermediate cases, where anxiety becomes progressively like
fear, and finally may be transformed into fear. This
account raises the question of where the line between
anxiety and fear is to be drawn. The same issue is present
in separating any emotion from closely related entities, as
well as in distinguishing two related emotions.
The schema-concept forces one to deal with these
problems. One of the features of the schema-concept that
makes it useful for understanding emotion is that it
includes the concepts of prototypes and variants. Emotions
differ from one occasion, person, and setting to another,
yet are meaningfully and importantly classed according to
which emotion a given episode in an episode of. For
example, jealousy may differ in any number of v/ays from one
instance to another and still be jealousy (and still not be
envy, anger, or resentment). These distinctions of one
emotion from another are not post hoc discriminations; the
episode is a product of some central set of specifications.
If one is to accommodate these features of emotion, a
concept that describes variant instances of a central
pattern is required. But as soon as one adopts such a
concept, practical problems arise in defining the boundaries
of the category. In order to satisfactorily deal with these
problems, the present theory will need to return to the
literature of the schema-concept, where efforts have been
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made in this direction (e.g., Rosen & Mervis, 1975;
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
A related problem is how emot ion-schemas develop in the
useful forms I have described for them, and in particular
how it is that they alone, among affective entities, have
the property of actively organizing and assimilating
elements into a pattern. in the present account, emotion-
schemas actively construct emotional episodes, and this
property has been restricted to emotions proper (for
example, when it was argued that effort and vigilance are
required to defend against painful emotion, but not against
emotion-fragments). Since I argue that emotions have
greater adaptive potential than related entities, this
property of actively constructing episodes coincides with
the requirements for adaptive usefulness. An account of
this fact v/ould usefully refine the present theory. The
problem is at bottom the same one encountered by functional
sociologists and evolutionary biologists, namely, how do
practices, institutions, bodily organs, physical features,
etc., evolve in forms that meet the requirements of the
relevant situation?
Another avenue for extending the theory would be
through a more detailed account of the logical relation and
dynamic interaction between the ego and emotion-schemas.
Regarding the logical relation, it seems that emotion-
schemas must be described as structures available to the
lve
ego. They are part of the ego, in that they are at its
disposal and allied (for the most part) with its adapt
purposes, but a distinction is required between the sohema,
per se, and the part of the ego which activates it. It may
be that a distinction between an executive ego and its store
of adaptive tools would be suitable. In elaborating any
such a psychic anatomy, though, one would want to avoid
reification by keeping one eye, as it were, on the origins
of these concepts.
Regarding the dynamic interaction of ego (or executive
ego) and schemas, one might begin by noting that activity in
the construction of an emotional episode has been ascribed
to both the ego and the schema. The schema, it has been
said, guides the development of a suitable object for the
emotion, sets up dispositions to action and expression, and
guides interpretation of component responses as elements of
the whole. The ego has been described as instituting
specific details in emotional episodes, whether in the
process of defense, in employing emotions toward needs and
goals, or in incorporating the characteristics of the
external situation. Roughly speaking, the schema provides
the pattern and the ego fills it in. However, the
interaction has another dimension, as there is a tension
between emotions and the ego that is not entirely accounted
for by id and superego factors. At times, there is conflict
between the activities of the ego and of emot ion-schemas
,
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and the details of these conflicts could be profitably
explored
.
A particularly central area that remains to be given
sufficient attention is consciousness and emotion. The
exposition of the theory has led far afield from the aspect
of emotions that, for many, give them their claim on our
interest, namely, that they are feelings. The word
"feelings" defies definition (Schafer, 1976), but it is used
here only to point to the fact that emotions often occupy
consciousness or it least make their presence felt there,
and that this is basic to their common-sense definition.
Though this issue has received only passing attention to
this point, the foundation has been laid for a coherent
account of consciousness and emotion. First, active
emotions as defined here are always accessible to
consciousness; in psychoanalytic terms, they are conscious
or preconscious. Whether they remain only potentially
conscious or become conscious depends on whether there is
occasion for self-awareness during the course of the episode
or afterv/ard. Emotions have sometimes been defined as
conscious phenomena (Freud, 1915d) , but that is not the
route taken here. Instead, they are depicted here as
processes that may or may not receive the kind of reflective
attention that common sense calls feeling.
Although an emotion remains an emotion whether or not
it is conscious, consciousness is not an epiphenomenon with
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regard to emotion. On the contrary, there is every reason
to suppose that emotion and consciousness interact in
consequential ways, and most pertinently, that emotion is
changed when it becomes conscious. The details of these
changes, and the process through which they are effected,
would have much to tell us with regard to the action of
psychotherapy, the interpersonal negotiation of emotional
episodes, and many other issues.
It has been assumed here that emotion-schemas are
acquired in the course of development and derive from
sociocultural sources. Both these areas offer immensely
fertile ground for further study, studies of childhood
development of emotion have lacked a theory of emotion that
could properly accommodate their results (e.g., Pine, 1980),
since few previous theories, and no psychoanalytic ones,
have described emotions as true developmental products. A
constructive interplay could occur between the present
theory and such studies. An equally useful adjunct would be
considerations of the roles and genesis of emotions in
cultures and societies. If emotions derive from
sociocultural sources, they could not exist if they did not
serve social and cultural imperatives. The study of these
imperatives would do much to illuminate emotion, not only by
giving an account of their sources but by deepening our
understanding of their ultimate consequences. Moreover,
such investigations could contribute to the psychoanalytic
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recognition of social factors in the development and
functioning of personality (e.g., Kovel, 1982).
These are some of the refinements that could be
introduced into the present theory and a few of the
directions that further study could take. But what is the
significance of this theory for psychoanalysis? what role
might it play in psychoanalytic theory and practice?
Psychoanalysis continues to search for a satisfactory
theory of affect, and much turns on the result. First, good
theory can illuminate clinical material and orient the
therapist. It does not do so directly, for the most part.
A therapist does not rehearse the theoretical principles of
psychoanalysis as he or she listens to a patient, as a means
of developing clinically useful understandings. Theory
comes into play outside the therapeutic hour, in the
therapist's training and continuing reflection. Coherent
theory can gradually form the framework for one's listening,
and from that point it exercises a powerful influence over
the connections one draws and the significance one imposes
on material. Just as good theory can promote the treatment
process, bad theory can disrupt it. Incoherence in theory
contributes to incoherence in practice, and theoretical
reifications can distort the practice and goals of psycho-
therapy over the course of decades.
The present theory, I believe, avoids many of the
shortcomings of previous psychoanalytic affect theories.
IS
an
The relocations attendant on the concept of psychic energy
are, I believe, excluded. There is little danger, on the
basis of the present theory, of coming to regard emotion as
the outward manifestation of the vicissitudes of an elusive
quantity. As a result of the present emphasis on under-
standing emotions at the level of organizations, there
less danger of seizing on some particular fragment of
emotion and assuming it to be the essence, thereby losing
sight of many connections, m a clinical hour, one aspect
of an emotion may come forward at one point, and another at
a different point. A theory should support the clinician's
assumption that a complex but coherent whole is present, and
it should guide the elucidation of that whole and its
connection to other aspects of the patient's past and
present, in fact, it is up to a theory of affect to
highlight the many roles emotion may play in psychotherapy.
Few clinicians doubt that affect occupies a central role in
the process and outcome of psychotherapy (Arlow, 1977;
Valenstein, 1962), but at present psychoanalysis as a social
institution lacks a theoretical buttress for this intuition.
The present theory, with its emphasis on emotions as
attempted adaptive solutions distilling unconscious
contents, needs and goals, and current coping strategies,
offers such a framework.
P^odell (1973) has aptly referred to affects as the pre-
eminent route to psychoanalytic knov/ledge, and Rangell
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(1966) has characterized them as "the human core". There is
a glaring gap between these views of affect and the current
affect theories. Current theories are either rudimentary
(Brenner, 1974b) or see in affect a biological product
(Basch, 1976; Bowlby, 1969; Emde, 1980). These theories are
not commensurate with the task they face, which is to
accommodate the special psychoanalytic view of the person.
However important a role biological considerations may play,
this view is not guided by the logic of biological
mechanism.
Psychoanalysts have never been content to confine their
ef >rts to treatment, but continue to attempt to expand
knowledge about motivation, development, and "the workings
of the mind". Affect has been left by the wayside in these
efforts, because psychoanalysis has never had a way of
conceptualizing them which firmly connected them to the
issues of enduring interest. This is all the more true
since the demise of drive concepts, which despite their
problems could be essentially connected to affect theory.
The present theory is offered as a contribution tov/ard
integrating emotion into the central considerations of
psychoanalysis.
FOOTNOTES
1. James Strachey, editor of the Standard Edition of
Freud's work, assumed that Freud adhered to the discharge
view of affect throughout his writings until 1926 (Freud,
1926/1959), and that the energy in the unconscious was
considered from the start to be quality-less (see Editor's
appendix to Freud
r 1894/1962, pp. 66-68). Strachey's
reading is a minority one on this point, and it is not clear
KThat grounds he had fo; d«ying a change in Freud's thought.
However, it is true that even from very early, Freud
(1895/1966b) employed a concept of quality-less mental
energy (called "Q" for quantity). Thus, the shift in
Freud's views that was completed by 1915 was in the nature
of an integration of previously un-synthesized concepts.
2. Schafer (1976) and others have posed the question, to
whom or what is the ego signalling if it already recognizes
the danger? Schur (1953) proposed an elaborate model of
this, involving successive stages of recognition and
signalling. Freud, though, clearly had no such model in
mind. Rather, he seems to have divided the ego, in this
formulation, into two parts, one capable of signalling with
anxiety and the other capable of initiating defense. He
v/rote that the ego makes use of the anxiety signal to
mobilize the pleasure principle on behalf of defense. In
later terms, this meant that anxiety was seen as the motive
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for defense.
3. The death instinct has not arisen in the course of this
review of Freud's metapsychological writings on affect, it
Played little part in these writings. After Freud
introduced the death instinct his metapsychological
interests in affect were confined to anxiety. Insofar as
instinct and energy remained relevant to anxiety during that
final period of Freud's work, it continued to be libido that
Freud cited.
As far as other affects are concerned, Freud assumed a
close correspondence between the death instinct and hate
(Freud, 1923/1961). in contrast to love, which Freud
explored on several occasions, he subjected hate to little
study, regarding it essentially as destructive impulses
directed toward a particular person. The death instinct
also entered indirectly into Freud's account of guilt,
especially unconscious guilt. Freud held that the superego
is based in part on the death instinct, directed toward the
parents and then re-introjected (Freud, 1923/1961). The
"tension" between the ego and superego, on which guilt was
based, was derived from the energy of the death instinct.
4. There is a large philosophical literature on emotional
objects. Some representative v/orks are Gordon (1974),
Gosling (1965), Kenny (1963), and Wilson (1972). The
present discussion is drawn from Averill (1982) and Solomon
(1976).
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5. The superego, too, is considered to be based on
identifications. in Freud's account, the identifications
that help resolve the Oedipal complex form the superego.
6. The concept of the internal, psychological adaptiveness
of emotions is similar to de Sousa's (1980a) concept of the
"minimal rationality- of emotions. De Sousa argues that if
the context of consideration is sufficiently restricted,
emotions are always rational, which is to say that there is
always a context in which a felt emotion is reasonable and
optimal. De Sousa notes the parallels between his
conceptions and psychoanalytic principles (de Sousa, 1980a,
1980b)
.
7. One could attempt to press the account further by trying
to explain the
-pain" in the childhood situations. But all
explanations have to stop somewhere. Freud's lead—pain
reflects a certain accumulation of psychic energy— is not
appealing
.
8. Not all inappropriate emotions are explained in this
way. Many, perhaps most, are more simply the products of
ignorance, confusion, or some other limitation.
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APPENDIX
Many analytic considerations of affect had to be
omitted from the reviews in Chapter III. Following are
reviews of papers of particular interest or importance that
were judged not to relate directly enough to the concerns of
the dissertation to be included in the third chapter. Four
papers from the thirties and forties and one from the early
sixties are discussed first, in order of their publication,
after which is a summary of a debate over the theory of
anxiety, which turned on issues of psychology versus
physiology.
Franz Alexander
Franz Alexander's "The Logic of Emotions and its
Dynamic Background" (Alexander, 1935) appeared while
Alexander was engaged (with Thomas French) in investigations
of specific psychodynamic etiologies for psychosomatic
illnesses or "organ neuroses", in Alexander's term, in the
paper, Alexander describes emotions as adhering to a system
of logic, like rational thought. Fie argues that this logic
is intuitively obvious owing to repeated experiences of the
"causal relationships" between particular events and
particular emotions. Alexander calls the logic underlying
an emotional reaction an "emotional syllogism".
connections as "? hi!. ^ u self
~evident emotional
chin ?V . ate hlm ' because he attacks ne" tshall call emotional syllogisms. (Alexander? wS/p!
Alexander is inconsistent with regard to whether the
form of emotional logic is the same in conscious and
unconscious processes. At first he states "the fundamental
emotional connections which I call *the logic of emotions'
are about the same in consciousness and in the unconscious"
(P. 401), but shortly he describes unconscious emotional
logic as "strange", "primitive", and "archaic".
Alexander's concept of the logic of emotions is
essentially a re-statement of the common-sense view that one
feels an emotion in response to appropriate circumstances or
events. He contends that psychoanalysis makes "seemingly
irrational psychic process, such as neurotic symptoms,
accessible for psychological explanation" through the
reconstruction of unconscious emotional syllogisms (p. 400).
This is similar to Freud's inherent justification of emotion
view, which holds that an apparently anomalous emotion is
appropriate to some unconscious object. Alexander's
argument is that this view represents part of the the
essence of psychoanalysis.
From the "logic of emotions", Alexander turns to a
"vector-analysis of psychic processes" which has little
bearing on emotions per se. Alexander proposes three basic
"directions" in psychic processes-incorporation,
elimination, and retention-and relates unconscious
reasoning and reactions regarding such "tendencies" to
psychosomatic conditions. Although Alexander applies his
term "emotional syllogism" to these processes, no emotions
are discussed.
Marjorie Brierley
Marjorie Brierley's "Affects in Theory and Practice"
was mentioned in the review in the discussions of
metapsychology and the ego. The paper appeared in the
International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1937, having been
read before an International Congress the previous year.
Brierley was a British analyst, and as such was most heavily
influenced by Jones, Klein, Glover, and Joan Riviere. In
her paper, Brierley bids to restore "affects to a place in
theory more consonant with their importance in practice"
(Brierley, 1937, p. 257). Though Brierley's explicit
statements retain the primacy of instinct and of ego
development over affect, the thrust of her argument is
tov/ard a view in which instinct is of little real concern
and in which ego development is based on affects, rather
than the other way around. In these and other respects, her
paper anticipates the theories of W.R.D. Fairbairn, and of
Otto Kernberg. The paper is widely cited (Ende, 1980;
Glover, 1939; Green, 1977; Jacobson, 1953, 1971; Kernbero,
1976; Novey, 1959, 1961; Rapaport, 1953) and yet its impact
has been limited, it proposed a revolution, but the task of
carrying it out was left to others.
Brierley introduces her topic with the observation that
in the early days of psychoanalysis—the time of the
cathartic method-affect played the leading role in theory
as well as practice. However, by the time of her writing
affect had been almost completely eclipsed in the realm of
formal theory by the concept of instinct, while losing
little of its clinical importance. "Whatever differences of
opinion exist as to principles of technique, no analyst
fails to pay attention to his patient's feelings" (Brierley,
1937, p. 257). Affect, she writes, is primary in diagnosis,
prognosis, and in the process and criteria of cure. The
theoretical predominance of instinct is not consonant with
psychoanalytic practice.
Not only was the theoretical neglect of affect
discordant with its practical importance, but this neglect
had left the understanding of affect in a highly rudimentary
state. Analysts would agree, Brierley observes, that
affects are in the domain of the ego yet have "peculiarly
intimate" connections with instincts. Beyond this,
agreement or clearer knowledge v/as lacking.
Brierley then turns to the core of the new psycho-
analytic interests—the early development of the ego in
relation to objects, she gives an account of the role of
affect in early psychological development that closely
anticipates the account developed by Kernberg more than
three decades later. Brierley posits that ego-nuclei-
fragments of self-are formed in the infant when experiences
lay down memory traces. These experiences are affective in
nature, and the affect at this stage is a primitive form, in
which sheer sensation is prominent. Objects are involved in
two ways. The nature of the sensation-affect is determined
by the caretakers' responses to the infant, and the nature
of the psychic object formed in the experiences is
determined by the quality (good vs. bad) of the sensation-
affect.
Brierley states that whereas Freud conceived of this
early stage of development as that of the "body-ego", it is
better to conceive of the early ego as a series of "part-
body part-object nuclei". Thus, Brierley's hypothesis is of
a sequence of sensation-affect-object experiences that lay
down memories and subsequently begin to unify into fragments
of self, or as Kernberg would later describe them, self-
object-affect units. Of particular note in Brierley's
account is the postulated unity of sensation, affect, self,
and object, in which affect is the primary organizing given.
Affect is thus described as the foundation for all
development
.
Brierley's suggestion that there are many instincts,
each with its own affect, was noted in the discussion on
metapsychology in Chapter III. such a suggestion could only
have been made at a time of profound change in psycho-
analytic theory. The Freudian focus on instincts and their
vicissitudes was giving way, in theory and practice alike,
to different interests. For this reason, and also because
of the decline in Freud's dominance of the movement, the
definition of the essence of psychoanalysis was more open to
question than at any time before. Brierley and her
colleagues were in the process of founding the object-
relations approach, in which a focus on the early
development of the ego through interactions with real and
fantasied objects replaced instincts as the defining focus
of psychoanalysis. This new approach, with its new defining
focus, provided the basis for Rrierley's assumption of
multiple instincts. Only if psychoanalytic theory was
defined by something apart front dual instinct theory could
such a move be made.
In the remainder of her paper, Brierley touches on a
variety of issues raised by the theory she had advanced.
First, she notes that affects not only underlie ego
development but are influenced in turn by development. In
particular, as ego development proceeds through Klein's
phase of the "depressive position" with the development of
whole, coherent self and objects, enduring attitudes of love
and hate are formed. Brierley recognizes (as many analytic
theorists have not) that she is describing qualitatively
different phenomena under the general heading of affect, and
she proposes a classification scheme and terminology, she
suggests that the earliest sensation-affects, lacking
objects "in the adult sense", be distinguished by the term
"feelings". She suggests "emotions" as the term for affects
tied to objects. Finally, she correctly notes that love and
hate "are not in themselves emotions, but... are dispositions
to experience certain emotions about certain objects"
(Brierley, 1937, p. 264), and suggests adopting the term
"sentiments" from Shand (1914).
Edward Glover
In 1939, another British analyst, Edward Glover,
published a theoretical paper on affect, "The Psycho-
Analysis of Affects". Glover begins by describing
psychoanalysis as being in a "fallow period" in its
development, due to a relative neglect of affect.
Accordingly, he seeks to re-stimulate psychoanalytic
progress with a fundamental study of affect. Only if such a
study is added to the Kleinian investigations of "early
stages of ego organization [and] early ideational content"
(Glover, 1939, p. 299), he implies, will psychoanalytic
theory continue to move forv/ard.
Glover ascribes the neglect of affect to a variety of
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sources. These include the greater difficulty in
comprehending affects, as compared with ideas, and the
greater "subjective resistances" aroused by the study of
affect. He also cites the focus on anxiety, at the expense
of other affects. Finally, like Brierley (1937) before him
and Fenichel (1941/1954) after him, he notes that the study
of instinct— in particular, the "ideational derivatives" of
instincts—had supplanted interest in affects, despite the
fact that "tilt is to the actual dfiiisaiiMfi q£ iDstiosi-
Sii^SS [and not to the abstract concept of instinct] that v/e
must look for an explanation of mental behavior" (Glover,
1939, p. 300, emphasis in original).
A clearer understanding of Glover's objectives in this
paper can be gathered from an annotation he wrote for it
later (Glover, 1956). There, he describes his objections to
the practice, at the time the paper was written, of
attributing adult phenomena to infants. He suggests that
the attribution of adult affects to infants v/as a product of
the absence of mental contents, through which psychoanalytic
theorists v/ere accustomed to tracing developmental stages;
that is, without the guideposts of ideas, analysts fell back
on an assumption that what v/as present in adults v/as present
from the beginning of life. Glover argues that this
assumption cannot be sustained for affects any more than it
can be for ideas, and states that the purpose of the 1939
paper was to provide an example of a method for deducing the
nature of an infantile affect. He describes the method as
one of drawing deductions from metapsychology and
"psychobiological possibility-
, and then refining and
extending these through an examination of clinical evidence.
Glover's turn to the "primary affects" of infancy
carries the implication that it is through an understanding
of the earliest, and thus the most basic, affects that
knowledge can be gained of their nature and significance.
Since earliest experience cannot be directly studied, Glover
reasons, the nature of primary affects must be deduced
through one or several classification schemes derived from
metapsychology. He notes, with varying degrees of approval,
several such possible bases of classification. "Pleasure
vs. pain" he rejects as too simple to have much value.
Somewhat more promising is classification with respect to
instinct or component instinct. (In this connection, Glover
draws a striking equivalence between physiological processes
and instinctual energy, linking affective experience and the
"distribution" of libido and aggressive energy among body
organs, and tracing both to sensory stimulation and the
action of the sympathetic nervous system.) Glover cites
with still more approval the classification of affects
according to whether they are "simple" or "compound", and
argues for the importance of differentiating mixture,
fusion, and simultaneous experience of different affects.
Finally, however, Glover rejects these candidates for basic
classification in favor of a distinction between tension
affects and discharge affects.
In the remainder of the paper, Glover develops a
hypothesis of an early, basic tension affect. He refers to
a broad variety of clinical phenomena, derived from
conditions including hysteria, depression, and psychogenic
impotence. In reviewing these phenomena, he equates
sensations of tension, the metapsycholog ical concept of
tension, and unconscious fantasies of fullness and bursting.
He concludes that the original essence of this affect is a
"psychic feeling of disruption", which progressively assumes
different forms during the course of development.
Glover concludes with a comparison of his tension
affect with Jones' concept of aphanisis, which it closely
resembles. Glover states that his tension affect is a
developmentally earlier, more basic entity. It is doubtful
that Jones would have accepted this claim, as he believed
aphanisis to be the earliest and most fundamental affect.
Gregory Zilboorg
One of Gregory Zilboorg' s papers was reviev/ed in the
discussion of defense and affect in Chapter III. Another of
his papers, "Affects, Personal and Social", was read before
the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1944, and it was
published the following year. The tone of the paper is
remarkable. Unlike the great majority of theoretical
psychoanalytic papers, it is written in a vigorously
polemical key. zilboorg 's motive in writing the paper seems
to have been an urgent impulse toward social commentary,
together with a desire to comment on—decry, in fact—the
dominant trends in psychoanalyt ically informed social
thought. The theory of affect was apparently a secondary
concern, a vehicle for treating other issues, and Zilboorg
gives less attention to affect than to his other concerns.
When he does turn to affect, it is not clear that the
phenomena he discusses are actually affects rather than
related entities.
In this paper, Zilboorg seems to be responding
primarily to the psychologizing of society, which he
maintains is rampant in psychoanalytic social thought and in
psychoanalytically informed sociology. He criticizes models
of society which are based on the individual, objecting that
these models fatuously assume that the v/orkings of social
structure are based on identical principles as the
psychological or biological functioning of an individual
person. He argues that society operates on entirely
different principles, particularly cultural and economic
ones, and that therefore the comprehension and amelioration
of social ills such as "inequality, hatred, crises, and
slavery of man at the hands of man" (p. 45) cannot proceed
along psychological lines.
Zilboorg has much criticism to offer of previous social
psychology, accusing Freud of "flagrant mistakes" in the
area and describing pre-Freudian social psychology as
subjective and psychologically naive, when he points to
Marx as a much undervalued and inadequately understood
source of social analysis, and one begins to suspect that
Zilboorg was becoming more disturbed by the injustices and
philosophical shortcomings of liberal humanism, of which
psychoanalytic theory was a part, as he witnessed the
vanquishing of fascism in Europe. That is, as the end of
the enormous social evil of Nazi ism came into view,
socialists—and Zilboorg' s citations of Marx and adoption of
some central Marxian tenets makes one suspect he was
sympathetic to socialism at that time—may have looked with
renewed alarm at the injustices and distortions in
democratic societies, which had subdued fascism and which
would prevail afterward, at least in the West.
Zilboorg, it becomes clear, had deep misgivings about
the dominant trends in his ov/n and other societies, and
about the forces that control the functioning of societies.
When he describes social affects (which are really
sentiments, or complexes of attitudes and tendencies to
experience affects) , he points to such phenomena as
persecution of outgroups, idealization of unrealistic goals
and of leaders, and abstract love of fellow members of the
group or class combined with rigid intolerance of deviance.
He argues that these phenomena establish that societies do
not function on the basis of libido, at least not in its
mature (genital) form, contrary to Freud's position (Freud,
1921). Personal affects, on the other hand, Zilboorg
considers to be based on libido, a position he justifies
only scantily.
Pegarding the question of what social affects are based
on, if not on libido, Zilboorg proceeds in two directions.
On the one hand, he states that social affects, and
therefore the functioning of society, derive from aggression
and from "partial" or "pregenital" instincts. This, he
maintains, accounts for the pr imitiveness and
destructiveness of society, and for its hostility to loving,
concrete mutuality. On the other hand, he states that
social affects spring not from instinctual sources at all
but from "the cultural, economic determinants which capture
the psychobiological apparatus of man" (pp. 42-3).
Zilboorg' s purview in this paper is sweeping, and is in
exhilarating contrast to the typical psychoanalytic
theoretical discussion. But despite his title, the paper's
strengths are not in the theory of affect. In particular,
Zilboorg does not address a central question, one which,
given his Marxian interests and his appreciation for
distinct levels of organization, one might have anticipated
he would discuss. This is the question of the role of
social structure and the principles that organize it in the
formation of affect. Zilboorg discusses only the influence
in the converse direction, namely the ways that affects
organize both the individual and society.
Samuel Novey
Samuel Novey wrote two papers on affect, of which only
the second is discussed here. In this paper, Novey (1961)
brings together affect and object representation, which had
been another interest of his (Novey, 1958). His central
points in this paper are that affect plays a critical role
in object representation, and that cognition and affect are
intermingled in object representation and in all other
mental phenomena as well.
Much of the paper is taken up with an elaboration of
the concept of object representation, which Novey (1958) had
drawn from Melanie Klein and w. p. D. Fairbairn, while
rejecting many of their views. He compares his view of
object representation to the psychological theory of
"apperception", citing Murray (1938), among others. Novey'
s
view of object representation is that it consists of
interpretations of the concrete behavior of real people, as
these interpretations are remembered and organized. Novey
emphasizes that all responses to people, and thus all
personality structure (which is based on internalizations of
others)
,
depend on such subjective interpretation.
Affect is so much involved in these interpretations,
Kovey (1961) maintains, that it predominates over cognition
in the content of object representations. Not only does
affect control the content of representations as they are
acquired, but it controls the form taken by them at any
given time.
Novey was the first writer after Brierley (1937) to
underline so forcefully the intimate connection between
affect and object representation. Unfortunately, he does
not go beyond a statement of the importance of this
connection to a theoretical account. His discussion is
limited to a series of observations concerning the frequent
interaction of subjective interpretations of people,
intrapsychic conflict, and emotion. In effect, he advocates
a change in psychoanalytic theory but does not offer a way
to carry it out.
The Anxiety Controversy
In the early fifties, there appeared a series of papers
dealing with the issue of "automatic" anxiety and the
concomitant issue of Freud's "anxiety-neurosis". The
contradiction between the psychological formulation of
anxiety as a response to perceived danger (Freud, 1926) and
the physiological concept of automatic anxiety could no
longer be ignored, and several attempts were made to resolve
it, with varying degrees of success. The issue derived its
urgency from the centrality of anxiety in psychoanalytic
theory and from the deep divergence between the two views of
anxiety; the dispute involved the question of whether
psychoanalysis was a biological or a psychological
discipline.
In Inhibition, Symptom, and Anxiety, Freud had
overturned his discharge theory and had entirely altered the
psychoanalytic picture of anxiety, where previously,
anxiety had been an "automatic", quasi-physiological
reaction, it became a psychological appraisal of danger,
carried out by the ego. The earlier theory was not entirely
abandoned by Freud, however, and was maintained by some
followers (e.g., Wilhelm Reich). Analytic theorists were
thus faced with two formulations of anxiety, one in harmony
with Freud's neurological, physiological model, the other a
product of the psychological model and an indication of its
growing predominance in psychoanalytic thought.
Elizabeth Zetzel, in "Anxiety and the Capacity to Bear
It" (1949) , advanced a dual scheme that accommodated both of
Freud's conceptions. Zetzel attributed anxiety to mounting
instinctual tension, in harmony with Freud's early work.
She distinguished between primary and secondary anxiety.
Primary anxiety is the direct consequence of tension that
has risen beyond a certain threshold which is
constitutionally given. Such anxiety characterizes infants,
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adults in a traumatic state, and adults who fail to develop
and tolerate secondary anxiety. The latter type of anxiety
is a signal of an "internal danger situation",
prototypically a rise in tension (i.e., impulse), it
requires maturity of the ego, and offers crucial adaptive
advantages
.
Zetzel gives the example of facing an examination.
Secondary anxiety, she writes, offers alertness, vigilance
to misleading questions, and heightened mobilization of
intelligence. Primary anxiety leads to disorganization,
confusion, and finally panic. The scheme parallels
Fenichel's (1941) distinction between primitive and tamed
affects, with the difference that Fenichel portrays affects
as a raw source, much like instincts, which the ego
confronts and tries to tame, whereas Zetzel describes
secondary anxiety as a product of the ego, created by it for
its own purposes over the course of development.
Zetzel's most significant departure from Freud's
conceptions is in her view of the role of biology in
secondary anxiety. Freud had little to say on this, and one
assumes that biology was of relatively little importance in
his concept of signal anxiety. Zetzel, however, emphasizes
the biological origins of secondary anxiety, and finds in
secondary anxiety most of the "unequivocally purposive"
psychological and physiological components of fear. She
mentions the "fight-flight" response, and implies that
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secondary anxiety, despite its appearance relatively late
individual development, is an inherited adaptive response—
what Freud would have called "instinctive" as distinct from
" instinctual"
.
Charles Brenner, in a paper delivered in 1950 and
published later in adapted form (Brenner, 1953), argued
vigorously that Freud's concept of automatic anxiety, and
the related clinical entity anxiety neurosis, could not be
supported. He asserted that Freud's evidence for automatic
anxiety—the association of anxiety with "unsatisfying"
sexual practices and the "unanalyzability" of the anxiety in
these cases—had been fallacious. He reviewed the
literature on traumatic neurosis in war and peace, and
concluded that it supported a view of neurotic anxiety as
dependent in all cases on the mobilization of unconscious
conflicts, never directly caused by the vicissitudes of
"excitation". He urged the abandonment of any concept of
automatic (physiological) anxiety, and proposed instead to
regard anxiety as "an emotion (affect) which the
anticipation of danger evokes in the ego" (p. 22) . He
denied that this emotion, and by implication any emotion,
could exist in infancy—the state that other theorists had
considered infantile anxiety (Spitz, 1950) Brenner argued
could only be considered global unpleasure, a precursor to
anxiety and other unpleasant emotions, which depend on
memory, sensory perception, and other cognitive functions.
Abram Blau, in "In Support of Freud's Syndrome of
Actual' Anxiety Neurosis" (Blau, 1952), did not refer to
Brenner's paper but said anxiety neurosis was being widely
thought of as "an obsolete concept". Blau's purpose was to
re-assert the existence of anxiety neurosis as a clinical
entity distinct from "functional psychoneurosis" and
psychosis. Blau believed that "actual neurosis, a
physiological or physiopathological reaction" (p. 363) was a
real clinical entity, and that Freud's original description
of it was correct,
Blau's definition of anxiety neurosis diverged from
Freud's, however. Freud defined it entirely on the basis of
its etiology; anxiety neurosis was anxiety with no
analyzable psychological source and caused by physical
factors, specifically unsatisfying sexual practices. Blau's
definition is initially obscure. At the outset of the
paper, he indicates he v/ill adhere to Freud's view, and one
anticipates he will follow early Freud in distinguishing
anxiety with psychological and physical causes. A series of
examples of proposed subtypes of anxiety neurosis including
reactions to trauma, childhood conduct disorders and "habit
disorders", and psychosomatic disorders suggests that Blau's
concept of anxiety disorder was broader than Freud's and
based on different principles.
In the end, it is difficult to know with certainty what
Blau's definition of anxiety neurosis was. It seems to have
been equivalent to anxiety itself, with the added
complication that he believed anxiety could take many forms.
He regarded anxiety as "biological".
In essence, anxiety is a form of emotion and a naturalbiological phenomenon. To some degree it occurs at
various times in all people. At root, it is a
physiological visceral response to a counterbalance
threats to the basic economy of the organism. (p. 369)
Blau's central thesis may have been that psychoanalysts deal
frequently with symptoms that represent an automatic
response, unmediated by psychological conflict.
The clearest insight into Blau's conceptualization is
offered by his recommendations for treatment of anxiety
neurosis as compared with treatment of conflict-based
psychoneurosis
.
In therapy each requires a diametrically different
approach. For the psychoneurosis, psycho-analysis is
indicated, while the actual anxiety neurosis needs some
reality change either by the direct use of the
transference relationship or an alteration of the
environment. (p. 371)
For unconscious conflict, Blau made the familiar
psychoanalytic prescription of insight through analysis.
For anxiety neurosis, and for anxiety in the context of a
psychoneurosis, he considered insight irrelevant. A change
in the environment or, failing that, some form of
reassurance and support were the pertinent measures. Blau
went on to apply standard psychoanalytic formulations about
anxiety to anxiety neurosis (e.g., that anxiety neurosis
should be kept at an optimum level in analytic sessions)
,
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demonstrating that he regarded anxiety and anxiety neurosis
as equivalent, and saw both as automatic, physiological
processes.
Schur's "The Ego in Anxiety" (1953) did not take
Freud's two views of anxiety as its main focus, but it
included a detailed assessment of them. Schur noted Freud's
inability to integrate his anxiety theories.
Freud's difficulty was to reconcile his new findings
with his old theories and clinical observations, his
new approach to anxiety as a psychological problem with
his previous "biological" anxiety theories. (Schur,
1953, p. 85)
Schur denied that Freud's earlier theory of anxiety as the
direct "toxic" conversion of libido was viable, and pointed
to internal contradictions and the absence of a plausible
physiological mechanism. He remarked on the "tenacity" with
which Freud held on to the early view. He then went on to
argue that Freud's clinical observations, which Freud had
advanced to support the toxic view of anxiety, could be
accounted for by the signal theory, if one added to it the
concept that frustration of instinctual wishes produces a
danger situation, to which the ego responds with the anxiety
signal. Schur's advocacy of the signal theory was with one
proviso; Schur, like Rangell (1955), objected to the concept
of the ego "producing" anxiety, since anxiety is experienced
passively. He argued that the ego could create danger
(e.g., through fantasy) as a means of causing a modest
amount of anxiety, which could then be used as a signal.
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The early 1950's group of papers on anxiety concluded
with three papers published as companion pieces in the 1955
volume of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association; two of these papers (Rangell, 1955; Zetzel,
1955) had been read in a symposium on anxiety the previous
year.
Zetzel (1955) returned to her topic of 1949, but did
not bring her distinction between primary and secondary
anxiety into her discussion. The attributes she had divided
between primary and secondary anxiety in 1949 appear
together in her 1955 version of the concept. She reviewed
Freud's changing views, and took his final view of anxiety
—
as a response to a "danger situation"—as the starting point
for further discussion. She cited some recent biology,
particularly Cannon and Selye, emphasizing the location of
the concept of anxiety at the "borderline" of psychology and
physiology and suggesting that psychoanalytic and biological
formulations converge in this area.
Instead of her earlier distinction between primary and
secondary anxiety, Zetzel (1955) proposed to make the
distinction in terms of the ego's development rather than in
the nature of the anxiety itself. When the ego is
sufficiently mature, anxiety (an automatic, more or less
biological response to a large variety of dangers) can be
used by the ego as an indication that some coping measures
are warranted.
Rangell (1955) focused on the dual views of Freud, and
he announced in his subtitle ("A Statement of a Unitary
Theory") that he intended to synthesize them. He reviewed
the recent literature arguing the existence of actual
neurosis and automatic anxiety, and the overlapping question
of whether infants experience true anxiety. He then
proposed his own view, which was that anxiety is always a
reaction to some kind of danger, which was to say, it always
has psychological content and is never "automatic" in the
sense in which the term was being used. Rangell denied that
infants experienced anxiety, calling their response to
unmanageable overstimulation "unpleasure"
. He called the
theory "unitary" because he felt he had included the
essential element of anxiety neurosis under the heading of a
"dammed up state", which he described as occurring when
there is an excess of input and restricted possibilities of
output. In the dual theory, according to Rangell, this was
thought to lead automatically to anxiety, which represented
a conversion of the excess energy. In Rangell 's view, the
anxiety in this situation was like anxiety in any other
situation, a signal that a danger was present— in this case,
the danger that helplessness v/ill continue or worsen.
In the remainder of the paper, Rangell addressed the
relation of his views to current theory of instinct, affect,
and ego. He largely rehearsed familiar formulations. He
felt that anxiety at moderate levels was consonant with the
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work of the ego, but had a disorganizing effect at high
levels, and that a strong ego was able to "tame" anxiety.
Consequently, he felt anxiety was a more predominantly
disruptive force early in life. He had denied that anxiety
is a conversion of energy, but inexplicably felt obligated
to discuss the "energy source" of affects; here he produced
the novel notion that the energy for affects is derived from
a pool of energy associated with instinctive defensive
behavior patterns. Regarding the connection with instinct
in the typical Freudian sense (libido and aggression)
,
Rangell agreed with Freud's (1926) final view, that anxiety
tends to appear in conjunction with high states of
instinctual tension because such states represent various
dangers, not because the tension spills over into anxiety,
so to speak.
Rangell (1968) later returned to this topic, devoting
his entire presidential address to the American
Psychoanalytic Association to the issue of Freud's dual view
of anxiety. He reiterated his "unitary" view, repeating
that anxiety neurosis as Freud described it is a genuine
clinical syndrome but that it is not caused by a different
mechanism than ordinary anxiety. Pangell repeated at
greater length his argument that "trauma" (i.e., an
unmanageable influx of stimulation, a concept of enormous
generality, encompassing events from an infant's mother
leaving the room to a threat of death in battle) constituted
danger, and that therefore anxiety in traumatic situations
represents a warning like anxiety in other situations.
In this later paper, Rangell also emphasized that
signal anxiety is "automatic". In the literature on
anxiety, "automatic" and "signal" anxiety were contrasted,
but Rangell argued that this contrast ignored the fact that
anxiety is experienced passively; he objected to speaking of
the ego actively "producing" anxiety, and argued that all
anxiety is "automatic".
The third of the three 1955 papers (Flescher, 1955),
despite its title, "A Dualistic Viewpoint on Anxiety", has
little to say about Freud's two views. Flescher 's purpose
v/as to advance a view of anxiety as a direct derivative of
an instinct (as in Freud's earlier view), but of the
aggressive instinct, not the libidinal one. Since Flescher
argued that anxiety derives solely from aggressive energy
(specifically, aggressive energy dammed up due to
environmental or internal prohibitions) , one is left
uncertain about why he calls his viewpoint "dualistic". The
term seems to refer to the simultaneous involvement of
libido and aggressive energy in anxiety; the anxiety itself,
though, Flescher held to proceed directly from aggressive
energ ies
.

